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A NATURAL LAW DEFENSE OF BUCKLEY V. VALEO
Jack B. Sarno*




By most accounts, philosophy departments and law schools are pay-
ing renewed attention to the natural law.2 Contemporary natural law
theorists have provided sophisticated accounts of practical reasoning
that have significantly contributed to contemporary moral debate.
Although the natural law tradition, also referred to as the "perfection-
ist tradition,"4 dates back to Aristotle,5 it has proved timeless enough
to weigh in on fundamental modem debates over the inviolability of
* I am grateful to Eugene Harper, adjunct professor, Fordham University
School of Law, for his helpful instruction and comments. This Note is written, as the
Jesuits say, ad majorem Dei gloriam.
1. See Saint Thomas Aquinas, On Law, Morality, and Politics 263 (William P.
Baumgarth & Richard J. Regan eds., Hackett Publishing Co. 1988) [hereinafter On
Law]; Aristotle, The Politics and the Constitution of Athens 1278b19-20 (Steven Ev-
erson ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) [hereinafter Politics].
2. See Robert P. George, Recent Criticism of Natural Law Theory, 55 U. Chi. L
Rev. 1371, 1372 (1988) (remarking that natural law theory has "again found an audi-
ence in the secular academy") [hereinafter Recent Criticism]; see also Steven D.
Smith, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essaiys, 10 Const. Comment 489, 490
(1993) (book review) (observing that recent natural law scholarship has provided
"new vigor to academic thinking on this subject"); Kevin M. Staley, New Natural Law,
Old Natural Law, or the Same Natural Law?, 38 Am. J. Juris. 109, 109 (1993) (assess-
ing the "renewal" of natural law theory in the works of Germain Grisez, John Finnis,
and Joseph Boyle). The "natural law" generally refers to the universal moral law that
man can discover by reason. See Black's Law Dictionary 1026 (6th ed. 1990).
3. See, e.g., John F'mnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980) [hereinafter Nat-
ural Law and Natural Rights]. For a review of Natural Law and Natural Rights, see
Ruth Gavison, Natural Law, Positivism, and the Limits of Jurisprudence: A Modern
Round, 91 Yale L.J. 1250 (1982) (book review); Philip Soper, Legal Theory and the
Problem of Definition, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1170 (1983) (same).
4. The "perfectionist tradition" refers generally to the "argument extended
through time" that law and politics play a valid role in making citizens virtuous. See
generally Robert P. George, Making Men Moral 19-21 (1993) (hereinafter Making
Men Moral] (describing the perfectionist tradition).
5. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1134b18-20 (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett
Publishing Co. 1985) [hereinafter Ethics) ("One part of what is politically just is natu-
ral, and the other part legal."). Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) claimed that the law should




human rights,6 the justice of so-called "morals legislation,"7 and the
doctrine of unjust laws (lex injusta non est lax).'
Perfectionist theory has frequently had the most impact in the area
of contentious social issues.9 This disparate impact, however, should
not obscure contemporary natural law theory's potential influence in
all matters of human thought, choice and action. Modern partisans of
the perfectionist tradition have presented comprehensive theories of
political morality and human well-being that address more than just
so-called "hot button" issues." The natural law equips citizens and
legislators to respond effectively and reasonably to any moral
question."
The natural law theory that this Note outlines in the pages that fol-
low, and part II in particular, is not original. After all, the natural law
is a "tradition" as much as it is a political theory or a school of
thought."2 It is a "tradition" because adherents of the natural law,
while squabbling internally on several interpretive points, generally
6. See Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 223-26 (noting that natu-
ral law theory, unlike utilitarian theories practiced by many governments, protects
absolute rights).
7. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 71-82. "Morals legislation" refers to
laws that proscribe so-called private or victimless immoral conduct such as assisted
suicide, euthanasia, dissemination and use of pornography, abortion, adultery, and
homosexuality.
8. See Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 351-66. The unjust law
doctrine holds that positive law that is contrary to the requirements of the common
good and practical reasonableness imposes no moral obligation on the citizen. Id. at
359-60.
9. See, e.g., John Finnis et al., Nuclear Deterrence, Morality, and Realism (1987)
[hereinafter Nuclear Deterrence] (addressing modem warfare); John Finnis et al., The
Rights and Wrongs of Abortion [hereinafter Rights and Wrongs] (addressing abor-
tion) (1974); John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," 9 Notre Dame
J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 11 (1995) [hereinafter Law, Morality and Sexual Orientation]
(addressing homosexuality); John Finnis, "The Value of Human Life" and "The Right
to Death": Some Reflections on Cruzan and Ronald Dworkin, 17 S. I11. U. L.J. 559
(1993) (addressing assisted suicide and euthanasia); Robert P. George & Gerard V.
Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 Geo. L.J. 301 (1995) [hereinafter
Marriage and the Liberal Imagination] (addressing homosexuality); Robert P. George,
Making Children Moral: Pornography, Parents, and the Public Interest, 29 Ariz. St.
L.J. 569 (1997) (addressing pornography); Robert P. George, Public Reason and Polit-
ical Conflict: Abortion and Homosexuality, 106 Yale L.J. 2475 (1997) (addressing
abortion and homosexuality); Lawrence Solum et al., Euthanasia, Morality, and the
Law, 30 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1465 (1997) (addressing assisted suicide and euthanasia).
10. For a natural law explanation of bankruptcy law, see Natural Law and Natural
Rights, supra note 3, at 188-93.
11. See Robert P. George, Natural Law and Civil Rights: From Jefferson's "Letter
to Henry Lee" to Martin Luther King's "Letter From Birmingham Jail," 43 Cath. U. L.
Rev. 143, 144-45 (1993) [hereinafter Natural Law and Civil Rights]. This Note defines
"moral" in the broadest possible sense. As Germain Grisez notes, "Every political
issue is a moral issue to the extent that society's common good and justice towards
individuals and groups are at stake." See 3 Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord
Jesus: Difficult Moral Questions 824 (1997).
12. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 19.
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agree on certain fundamental matters. 13 Natural law theorists openly
build upon and reshape the work of their perfectionist predecessors. 14
St. Thomas Aquinas, for example, interpreted and expanded upon Ar-
istotle's work and provided the critical link between ancient and mod-
em natural law thought.15 Contemporary perfectionist theorist
German Grisez borrows extensively from Aquinas's theory.', John
Finnis, in turn, acknowledges that components of the ethical theory he
advances in Natural Law and Natural Rights are "squarely based" on
his interpretation of Grisez's work.17 Robert George's recent book,
Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality, adds to these
contributions by presenting the natural law tradition in the modem
parlance of civil liberties.'" Whereas these prolific scholars have al-
ready articulated the principle components of general natural law the-
ory, this Note will apply the theory to a current "moral" debate-the
ongoing effort to reform the federal campaign finance laws.
Specifically, this Note will advance a perfectionist defense of Buck-
ley v. Valeo.'9 Buckley is the seminal case on the campaign finance
question and one that is roundly criticized by legal commentators and
politicians who advocate stricter campaign financing. 2° The criticism
of Buckley and the advocacy of stricter campaign financing has its
philosophical roots in the "liberal" tradition.2 ' This Note, therefore,
will illuminate specific differences on campaign finance policy, as well
13. Id.
14. See id at 19-20.
15. Aquinas's (1225-1274) influence on western philosophical thought should not
be understated. See On Law, supra note 1, at xi, xiii, xxi. His works include the unfin-
ished Summa Theologiae, the Sentences of Peter Lombard, commentaries on Aris-
totle's Ethics and Politics, the Sunmna Contra Gentiles, and On Kingship (De Regno).
Id. at xx. He initiated the medieval revival of classical Greek philosophy. The
Church made him a saint in 1323. Id. at xiii. In 1879, Pope Leo XIII ushered in a neo-
scholastic revival in the seminaries by calling for a Church-wide return to Thomism.
See Thomas Guarino, Before the Papacy, First Things, Apr. 1998, at 39 (reviewing
Rocco Buttiglione, Karol Wotyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became John Paul
II, which discusses Wojtyla's philosophical upbringing and recounts the encyclical of
Pope Leo XIII (Aeterni Patris)).
16. See Germain Grisez, The First Principle of Practical Reason. A Commentary
on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2, 10 Nat. L. F. 168 (1965). Signif-
icantly, Grisez interpreted Aquinas to mean that, contrary to the neo-scholastic natu-
ral lav interpretation, man properly evaluates moral choices by their conformity to
reason and not human nature. For a more detailed discussion of this interpretation,
see infra note 259 and accompanying text.
17. Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3. at vii.
18. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 190. In Making Men Moral, Professor
George contends that perfectionist theory is consistent with modem notions of plural-
ism and individual rights. See id.
19. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
20. See infra note 145-152 and accompanying text.
21. See Ronald Dworkin, The Curse of American Politics, N.Y. Rev. of Books,
Oct. 17, 1996, at 19 [hereinafter Curse of American Politics]. For a discussion of Pro-
fessor Dworkin's liberal theory of political morality and its implications on campaign
finance laws, see infra part I.C.
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as the broader and deeper philosophical differences between the per-
fectionist and liberal traditions."2 Only through what philosophers re-
fer to as "practical reasoning" can a citizen or a legislator decide
whether the Buckley decision is sound and whether to support the
latest efforts to enact new campaign finance restrictions.23
22. Contemporary liberal political theory can be roughly divided into at least
three schools of thought. Some liberals adopt John Stuart Mill's utilitarian political
theory. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 14 (Currin V. Shields ed., 1956) (1859) [here-
inafter On Liberty] (stating that he "regard[s] utility as the ultimate appeal on all
ethical questions"). Under Mill's utilitarianism, decisions are evaluated and rights are
granted with a view to the greatest benefit to society as a whole. See id. at 13. Natural
law theorists criticize utilitarian liberals for assuming that one can decide among in-
compatible options by weighing the amount of "benefit" each choice would realize.
For a discussion of this incommensurability thesis, see infra notes 292, 324, 331 and
accompanying text. Other liberals adopt the course that Mill explicitly rejected: de-
termining moral questions with reference to the idea of "abstract right." See On Lib-
erty, supra, at 14. These theorists argue that one or more abstract principles dictate
that certain individual rights exist irrespective of their utility to society as a whole. See
Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 83-84. For example, liberal theorist Ronald
Dworkin bases his theory on an abstract right to equal "concern and respect." See
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 199 (1977) [hereinafter Taking Rights Seri-
ously]. Under this theory of political morality, the government has no business regu-
lating affairs with a view to a particular moral or religious conception of the good life.
See Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 191 (1985) [hereinafter A Matter of Prin-
ciple]. For the natural law critique of Professor Dworkin's theory, see infra part II.E.
Other liberals eschew Professor Dworkin's "procedural liberalism" in favor of a phi-
losophy that does not require the government to be neutral among the conceptions of
what constitutes the "good life." See Michael J. Sandel, The Constitution of the Proce-
dural Republic: Liberal Rights and Civic Virtues, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 2 (1997).
Under Professor Sandel's civic republican theory, it is proper for politics and law to
instill certain civic virtues in the members of the political community so that they can
"share in self-rule." See id. at 3. Natural law theorists concur with civic republicans
that the state plays a "formative" role in promoting certain virtues. See id. at 20 (not-
ing that civic republicans and natural law theorists both criticize procedural liberalism
on its requirement that the state avoid the promotion of any conception of the good
life). Natural law theorists, however, ask why law and politics should merely promote
certain civic virtues and not any other sort of virtue. See id. at 19 (natural law profes-
sor Eugene Harper querying Professor Sandel on why, given the formative nature of
his project, he does not more fully embrace Aquinas and other natural law theorists).
23. This Note does not presume that all, or even any, natural law theorists will
share the conclusions reached in this Note about the campaign finance laws. At the
very least, however, this Note provides a method for legislators and citizens to ap-
proach these questions, even if a particular legislator or citizen eventually reaches
different conclusions. These conclusions may be entirely valid, so long as they com-
port with the rules of practical reasoning. See infra part II.B-D for a description of
the requirements of practical reasonableness.
Critics often claim that the perfectionist tradition's premises yield rigid conclusions
and threaten liberty. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 76-78. Professor
George notes the irony in the criticism: "The legislator acting on the tradition's
premisses may, of course, make mistakes.... He may fall victim to his own peculiar
prejudices or to prejudices widely shared in his culture. The premiss he accepts, how-
ever, requires him to reason about the [decision.]" Id. at 77-78. Thus, a legislator
debating campaign finance reform who accepts the premises of this Note may none-
theless draw slightly different conclusions on precise questions of campaign finance.
In all cases, however, the tradition requires the legislator to provide public reasons to
justify his conclusions and, furthermore, to avoid non-rational impulses like bias or
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Part I presents an overview of the campaign finance debate as it has
played out in the judiciary, the scholarly journals, and the Congress in
the last twenty-five years. This part examines the relevant case law,
focusing primarily on the seminal Buckley decision. In addition, this
part will detail the latest reform effort by Buckley opponents in Con-
gress. Part II provides a general account of perfectionist theory as
outlined by contemporary natural law theorists-primarily John Fin-
nis, Germain Grisez, and Robert George.24 Part III then moves from
general natural law theory to identify and defend a natural law free
speech principle. Armed with this free speech principle and the rules
of practical reasonableness, a legislator can intelligently decide how to
vote on the campaign finance issue. Part IV contends that a legislator
who applies practical reasoning to this issue should conclude that the
major criticisms of Buckley are unwarranted. This part also applies
natural law principles to the latest campaign finance reform proposal
in Congress.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE DEBATE
This part will analyze the campaign finance debate as it has played
out over the last twenty-five years. Part L.A describes the federal law
that started the debate over campaign finance. Part I.B explains
Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court decision that nullified portions
of that law. The Buckley holding remains undisturbed by subsequent
case law despite a barrage of criticism from commentators and legisla-
tors. Part I.C discusses the philosophical roots of the criticism of
Buckley. Part I.D details the latest version of campaign finance "re-
form" sponsored by critics of Buckley in Congress. Although it has
been almost twenty-five years since Buckley, the campaign finance de-
bate has changed very little over the years.'
A. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and the 1974 amend-
ments thereto (collectively "FECA")2 6 sought to remedy the appear-
partiality in his reasoning. For a discussion of the natural law rules that guard against
unreasonable impulses, see supra part II.D.
24. Although these scholars, along with Joseph Boyle and other natural law theo-
rists, do not agree on all matters, they often collaborate and advance similar-enough
theories to be grouped together under the heading of "new natural law" theorists. See
Gerard V. Bradley and Robert George, The New Natural Law Theory: A Reply to
Jean Porter, 39 Am. J. Juris. 303, 303 (1994) [hereinafter A Reply]. For a brief discus-
sion of the primary philosophical debate between new natural law theorists and so-
called neo-scholastic natural law theorists, see infra note 259.
25. See Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of
Campaign Finance Reforn, 105 Yale LJ. 1049, 1050 (1996) [hereinafter Faulty As-
sumptions] (describing "longstanding agenda of the campaign finance reform
movement").
26. See Pub. L. No. 93-433, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§§ 431-56 (1994)).
1998] 2697
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ance of a corrupt political process in the wake of Watergate and tolevel the electoral playing field by reducing campaign costs. 27 UnderFECA, Congress (a) limited individual political contributions to anyfederal candidate in an election to $1000, with a total annual limita-
tion of $25,000 to all federal candidates by any single contributor;28(b) limited individual contributions to political committees to $5000per year;29 (c) limited contributions from registered political action
committees ("PACs") to a federal candidate to $5000;311 (d) limited
"independent expenditures"-expenditures not coordinated with the
candidate or his campaign-by individuals and groups "relative to a
clearly identified candidate" to $1000 per year;31 (e) limited total cam-paign spending by a federal candidate and his campaign organizationbased on a district-by-district formula;3 2 (f) restricted a candidate's
use of personal funds in his campaign;33 and (g) limited expendituresby political parties in connection with federal election campaigns.34 In
27. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-27 (1976) (per curiam) (stating the pur-
pose of FECA).
28. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A), (3) (1994). FECA also limits individual contribu-tions to national political parties to $20,000 per year. Id. § 441a(a)(1)(B).29. Id. § 441a(a)(1)(C). A "political committee" is any "group of persons which
receives contributions . . . or which makes expenditures aggregating in excess of$1,000 during a calendar year." Id. § 431(4)(A). The Supreme Court upheld the$5,000 limit on individual contributions to political committees in California MedicalAssoc. v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 184-85 (1981) (plurality opinion).30. See id. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A) (1994). A PAC (also referred to as a "multi-
candidate political committee") is an organization registered as a political committeefor at least six months, which has received contributions from at least 50 people andwhich has contributed to at least five candidates. Id. § 441a(a)(4). Contributions fromPACs to national political parties may not exceed $15,000 per year. Id.§ 441a(a)(2)(B).
31. See 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976). The BuckleyCourt found that this provision violated the First Amendment. See infra note 64 and
accompanying text.32. See 18 U.S.C. § 608(c) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976). The overallSenate campaign expenditure limits were based on a formula tied to the size of theapplicable state's voting population, with minimum amounts for sparsely-populated
states. Id. The overall House campaign expenditure limit was $70,000 for both pri-mary and general election campaigns, with a "carve-out" for thinly-populated states.Id. FECA indexed these expenditure limitations for inflation. See id. § 608(d). TheBuckley Court struck down this provision as a violation of the First Amendment. Seeinfra note 66 and accompanying text.33. See 18 U.S.C. § 608(a)(1) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976). This provi-sion limited expenditures from personal funds or the personal funds of his immediatefamily in each calendar year to $50,000 for Presidential and Vice Presidential candi-dates, $35,000 for Senate candidates, and $25,000 for most candidates for the Houseof Representatives. Id. The Buckley Court found this provision unconstitutional. Seeinfra note 65 and accompanying text.34. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d) (1994). In Senate elections and House races in stateswith only one representative, this provision prohibits spending by a state committee
of a political party the greater of $20,000 or $.02 multiplied by the voting age popula-tion of the state "in connection with" a federal campaign. Id. § 441a(d)(3)(A). In allother House elections, FECA prohibits the party from spending more than $10,000 onbehalf of the candidate. Id. § 441a(d)(3)(B). In the case of a presidential candidate,
2698
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addition, the law mandated public disclosure of all contributions
above a threshold level, in addition to other reporting requirements.35
Finally, FECA created both the public funding system for presidential
campaigns that exists today36 and the Federal Election Commission
FECA allows party expenditures in an amount not greater than $0.02 multiplied by
the voting age population of the United States. Id. § 441a(d)(2). The Supreme Court
recently held that the party expenditure restriction as applied to uncoordinated party
independent expenditures was unconstitutional. See Colorado Republican Fed. Cam-
paign Comm. v. FEC, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996). For a more detailed discussion of Colo-
rado Republican Fed Campaign Conun., see infra notes 89-106 and accompanying
text.
35. See 2 U.S.C. § 434 (1994). FECA requires all political committees to register
with the FEC, id § 433(a), to maintain records of all contributions received in a calen-
dar year, id. § 432(c), and to record any disbursements in excess of $200. 1i.
§ 432(c)(5). Political committees, including the authorized campaign committees of
federal candidates, must file periodic reports to the FEC detailing the amount of cash
on hand, id § 434(b)(1), the total amount of contributions and other receipts for the
reporting period and the calendar year, id. § 434(b)(2), the identification of contribu-
tors and other financial sources that contribute in excess of $200 in a calendar year, id.
§ 434(b)(3), the total amount of disbursements for the reporting period and the calen-
dar year, id. § 434(b)(4), and the names and addresses of recipients of expenditures by
the political committee that exceed $200. Id. § 434(b)(5)(A). Congress authorized the
FEC to conduct periodic audits of these reports. Id. § 438(b). Finally, FECA requires
every individual and group, other than a political committee or candidate, to file a
disclosure statement to the FEC with respect to independent expenditures that ex-
ceed $250 in a calendar year. Id. § 434(c).
36. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9042 (1994) [hereinafter Presidential Fund Act]. The Presi-
dential Fund Act induces presidential candidates of the major parties to abide by
certain funding restrictions in exchange for partial public financing. See id. § 9006.
The statute established three separate accounts to help subsidize certain presidential
campaign activities. These accounts are funded in the aggregate amount designated
by individual and joint taxpayers by the means of the voluntary dollar check-off sys-
tem. First, the Presidential Fund Act provides up to $4,000,000 for a major party's
presidential nominating convention, id. § 9008(b)(1), so long as the party's expendi-
tures do not exceed the dollar amount, id. § 9008(d)(1). and do not go for anything
but convention expenses. Id § 9008(c). Minor parties receive a portion of the major
party amount based on a ratio determined by party's vote count in the last election.
Id § 9008(b)(2). The statute indexes both amounts for inflation. Id. § 9008(b)(5).
Second, the Presidential Fund Act provides presidential candidates of the major par-
ties up to $20,000,000 for the general election and $10,000,000 for the primary elec-
tion-the amounts indexed for inflation beginning in 1976. See 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(b)(1)(A)-(B), 441a(c) (1994). The statute conditions these funds on the candi-
date's pledge not to spend amounts in excess of the amounts provided in section 9004
and not to solicit contributions except to the extent the fund is insufficient to finance
the full expenses. See 26 U.S.C. § 9003(b) (1994). Again, minor parties receive these
funds based on their performance in the last election. See id. § 9004(a)(2)(A). The
Presidential Fund Act prohibits personal expenditures in excess of S50,000, id.
§ 9004(d), prompting recent wealthy presidential hopefuls, Ross Perot and Steve
Forbes, to eschew public financing. See David Frum, An End to Money Grubbing:
Changing the Campaign Finance System, Wkly. Standard, Jan. 15, 1996, at 25, 26. Fi-
nally, the statute establishes a fund to help defray primary election costs. See 26
U.S.C. § 9037(a) (1994). If a presidential candidate raises at least S5,000 from at least
twenty states, counting only the first $250 of each contribution, id. § 9033(b)(3), and
abides by the spending limits in section 9033, the fund provides him with matching
funds according to a formula. See id. § 9034(a).
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("FEC") to administer and enforce the law.37 In sum, FECA set up
an unprecedented, comprehensive system of campaign finance regula-
tion that touched on all aspects of the federal election funding
process.
B. The Buckley Decision
Shortly after Congress enacted FECA, Senator James L. Buckley, a
conservative Republican from New York, Eugene McCarthy, a liberal
Presidential aspirant from Minnesota, and various political parties and
civil liberties organizations challenged most of FECA's major provi-
sions on First Amendment grounds.3 8
1. The Lower Court Decision
The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that FECA's major
provisions were unconstitutional and an injunction against enforce-
ment of the provisions.3 9 The federal district court for the District of
Columbia entered an order adopting certain findings of fact and sent
the case up to the Court of Appeals.40 On plenary review, the Court of
Appeals sustained FECA's provisions, holding that contributions and
expenditures involve "conduct" and only incidentally affect
"speech."'" The court analogized contribution and expenditure limi-
tations to the criminal prohibition against draft card burning that the
Supreme Court upheld in United States v O'Brien.4 2 In O'Brien, the
Court held that when activity, like draft card burning, involves both
speech and non-speech elements, a court should apply relaxed consti-
tutional scrutiny.43 In other words, a sufficiently important govern-
ment interest in regulating the non-speech element can justify
incidental First Amendment restrictions." The Court of Appeals
viewed contributions and expenditures as involving both elements of
speech and conduct. Following O'Brien, the Court of Appeals applied
lenient scrutiny and upheld all but one of the challenged provisions
37. See 2 U.S.C. § 437(c) (1994).
38. Petitioners included the Conservative Party of the State of New York, the Mis-
sissippi Republican Party, the Libertarian Party, the New York Civil Liberties Union,
the American Conservative Union, the Conservative Victory Fund, and Human
Events. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 8 (1976) (per curiam). Respondents included
the Secretary of the United States Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representa-
tives, in their official capacities, the United States Attorney General, and the Comp-
troller General of the United States. Id.
39. Id. at 8-9.
40. Id. at 9.
41. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (citation
omitted), affirmed in part and reversed in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
42. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
43. See id. at 376-77.
44. Id.
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based on the government's "clear and compelling interest" in preserv-
ing the integrity of the campaign finance system.45
2. The Supreme Court Decision
On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the O'Brien analogy.46 The
Court observed that even if contributions and expenditures could be
characterized as "conduct," these restrictions directly, and not just in-
cidentally, suppressed speech.47 In O'Brien, the Court conceded that
the government's interest was to preserve draft cards, and the sup-
pression of the symbolic speech was only incidental.4 By contrast, the
government's interest in regulating political contributions and expend-
itures "arises in some measure because the communication [or more
precisely, the quantity of communication] allegedly integral to the
conduct is itself thought to be harmful."'49
The Court concluded that FECA's contribution and expenditure
limitations imposed direct quantity restrictions on political speech.'
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend
on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces
the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues dis-
cussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating
ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money.Sf
The Court made clear that political spending is entitled to the highest
constitutional protection and that Congressional efforts to restrict
valid political spending must withstand strict scrutiny."2 This premise
has remained a foundation of the Court's campaign finance jurispru-
dence since Buckley. 3
Nevertheless, the Buckley Court did not find that contribution and
expenditure restrictions posed equal threats to the First Amend-
ment.' While the contribution restrictions involved only "marginal
restriction[s]" on an individual's ability to communicate, s the expen-
45. See Buckley, 519 F.2d at 841. The lower court struck down a reporting provi-
sion under section 437a as unconstitutionally vague. See id. at 843.
46. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (per curiam).
47. d at 17.
48. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
49. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382).
50. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 18.
51. Id. at 19.
52. See id at 17.
53. See infra Part I.B.3.
54. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23.
55. Id. at 20. The Court reasoned that a contribution serves as a "symbolic expres-
sion of support" for the candidate and his positions. Id. at 21. The communicative
value of a contribution, unlike an expenditure, does not "increase perceptibly with the
size of his contribution." Id. At most, the Court explained, the size of a contribution
is only a rough measure of the intensity of the contributor's support for the candidate.
Id. The Court cautioned, however, that "contribution restrictions could have a severe
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diture restrictions "substantial[ly]" restrained the total quantity of
political communication. 6 The government offered three rationales
to justify these restrictions: (1) to prevent corruption and the appear-
ance of corruption; (2) to equalize the relative ability of individuals
and groups to influence the election process; and (3) to control the
alleged "skyrocketing" costs of political campaigns, thereby opening
up the political process to those without large amounts of resources. 7
The Court found the government's interest in preventing quid pro quo
corruption compelling enough to justify the limitations on contribu-
tions from individuals and PACs." The Court reasoned that the con-
tribution limits were narrowly tailored provisions that served the
compelling purpose of deterring the practice of exchanging contribu-
tions for political favors and eliminating the appearance of a corrupt
political process. 9 Significantly, the Court found that the contribu-
tion restrictions did not appear to "undermine to any material degree
the potential for robust and effective discussion. 6
The Court viewed FECA's expenditure provisions with more suspi-
cion. In addition to limiting overall expenditures by candidates and
parties, FECA restricted "independent expenditures" by individuals
and groups "relative to a clearly identified candidate."61 In contrast
to the contribution provisions, the Court found it "clear that a primary
effect of [the] expenditure limitations is to restrict the quantity of cam-
impact on political dialogue if the limitations prevented candidates and political com-
mittees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy." Id. Statistics
indicated to the Court that the $1000 contribution limit would not have this adverse
effect. See id. at 21-22 & n. 23. In fact, courts have since struck down some state-
imposed contribution restrictions precisely on these grounds. See Carver v. Nixon, 72
F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995) (permanently enjoining enforcement of Missouri's $300 indi-
vidual contribution limitation to state candidates), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2579 (1996);
see aLvo California Prolife Council Political Action Comm. v. Scully, No. CIV.S-96-
1965LKKDAD, 1998 WL 7173, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 1998) (concluding that state
contribution limits unconstitutionally "prevent the marshalling of assets sufficient to
conduct a meaningful campaign"); see generally Note, William J. Connolly, How Low
Can Yo7u Go? State Campaign Contribution Limits and the First Amendment, 76 B.U.
L. Rev. 483, 486 (1996) [hereinafter How Low Can You Go?] (arguing that courts
should not engage in a technical "number's game" analysis when determining the
constitutionality of contribution limits because contribution limits do not substantially
burden free speech).
56. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39. The Court cited statistical findings by the district
court indicating that over 25% of the major-party Senatorial candidates spent more
than FECA would have allowed. Id. at 20 n.21.
57. Id. at 25-26.
58. Id. at 29, 35, 38.
59. See id. at 26-27. The theory is that, by limiting the amount one can contribute
to a candidate, the contributor and the candidate are less likely to enter into a corrupt
quid pro quo relationship. See id. One may question whether someone otherwise
disposed to bribery or other corrupt practices would be overly concerned with the
niceties of campaign finance laws.
60. Id. at 29. Finding the corruption rationale compelling, the Court did not ad-
dress the other two rationales with respect to FECA's contribution restrictions. See id.
61. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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paign speech by individuals, groups, and candidates. ' 'b 2 Unlike the
contribution provisions, the Court found that the government interest
in preventing corruption could not justify any limitation on expendi-
tures.63 In the case of "independent expenditures," the Court rea-
soned that this type of political spending did not present the same risk
of corruption as direct contributions to candidates-mainly because of
the absence of "prearrangement and coordination" with the candi-
date. 4 Nor could the corruption rationale justify the ceilings on per-
62. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39. For example, the Court noted that:
The plain effect of [the restriction on independent expenditures] is to pro-
hibit all individuals, who are neither candidates nor owners of institutional
press facilities, and all groups, except political parties and campaign organi-
zations, from voicing their views "relative to a clearly identified candidate"
through means that entail aggregate expenditures of more than SI.000 dur-
ing a calendar year. The provision, for example, would make it a federal
criminal offense for a person or association to place a single one-quarter
page advertisement "relative to a clearly identified candidate" in a major
metropolitan newspaper.
Id. at 39-40.
63. Id. at 45, 53, 55.
64. Id at 47. FECA treats controlled or coordinated expenditures as contribu-
tions subject to the $1,000, $5,000, and $25,000 limits. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A) (1994).
Thus, the Court rejected the argument that the independent expenditures limitation
was necessary to prevent otherwise-restricted contributors from circumventing the
contribution limits by directly paying for a candidate's media or other campaign ex-
penditures. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-47. This potential "backdoor" to quid pro quo
corruption is shut by FECA's broad definition of contribution, It. at 47.
The plaintiffs initially challenged the independent expenditure restriction as uncon-
stitutionally vague. Id. at 40. The provision prohibited expenditures "relative to a
clearly defined candidate during a calendar year which, when added to all other ex-
penditures . . . advocating the election of such candidate," exceeded S1,000. See 18
U.S.C. 608(c)(1) (1970 & Supp, IV 1974) (repealed 1976). The Court acknowledged
that the vagueness of the word "relative" could be construed to refer to expenditures
that "advocat[e] the election or defeat of [a] candidate." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39 (cita-
tions omitted). That interpretation, however, did not solve the vagueness problem
because the distinction between discussion of issues and advocacy' of electoral success
or defeat "may often dissolve in practical application" because candidates are -inti-
mately tied to public issues." Id. at 42. The Court found that the vagueness problem
could only be solved by interpreting the provision to apply only to expenditures on
communication that advocate the election or defeat of a candidate in express terms.
Id. at 44. In a footnote, the Court explained that the independent expenditure provi-
sion would only apply to communications that included the so-called -magic words"
of express advocacy-"vote for," "elect," "support." "cast your ballot for," -Smith for
Congress," "vote against," "defeat," and "reject." Id. at 44 n.52.
Although the Court solved the vagueness problem by setting up the express advo-
cacy test that figures prominently in later campaign finance cases, it nevertheless held
that the corruption rationale did not justify the re-interpreted independent expendi-
ture ceiling. IM. at 45. The distinction between express advocacy and issue advocacy is
significant, even if it did not ultimately determine the fate of FECA's independent
expenditure restriction. The Court applied this bright-line test to distinguish between
issue advocacy and express advocacy with respect to FECA's disclosure requirements.
See infra note 69. The net effect of the Buckley Court's application of the express
advocacy test to both provisions was to render issue advocacy---expenditures that do
not use explicit language to advocate the election or defeat of a candidate-entirely
immune from campaign finance regulation. This Note discusses the latest congres-
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sonal expenditures by candidates, the Court reasoned, because
candidates obviously cannot bribe themselves. With respect to the
ceilings on total campaign expenditures by candidates, the Court
found that given FECA's other corruption-preventing measures, like
the disclosure requirements and the contribution limits, the corruption
danger was not compelling enough.66
The Court's distinction between contribution limits and expenditure
limits has often been criticized by both sides of the campaign finance
reform debate. 67 Advocates of stricter campaign finance restrictions,
citing Justice White's dissent in Buckley, argue that corruption is a
compelling enough reason to uphold contribution limits and expendi-
sional attempts to regulate issue advocacy. See infra note 221-27 and accompanying
text. For criticism of these proposed regulations, see infra part IV.B.2.
Since Buckley, the courts have consistently applied the express advocacy test in a
variety of campaign finance contexts. For example, in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens
For Life, the FEC charged a non-profit corporation with violating 2 U.S.C. § 441b
because it had published a newsletter urging readers to vote pro-life. 479 U.S. 238,
241, 243 (1986). The provision at issue prohibits corporations from making direct
expenditures "in connection with any election to any political office." See 2 U.S.C.
§ 441 b(a) (1994). The Massachusetts Citizens For Life Court construed the definition
of expenditure in section 441b to not include issue advocacy. 479 U.S. at 248-49. The
Court went on to hold that the pro-life organization had engaged in express advocacy
but was immune from section 441b by virtue of the organization's purpose. Id. at 250-
51.
The lower courts have repeatedly applied the express advocacy test, often rebuffing
the FEC's repeated attempts to regulate issue advocacy. See, e.g., Faucher v. FEC, 928
F.2d 468, 472 (1st Cir. 1991) (striking down FEC regulations prohibiting voter guides
from expressing a position on an issue); FEC v. Central Long Island Tax Reform
Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (reading an express
advocacy requirement into the reporting requirements under 2 U.S.C. § 434e and
§ 441d); FEC v. Christian Action Network, 894 F. Supp. 946 (W.D. Va. 1995) (ruling
against FEC in a case involving advertisements critical of candidate Bill Clinton), affd
92 F.3d 1178 (1996). The Fourth Circuit later granted the Christian Action Network
attorney's fees due to the FEC's "bad faith" in bringing a merit-less issue advocacy
suit. See FEC v. Christian Action Network, 110 F.3d 1049, 1064 (4th Cir. 1997). One
court of appeals has accepted, to some degree at least, the FEC's expanded reading of
express advocacy. See FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 863-64 (9th Cir.) (applying a
contextual standard that arguably broadens the definition of express advocacy), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987).
65. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 53. As the Court stated, "[t]he candidate, no less than
any other person, has a First Amendment right to engage in the discussion of public
issues and vigorously and tirelessly to advocate his own election and the election of
other candidates." Id. at 52. The corruption rationale, the Court noted, is actually
weakened when the candidate relies on personal funds rather than outside contribu-
tions. Id. at 54.
66. Id. at 56. FECA supporters argued unsuccessfully that the expenditure limita-
tions were necessary to reduce the incentive to circumvent the contribution limits. See
id. The Court was unconvinced, however, that the "substantial criminal penalties for
violating the contribution ceilings" and the "[e]xtensive reporting, auditing, and dis-
closure requirements" were insufficient to deter illegal contributions. Id.
67. See Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amend-
ment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1045, 1063 (1985) [hereinafter
Money and Politics] (describing the distinction as having been "so severely criticized
that it may no longer support a different level of scrutiny").
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ture limitations.68 On the other side, Justice Burger argued that, in
light of FECA's disclosure requirements,69 the corruption rationale
was not weighty enough to justify restrictions on expenditures or con-
tributions.70 Nevertheless, the Court has maintained the distinction
between contributions and expenditures in subsequent cases.71
It is the Court's rejection of the other two rationales offered by
FECA defenders-to equalize influence in political campaigns and to
curb the alleged "skyrocketing" costs of elections-that has fueled the
68. Justice White would have sustained the expenditure limits. See Buckley, 424
U.S. at 261-64 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the
Court should defer to Congress's judgement that the danger of corruption warrants
contribution and expenditure restrictions). Many liberal commentators concur with
Justice White. See Andrew Stark, Strange Bedfellows: Two Paradoxes in Constitu-
tional Discourse Over Corporate and Individual Political Action, 14 Cardozo L Rev.
1343, 1347 n.11 (1993) (asserting that "few constitutional jurists and scholars" support
the distinction between contributions and expenditures). Cass R. Sunstein, Political
Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1390, 1395 (1994) [herein-
after Political Equality] (arguing that the distinction between contributions and ex-
penditures may be irrelevant).
69. The petitioners challenged FECA's disclosure requirements, see supra note 35
and accompanying text, as constitutionally over-broad as applied to minor-party and
independent candidates and to contributors of an amount as small as S1I or S101.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 60-61. The petitioners also challenged the disclosure require-
ment that applied to independent expenditures. Id. at 61. Although the Court ac-
knowledged the potential danger disclosure requirements pose to free association, it
found that FECA's disclosure requirements "serve substantial governmental inter-
ests." Id at 68. These interests include informing the electorate about the sources of a
candidate's financial support, deterring actual and apparent corruption, and providing
a means to detect violations of the contribution limits. Id. at 66-68. But, like the
independent expenditure provision, see supra note 64, the disclosure provisions posed
vagueness problems. In order to avoid the vagueness problems, the Court construed
"expenditure" for purposes of the disclosure requirements to include only express
advocacy. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80. Thus, pure issue advocacy that eschews the
"magic words" do not fall under FECA's disclosure requirements. See id. at 78-80.
70. See id at 241-44 (Burger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (com-
menting that, in failing to strike down contribution limits, the Court -ignores the rea-
sons it finds so persuasive in the context of expenditures"); see also Colorado
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 2325 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the distinction lacks -constitu-
tional significance"). For commentary that basically concurs with Justices Burger and
Thomas on this point, see Money and Politics, supra note 67, at 1064 (arguing that 'a
rule that accords less first amendment protection to contributions than to expendi-
tures severely infringes upon the right of association").
71. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Con.nL, 116 S. Ct. at 2315-16 (1996)
(plurality opinion) (characterizing challenged provision as an unconstitutional expen-
diture limitation as applied); FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. 238,
259-60 (1986) (citations omitted) (stating that "[w]e have consistently held that re-
strictions on contributions require less compelling justification than restrictions on
independent spending"); FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U.S. 480, 497 (1985) (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate FECA's S1,000 limitation
on a political committee's independent expenditures to support a presidential candi-
date who opts for public financing under the Presidential Fund Act). For further
discussion of the post-Buckley campaign finance case law, see infra part I.B.3.
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most criticism of the Buckley decision.72 With respect to the cost-cut-
ting rationale, the Court dismissed the notion that Congress has the
power to determine the proper amount of political spending in federal
elections. 73 On the contrary, the Court maintained that it is the peo-
ple-as individuals, candidates, associations and parties-that should
determine how much money is spent on federal election campaigns. 4
The equalization rationale offered by FECA's supporters fared no
better before the Court. There was little doubt that FECA "equal-
ized" each citizen's political influence by effectively lowering the
amount of permissible spending by all. The Court rejected the princi-
ple underlying the effort to level the playing field: "[T]he concept that
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in
order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
First Amendment, which was designed to secure the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources
.... "'I Thus, the Court recognized the danger of quid pro quo cor-
ruption and the appearance thereof as the only compelling rationale
for campaign finance restrictions. 76 Furthermore, even the corruption
rationale can not justify expenditure limitations.77
3. Subsequent Case Law
Despite a torrent of criticism,78 the Court, far from backtracking
from Buckley, has affirmed-and even expanded-its original ration-
ale.79 In Buckley, the Court invalidated FECA's restriction on in-
72. See, e.g., Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Pri-
mary, 11 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 273, 278 (1993) [hereinafter Wealth Primary] (calling
system created by Buckley "plutocratic and inegalitarian").
73. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57. The Court concluded that "the mere growth in
the cost of federal election campaigns in and of itself provides no basis for govern-
mental restrictions on the quantity of campaign spending and the resulting limitation
on the scope of federal campaigns." Id.
74. Id. at 57.
75. Id. at 48-49 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (citations omitted)).
76. Id. at 58-59.
77. Id.
78. See supra note 71 and infra note 150.
79. One area that has remained in flux is political spending by organizations in the
corporate form. Two years after Buckley, the Court struck down a law prohibiting
corporations from making independent expenditures in state referenda. See First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). The Belotti Court acknowledged the
government's compelling interest in preventing corruption from corporate expendi-
tures on elections. Id. at 788-89. Nonetheless, the Court held that the corruption dan-
ger did not exist in referenda, because there are no candidates for the corporations to
bribe. Id. at 789-90. Nor did the Court accept the argument that excessive corporate
spending in referenda should be curtailed because such corporate spending could un-
duly influence individual voters. Id. at 788-92; see also Citizens Against Rent Control
v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1981) (finding unconstitutional an ordi-
nance that limited contributions of political committees established to influence
referenda).
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dependent expenditures by individuals.' Nine years after Buckley,
the Court moved to protect the First Amendment right of PACs to
make independent expenditures in FEC v. National Conservative
Political Action Committee." In National Conservative Political Ac-
Yet, four years later, the Court seemed to contradict Bellotti in FEC v. National
Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197 (1982). In National Right to Work Conmmittee,
the Court upheld a provision that limited the persons that for-profit and nonprofit
corporations could solicit for contributions to the corporation's political committee.
Id. at 209-11. In upholding the restriction as it applied to both for-profit and non-
profit corporations, the Court recognized the compelling government interest in con-
taining corporate political spending. Id. at 210-11. The Court reasoned that the cor-
porate form grants state-created advantages which facilitate the formation of capital
and which could provide corporations with an unfair financial advantage in terms of
political advocacy. Id. at 207. The National Right to Work Conmnittee holding is incon-
sistent with Bellotti in its recognition of corporate corruption as a compelling reason
to restrict political spending.
Then, the Court seemed to move away from National Right to Work Committee in
1986 when it decided FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. 238, 259-60
(1986). In Massachusetts Citizens For Life, a nonprofit corporate advocacy group
spent over $9,000 from its general treasury to publish a newsletter urging readers to
"vote pro-life." Id. at 241-44. The FEC charged the nonprofit corporation with violat-
ing the FECA provision that prohibits direct corporate expenditures "in connection
with any election to any public office." 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1994). The Court, unlike
National Right to Work Committee, distinguished between nonprofit advocacy organi-
zations and for-profit corporations, finding that Massachusetts Citizens For Life "was
formed to disseminate political ideas, not to amass capital." Massachusetts Citizens
For Life, 479 U.S. at 259. The corporate corruption rationale did not apply to organi-
zations like Massachusetts Citizens For Life. First, the Court determined that the
purpose of the organization was to promote political ideas, thus ensuring that political
resources reflect popular support. Id at 264. Then, the Court noted that the organiza-
tion had no shareholders or others with a claim on its earnings. Id. Finally, the Court
found that the pro-life organization was not created by a corporation or labor union
and did not accept contributions from either. Id. The Court analyzed these three
factors-purpose of the organization, presence of financial affiliates, and potential
that the group is a mere conduit-and determined that the potentially-chilling FECA
provision could not withstand constitutional scrutiny as applied. Id. at 263-64.
Four years after Massachusetts Citizens For Life, the Court applied this three-part
test in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). In Aus-
tin, a nonprofit corporation challenged a state law similar to FECA which imposed
certain requirements on corporations that seek to influence politics. Id. at 656. The
Court held that the nonprofit corporation, unlike Massachusetts Citizens For Life,
failed to satisfy the three-part test and, thus, was not exempt from the statute's re-
quirements. Id. at 662-65. The Austin Chamber of Commerce failed the first prong of
the test by engaging in activities beyond the promotion of political ideas. Id. at 662-63.
Second, although the chamber of commerce had no shareholders, it did have mem-
bers who benefited financially by associating with the organization. Id. at 663. Finally,
unlike the pro-life association in Massachusetts Citizens For Life, the Court did not
view the chamber of commerce as sufficiently independent of for-profit corporations.
Id. at 664. The promising sign for critics of Buckley in these later cases seems to be
the Court's recognition that the corruption rationale encompassed not only the quid
pro quo variety, but the "distorting effects of corporate wealth" on the political pro-
cess. See Lisa Gordon, Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal
Election Commission: A Court Divided-One Opinion Properly Subjects Campaign
Finance Jurisprudence to a Reality Check, 81 Minn. L Rev. 1565, 1581 (1997).
80. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-51.
81. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
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tion Committee, the FEC sought a declaratory judgment against a PAC
based on the PAC's alleged violation of a provision of the Presidential
Election Campaign Fund Act that limited independent expenditures
to $1000 when a Presidential candidate accepted federal funding.82
The lower court denied the FEC relief, but did not hold the provision
unconstitutional because the PAC did not counterclaim on the issue.83
On appeal, the Supreme Court did not hesitate to hold the provision
unconstitutional. 84 First, the Court found that PACs-as organizations
of like-minded individuals-deserved full First Amendment free-
doms.85 Again making a distinction between contributions and ex-
penditures, the Court found that the corruption rationale was not
compelling enough to sustain the independent expenditure restric-
tions.86 The Court reasoned, as it did in Buckley, that independent
expenditures are, by definition, not coordinated with the candidate. 87
Most recently, the Court addressed whether FECA could constitu-
tionally restrict national, state, and local political parties from making
independent expenditures "in connection with" federal candidates. 88
The lower court narrowly interpreted "in connection with" to mean
those expenditures expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
candidate.89 Finding that the advertisement at issue did not contain
express advocacy, the lower court granted the political party summary
judgment.9" On appeal, the FEC urged the Court of Appeals to adopt
its broader interpretation of the party expenditure provision to cover,
not just express advocacy, but any "electioneering message" with re-
spect to a "clearly identified candidate."91 The Court of Appeals
agreed with the FEC's interpretation and ordered judgment against
the state party.92 The Supreme Court reversed and found the provi-
sion unconstitutional as applied.93
As an initial matter, Justice Breyer determined that the expenditure
at issue was indeed an independent expenditure that was uncoordi-
nated with the candidate, rather than a contribution.94 Dutifully fol-
lowing Buckley, he found that the party expenditure restriction
82. Id. at 482-83.
83. Id. at 484.
84. Id. at 501.
85. Id. at 494.
86. Id. at 496-97.
87. Id. at 497.
88. See supra note 34.
89. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 2314
(1996) (plurality opinion). For a discussion of the party expenditure limitation, see
supra note 34.
90. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 116 S. Ct. at 2314 (plurality
opinion).
91. See id. (plurality opinion).
92. See id. (plurality opinion).
93. See id. at 2314-15 (plurality opinion).
94. See id. at 2315 (plurality opinion).
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"significantly impair[ed] the ability of individuals and groups to en-
gage in direct political advocacy."9 Justice Breyer concluded that the
corruption rationale could not sustain the restriction on independent
party expenditures. 96 He rejected the notion that all party expendi-
tures are coordinated with the party's candidate and, therefore, poten-
tially corrupting.97 Justice Breyer noted that the legislative history of
the party expenditure provision demonstrated that Congress passed
the provision, not so much to prevent corruption, but because Con-
gress wanted to reduce excessive spending in campaigns.9 Thus, the
plurality found the provision unconstitutional as applied to independ-
ent expenditures,99 but did not decide the broader facial challenge to
the constitutionality of the restriction on party coordinated
expenditures. 10°
Justice Kennedy's opinion endorsed Justice Breyer's conclusion that
the party expenditure provision was unconstitutional as applied to the
state party's independent expenditures. 0 1 Justice Kennedy, however,
held that political party spending, independent or coordinated, could
never be considered "contributions" wvithin the Buckley framework:1 02
It makes no sense, therefore, to ask, as FECA does, whether a
party's spending is made "in cooperation, consultation, or concert
with" its candidate. The answer in most cases will be yes, but that
provides more, not less, justification for holding unconstitutional
the statute's attempt to control this type of party spending .... 103
Justice Kennedy viewed party expenditures as almost indistinguish-
able from expenditures by candidates, which Buckley granted full First
Amendment protection."° ' Finding that parties play a crucial role in,
among other things, selecting candidates and advancing candida-
cies, 10 he held that the party expenditure limitation substantially di-
minished a party's ability to engage in political discussion."°
Whatever the precise rationale, the Court has shown no inclination to
95. See id at 2315 (plurality opinion).
96. Id. at 2316 (plurality opinion).
97. Id. at 2317-19 (plurality opinion). "We are not aware of any special dangers of
corruption associated with political parties that tip the constitutional balance in a dif-
ferent direction." Id. at 2316 (plurality opinion).
98. Id. at 2317 (plurality opinion) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976) (per
curiam)). The Buckley Court did not recognize this rationale as compelling. See supra
note 73 and accompanying text.
99. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 116 S. Ct. at 2317 (plurality
opinion).
100. Id. at 2319 (plurality opinion).
101. Id. at 2321 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
102. Id at 2322 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
103. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
104. See id. at 2323 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
105. Id. at 2322.
106. Id. at 2323.
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upset the basic Buckley holding that gave substantial constitutional
protection to political spending.
1 7
C. Liberal Critique Of Buckley And Conservative Rebuttal
The Court, in Buckley and in subsequent campaign finance cases,
has consistently rejected the other rationales to justify campaign
spending limits-namely, the interest in equalizing the relative ability
of individuals and groups to participate in the election process and the
interest in reducing the amount of money spent in political cam-
paigns."a 8 It is this part of the Buckley holding that has arguably pro-
voked the most criticism, especially from those working in the liberal
tradition.109 Without much elaboration, the Buckley Court, as noted
earlier, rejected the equalization rationale, saying that the "concept
that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our soci-
ety in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to
the First Amendment.""' The Court dismissed the "too much
money" rationale because it held that Congress has no business deter-
mining how much money should be spent on politics."' At the heart
of the Buckley controversy, then, lies a fundamental disagreement
over principles: whether the "equal participation" principle is valid;'1 2
whether the people and not Congress should determine the amount of
money spent on politics;" 3 and whether it is proper to give full First
Amendment protection to political spending." 4
107. Justice Thomas provided the seventh concurring vote on the judgment, but
argued for a modification in Buckley to give both contributions and expenditures full
constitutional protection. See id. at 2330-31 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). He would have overturned that part of Buckley which held that
"[b]road prophylactic bans on campaign expenditures and contributions" are not nar-
rowly-tailored to the government's interest in deterring corruption. Id. at 2329.
Justice Ginsberg joined Justice Stevens in dissent, who considered all party expend-
itures "to secure the election of its candidate" as a "contribution" under FECA. Id. at
2332 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens found the limitation justified because
the close relationship between party and candidate creates the danger of the party
unduly influencing the candidate. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Secondly, the party
expenditure restriction serves to supplement other FECA provisions. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Finally, the dissent considers "leveling the electoral playing field" by low-
ering the costs of campaigns a compelling government interest. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
108. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 145-152 and accompanying text.
110. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam).
111. See id. at 48-49.
112. See infra Part IV.A.3 (defending the Buckley Court's rejection of this
principle).
113. See infra Part IV.A.4 (defending the Court's holding that the people as indi-
viduals, groups, parties, and candidates should determine the "proper" amount of
political spending).
114. See infra Part IV.A.1 (defending the full constitutional protection for political
spending).
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Some of the strongest criticism of Buckley has come from promi-
nent liberal political philosophers," 5 like Professor Ronald Dworkin,
who argue that the Court was indeed wrong to fully protect political
spending and wrong to reject the egalitarian rationale."l ' Professor
Dworkin argues that "money is the biggest threat to the democratic
process,"" 7 and, given the importance of money in contemporary
politics, the current system fosters political inequality.'", Conse-
quently, some citizens can speak louder in political campaigns than
others." 9 He explains:
[w]hen wealth is unevenly distributed and money dominates poli-
tics, then, though individual citizens may be equal in their vote and
their freedom to hear the candidates they wish to hear, they are not
equal in their own ability to command the attention of others for
their own candidates, interests, and convictions. '20
This right to equal political influence flows naturally from Professor
Dworkin's conception of a political democracy in which each citizen is
an "equal partner[ ] in a cooperative political enterprise." a1 2' Thus,
Professor Dworkin argues that the Buckley court erroneously rejected
the egalitarian rationale as not compelling.12- He presumably favors
current reform proposals that impose expenditure ceilings, eliminate
PAC contributions, and crack down on the spending of outside organi-
zations because these provisions would presumably reduce the
amount of money in politics, thereby equalizing each citizen's ability
to influence the political process. "'
Professor Dworkin's position on campaign finance is illustrative of
his larger theory of political morality. He argues that individual rights
should prevail even when the collective good would benefit by their
suppression. 24 Individual rights are not derived from considerations
of the collective good, or, indeed, from any conception of the
"good."'" The government, in Professor Dworkin's conception of
political morality, should remain "neutral" among the various concep-
tions of the "good."' 26 Individual rights are derived from an abstract
right to be treated by the government with "equal concern and re-
115. For a discussion of the liberal philosophical tradition, see supra note 22 and
infra notes 124-129 and accompanying text.
116. See Curse of Anterican Politics, supra note 21, at 23.
117. See id at 19.
118. Id




123. See id. at 21, 24 (suggesting a "straight legal ceiling on all campaign expendi-
tures by candidates or parties" or "any reasonable and effective device" to "circum-
vent" Buckley).
124. See Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 22, at 199.




spect.' 127 From this equality principle, Professor Dworkin can iden-
tify the traditional liberal rights to privacy and free speech, among
others. 128  In Professor Dworkin's basic theory, individual rights
trump the collective good. 29 Whereas the job of the legislature is to
promote the collective good, the judiciary's job is to protect individual
rights.130
According to Professor Dworkin, the First Amendment's guarantee
of freedom of speech means "the freedom to speak or publish when
denying that freedom would damage some other individual right that
free speech protects, or when it would impair democracy itself."'13
Focusing on the "impair democracy" prong of this free speech princi-
ple, Professor Dworkin identifies two conditions for a just democ-
racy. 132 First, the people as a whole must have the final authority over
their government. 133 The government violates this principle, for ex-
ample, when it censors certain speech to protect the government from
criticism or because the political opinion expressed "is less worthy or
more dangerous than any other.' 1 34 The second condition of a just
democracy is that each citizen must be able to "participate on equal
terms in both formal politics and in the informal cultural life that cre-
ates the moral environment of the community.' 3 This principle, it-
self derived from his underlying equality principle, would prohibit the
government from censoring neo-Nazis, pornographers, and flag-
burners. 136
Professor Dworkin argues that campaign expenditure restrictions
violate neither of these principles. Campaign finance restrictions do
not protect the government from criticism-in fact, Professor Dwor-
kin believes that tighter restrictions would help challengers. 137 More-
over, campaign finance limitations are content neutral. 38 Professor
Dworkin dismisses the argument that expenditure restrictions would
impermissibly diminish the overall quantity or diversity of the political
127. Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 22, at 273.
128. Id. at 266-78.
129. See id. at 199.
130. See id. at 88-89.
131. See Curse of American Politics, supra note 21, at 21.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id. Professor Dworkin cites to the Pentagon Papers Case as an example of
the U.S. Supreme Court properly applying this First Amendment principle. See New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (finding that
the United States could not justify enforcement of a prior restraint involving publica-
tion of classified materials).
135. See Curse of American Politics, supra note 21, at 21.
136. Id.
137. Id. This assertion has been challenged by those who argue, persuasively, that
further campaign finance restrictions would serve to further entrench incumbents and
immunize them, to some degree, from criticism. See infra text accompanying notes
508-513.
138. See Curse of American Politics, supra note 21, at 21.
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debate. 39 According to Professor Dworkin, today's debate largely
consists of negative television advertising. 40 He concedes that expen-
diture restrictions would reduce the ability of a candidate to broadcast
political advertisements,'41 but finds that this is no great loss because
the ads are "negative, witless, and condescending."' 4 2 After all, "the
curtailed broadcasts would almost certainly have repeated what the
candidate had said on other occasions."' 43 Furthermore, he asserts
that, even with expenditure restrictions, there is little danger that a
citizen could not discover the positions and background of any serious
candidate. 144
As noted above, Professor Dworkin's principal objection to Buckley
is the Court's ruling that the "equal political participation" principle is
"foreign" to the First Amendment.145 According to Professor Dwor-
kin, the Court erred by not recognizing that each citizen, in a just soci-
ety, must have "a fair and reasonably equal opportunity" to
participate in the political process. 46 In his view, campaign finance
reform would remedy the current problem of unequal influence.' 47
Professor Dworkin has formidable allies on the campaign finance
issue, including prominent newspaper editorial boards, ' 41 public
watchdog groups,'149 and many legal scholars' 50 and pundits.,-" In
139. Id. at 22.
140. See id. at 19.
141. Id at 22.
142. Id. at 19. For a discussion on the propriety of negative political advertising,
see infra notes 517-526 and accompanying text.
143. Curse of American Politics, supra note 21, at 22.
144. Id
145. See id. at 23.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 24 (suggesting that an overruling of Buckle) could usher in -a new
system of regulation" that might include banning political commercials during ordi-
nary programming and providing candidates with free television time).
148. See, e.g., Editorial, Thunder in the Senate, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1997, at A22
(describing the "abject corruption of the present campaign system").
149. Groups like Common Cause and the Center for Public Integrity have for a
long time advocated stricter campaign finance laws. See Buckley v. Valco, 519 F.2d
821, 834 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (citing advocacy groups. including Common Cause, per-
mitted to intervene), affirmed in part and reversed in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per
curiam); Tucker Carlson, Mr. Lewis's Center for Public Moralizing, Wkly. Standard
Feb, 12, 1996, at 25, 26 (citing efforts of Center for Public Integrity).
150. See Leslie Wayne, After the Election: Campaign Finance; Scholars Ask Court
to Backtrack, Shutting Floodgates on Political Spending, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1996, at
A30 (describing legal scholars' letter to Court urging overruling of Buckley). Much of
the published legal scholarship is hostile to Buckley and calls for a more restrictive
campaign finance regime. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Ott Campaign Finance Re-
forn: The Root of All Evil is Deeply Rooted, 18 Hofstra L. Rev. 301, 348-60 (1989);
Marlene Arnold Nicholson, Continuing the Dialogue on C'ampaign Finance Reform.
A Response to Roy Sciotland, 21 Cap. U. L. Rev. 463, 471-82 (1992); Jamin Raskin &
John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of Democrati-
cally Financed Elections, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1160 (1994); Wealth Primary, supra note
72; Political Equality, supra note 68; Fred Wertheimer & Randy Huwa, Campaign
Finance Reforms: Past Accomplishments, Future Challenges. 10 N.Y.U. Rev. L &
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often apocalyptic terms, this camp calls for "dramatic" campaign fi-
nance reform to end the allegedly corrupt influence of money in poli-
tics once and for all.' 52 This call has become louder as some shady
campaign practices of the 1996 campaign have been brought to
light.' 53
The opposing camp consists of a rather odd coalition of the
ACLU, 154 most Republicans,'55 a few noted legal scholars 56 and
outside political advocacy groups from both sides of the political spec-
trum.'57 This coalition raises both philosophical and practical objec-
tions to the liberal view of campaign finance reform. First, on a
philosophical level, this group is skeptical about any "reform" that
burdens the right of individuals, groups, candidates, and parties to or-
ganize and attempt to influence politics. 5 ' This camp objects to con-
Soc. Change 43 (1980-81); Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance
Reform: A Key to Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1126,
1149-57 (1994); J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First
Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 609, 625-42 (1982);
How Low Can You Go?, supra note 55.
151. See Albert R. Hunt, Waiting for the Really Big Scandal, Wall St. J., Mar. 12,
1998, at A19 (calling current system a "cesspool" and "legalized bribery").
152. See 144 Cong. Rec. S1046-47 (daily ed. Feb 24, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Glenn); Editorial, Campaign Finance Charades, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1998, at A16
(calling system "corrupt"). To this camp, campaign finance "reform" has always
meant something along the lines of campaign expenditure limits, the elimination of
contributions from PACs, a general tightening on the ability of "special interests" to
influence the process, and possibly some form of public financing in federal elections.
See 143 Cong. Rec. S9998 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (cit-
ing Democrats efforts over the last two decades to "limit spending and reduce special
interest influence").
153. See Editorial, Campaign Fact and Fiction, N.Y. Times, Oct 12, 1997, at 14 (cit-
ing evidence of illegal contributions and money laundering at Senate campaign fi-
nance hearings).
154. See 144 Cong. Rec. S916 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1998) (statement of Sen. McCon-
nell) (inserting letter from ACLU to Senator McConnell citing "grave concerns"
about speech-restricting provisions in McCain-Feingold).
155. See, e.g., 143 Cong. Rec. S10462 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Smith) (opposing the invocation of cloture on a version of campaign finance
restrictions).
156. See infra note 158.
157. See 143 Cong. Rec. S10359 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1997) (statement of Sen. McCon-
nell) (inserting article by James Bopp, Jr. citing the efforts of the Free Speech Coali-
tion). The Free Speech Coalition consists of issue-oriented organizations who have
little in common except their opposition to liberal campaign finance reform efforts.
The coalition ranges from the American Conservative Union, Fund for the Feminist
Majority, the National Rifle Association, the Coalition to Stop Gun Violence, abor-
tion rights groups, and the National Right to Life Committee. Id.
158. See 143 Cong. Rec. S10341 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1997) (statement of Sen. McCon-
nell) (expressing skepticism about the constitutionality of "McCain-Feingold's convo-
luted provisions [that] limit the speech of private citizens, groups, candidates and
parties"). Some legal scholars are sympathetic to the Buckley decision. See Lillian R.
BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, Intractable Dilemmas, 94
Colum. L. Rev. 1258 (1994) [hereinafter Specious Arguments]; Money and Politics,
supra note 67; Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Dilemma of Election Campaign Finance Re-
form, 18 Hofstra L. Rev. 213 (1989); David J. Weidman, Comment, The Real Truth
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tribution and expenditure limitations generally because these
regulations limit the quantity of debate and make it more difficult for
individuals, candidates, associations, and parties to disseminate their
message.1 59 From a more practical standpoint, this camp contends
that the 1974 campaign finance restrictions have caused many of to-
day's alleged problems with campaign financing." Strict campaign
finance restrictions simply make fund-raising more time-consuming
and corrupting. 61  Expenditure restrictions, for example, invariably
hurt challengers by not allowing them to raise the funds they need to
counter the built-in advantages of incumbency like name recognition
and free media opportunities. 62 Indeed, according to this camp, the
biggest myth in the campaign reform movement is that there is too
much money in politics.' 63 This coalition concurs with Buckley that it
is for the people-as individuals, groups, candidates, and parties-and
not the Congress to determine how much money is spent on
politics. 16 4
D. Legislative Debate
It is not surprising that the philosophical dispute over Buckley has
spilled over into the legislative arena. Legislators sympathetic to the
liberal tradition's egalitarian principles have tried numerous times to
About Federal Campaign Finance: Rejecting the Hysterical Call for Publicly Financed
Congressional Campaigns, 63 Tenn. L. Rev. 775 (1996) [hereinafter The Real Trth
About Federal Campaign Finance]; Faulty Assumptions, supra note 25.
159. See Mitch McConnell, The Money Gag, Nat'l Rev., June 30, 1997, at 36 ("The
reformers do not care or, in some cases, cannot accept that spending limits limit
speech.").
160. See Bradley A. Smith, Why Campaign Finance Reform Never Works, Wall St.
J., Mar. 19, 1997, at A19. Professor Smith explains that "since passage of [FECAl and
similar state laws, the influence of special interests has grown, voter turnout has
fallen, and incumbents have become tougher to dislodge. Low contribution limits
have forced candidates to spend large amounts of time seeking funds." Id. The pro-
Buckley camp generally argues that campaign finance reform invariably yields unin-
tended consequences. As one commentator notes, "limits on individual contributions
helped to increase the number of PACs; limits on hard money contributions stimu-
lated the proliferation of soft money contributions; and limits on contributions gener-
ally spurred the growth of independent expenditures." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political
Money and Freedom of Speedc, 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 663, 687-88 (1997) [hereinafter
Political Money].
161. See David S. Broder, Gingrich's Heresy, Wash. Post, Nov. 14, 1995, at A19.
Curtis Gans, author of a campaign study for the liberal Committee for the Study of
the Electorate stated that, "[tihe overwhelming body of scholarly research ... indi-
cates that low spending limits will undermine political competition by enhancing the
existing advantages of incumbency." Id The libertarian Cato Institute reached the
same conclusion. Id. For further discussion on the pro-incumbent effects of campaign
spending limits, see infra notes 508-514 and accompanying text.
162. See infra notes 509-509 and accompanying text.
163. See Broder, supra note 161.
164. See George F. Will, So, We Talk Too Much?, Ne%week, June 28, 1993, at 68
(lamenting that certain congressmen seek to "hack away at the Bill of Rights in order
to shrink the permissible amount of political discourse").
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get around or blunt the effects of Buckley. On more than one occa-
sion, congressmen frustrated with the Buckley holding have tried to
amend the First Amendment to give unprecedented power to Con-
gress to regulate federal election campaigns. 165
1. Past Reform Efforts
Indeed, the movement for a constitutional amendment is only one
chapter in the colorful and contentious history of campaign finance
reform. 66 For example, in the 100th Congress, the Democrats tried to
pass a reform bill consisting of a combination of taxpayer funding of
elections and spending limits. 67 Senate Republicans blocked the bill
by leading a record-breaking filibuster that survived eight cloture
votes.' 68 Then-Majority Leader Robert Byrd (D-W.VA.) at one point
during the debate directed the Sergeant-at-Arms of the Senate to
arrest absent Senators. 69
In the 101st Congress, the parties waged another fight over a tax-
payer-funded system of spending limits.' This time, the Senate
passed the bill. 7 ' The House of Representatives, however, did not act
on the bill before the legislative session ended and the bill died.'72
Democrats tried again in the 102nd Congress. After a bruising, week-
long floor fight, a typical reform bill passed the Senate. 7 3 This time,
the House passed a similar bill.'74 After each house hurriedly ap-
165. See Edwin Chen, Senate Votes Down Constitutional Amendment on Campaign
Spending, L.A. Times, Mar. 19, 1998, at A13 (reporting that the Senate rejected by a
vote of 38-61 a proposed constitutional amendment to give Congress the power to
enact spending limits); see also Will, supra note 164, at 68 (reporting a Senate vote
(52-43) on a resolution to amend the First Amendment to permit spending limits).
166. These reform efforts have almost all been efforts to, in one way or another,
add further restrictions to political contributions and expenditures. See 143 Cong.
Rec. S998 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997) (statement of Sen. Feingold) ("For the last 21
years. since [the Buckley] decision, Democrats have tried to overcome obstacles put in
place by that ruling."); Office of Senator Mitch McConnell, CFR Time-Line in Cam-
paign Finance Reform (available on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter
CFR Time-Line].
167. See 143 Cong. Rec. S998 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997) (statement of Sen. Fein-
gold): CFR Time-Line, supra note 166.
168. 143 Cong. Rec. S998 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997) (statement of Sen. Feingold);
CFR Time-Line, supra note 166.
169. CFR Time-Line, supra note 166.
170. Id.
171. 143 Cong. Rec. S998 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997) (statement of Sen. Feingold);
CFR Time-Line, supra note 166.
172. See CFR Time-Line, supra note 166.
173. 143 Cong. Rec. S998 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997) (statement of Sen. Feingold);
CFR Time-Line, supra note 166.
174. 143 Cong. Rec. S998 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997) (statement of Sen. Feingold);
CFR Time-Line, supra note 166.
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proved the conference report, President Bush dashed the hopes of the
reformers by promptly vetoing the bill.175
President Clinton's election in 1992 breathed new life into a spend-
ing limit proposal. After a month-long battle and several cloture
votes, the Senate passed a bill banning PAC contributions and impos-
ing a tax on candidates who exceed "voluntary" spending limits
and.'7 6 Late in 1993, the House approved a slightly different cam-
paign finance bill."7 Almost a year later, after intra-party squabbling,
Democrats finally appointed conferees in an attempt to resolve the
differences between the bills.'7 8 Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), a
staunch supporter of Buckley, shattered the Democrats' hopes by ob-
jecting to the appointment of conferees, normally only a formality.'79
Senator McConnell's unprecedented, round-the-clock filibuster even-
tually prevailed. 8 It was reportedly the first time in Senate history
that a Senator filibustered the appointment of conferees."8
2. The McCain-Feingold Bill
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997 ("McCain-Fein-
gold")1 2 is the latest attempt at campaign finance reform. All 45
Democratic Senators and 7 Republican Senators in the 105th Con-
gress supported the bill.' 8 3 Nevertheless, despite the overwhelming
support of editorial pages,1s4 pundits,as and public watchdog
175. See 138 Cong. Rec. S6417 (1992) (veto message of President Bush expressing
disapproval of campaign finance reform bill). The Senate failed to override the Presi-
dent's veto, 57-42. 138 Cong. Rec. S6586 (1992).
176. CFR Time-Line, supra note 166.
177. Id. The House bill provided for partial public finding to House candidates
who agree to abide by overall campaign expenditure limits. See Wealth Primary, supra
note 72, at 332.
178. CFR Tune-Line, supra note 166.
179. 143 Cong. Rec. S998 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997) (statement of Sen. Feingold);
CFR Time-Line, supra note 166.
180. See 143 Cong. Rec. S998 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997) (statement of Sen. Fein-
gold); CFR Time Line, supra note 166.
181. CFR Time-Line, supra note 166.
182. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997, S. 25, 105th Cong. (reintroduced
campaign finance proposal); Senate Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1995, S. 1219,
104th Cong. (original McCain-Feingold proposal).
183. Alison Mitchell, Deadlock in Senate Blocks Campaign Finance Reform, All
But Killing It for Year; Bill Lacks 9 Votes, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1998, at Al, A22. The
final tally on McCain-Feingold was 51-48 in favor of McCain-Feingold, nine votes shy
of the 60 needed to break a filibuster. Ld. Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), a supporter
of McCain-Feingold, was absent for the final vote. Id.
184. See, e.g., Editorial, McCain-Feingold, at Last, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23,1998, at A18
(characterizing Senator McConnell as the "chief obstructionist" of campaign finance
reform).
185. Some pundits even suggest that Buckley and the alleged corruption that en-
sued led to the recent lowering of the top tax rates on income and capital gains-an
unfortunate development to many political liberals. Scott Turow, The High Court's
20-Year-Old Mistake, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1997, at A15 (suggesting "that Buckley may
well come to be regarded as a sort of 20th-century stepchild to Dred Scott").
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groups18 6 in the wake of the 1996 election "scandal,"' 87 McCain-Fein-
gold's supporters could not get the requisite 60 votes for cloture.' 8
Although Senator McConnell proudly pronounced the bill "dead,"
supporters in the Senate vowed to introduce it at a later date. 8 9 The
House plans to take up the issue late in the 105th Congress and is
expected to consider proposals modeled after McCain-Feingold.190
Judging from the history of the legislative efforts to enact campaign
finance reform, McCain-Feingold, or some variation thereof, will re-
emerge-if not this year, then some following year. 191 McCain-Fein-
gold, as originally proposed and in later versions,' 92 is a typical exam-
ple of the type of reform bill that opponents of Buckley advocate. This
section will now turn to an analysis of McCain-Feingold's major
provisions.
186. See 144 Cong. Rec. H1523 (daily ed. March 25, 1998) (statement of Rep. Al-
len) (noting that Common Cause "has been leading the fight" for campaign finance
restrictions).
187. See David Johnston, Campaign Finance Measure Blocked in 2 Senate Votes;
Main Foe Says Bill is 'Dead': Clinton Lawyer is Subpoenaed on Tape Delay, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 8, 1997, at Al (reporting criticism of the Clinton re-election campaign by
chairman of the Senate committee investigating campaign finance abuses).
188. See Mitchell, supra note 183, at Al.
189. Id. Senator McCain vowed that, "We will not quit and we will prevail." Id.
190. Id. The House leadership initially attempted to avoid voting on the House
version of McCain-Feingold. See David Rogers, Gingrich in Reversal, to Allow Debate
On Changing Campaign-Finance Laws, Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 1998, at A2. Proponents
waged a campaign to compel a vote on the bill using a procedural device known as a
"discharge petition." Id. Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) recently agreed to schedule
a vote on the bill later in the session. Id. Despite this procedural victory, McCain-
Feingold nevertheless faces an uphill battle in both chambers. See id.
191. Editorial, Campaign Reform Has Nine Lives, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1998, at
A24.
192. Unless otherwise indicated, this Note will analyze the version of the McCain-
Feingold Bill that was placed on the Senate calendar on September 25, 1997. The
McCain-Feingold Bill that was initially introduced early in the 104th Congress bears
little resemblance to the McCain-Feingold Bill that the Senate most recently rejected
in February. Compare Senate Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1995, S. 1219, 104th
Cong. with the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997, S. 25, 105th Cong. Support-
ers dropped the voluntary spending limit provisions and the outright ban on PAC
contributions, as well as certain other restrictions, in an ultimately unsuccessful effort
to win more support. See 144 Cong. Rec. S830 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1998) (statement of
Sen. McCain) (offering an amendment to his original bill that contains a ban on soft
money and restrictions on issue advocacy, but no spending limits or PAC contribution
limits); McCain-Feingold, at Last, supra note 184 (noting that latest "compromise"
version had less draconian restrictions on issue advocacy than the previous vote in
October, 1997). Nevertheless, it is useful to analyze McCain-Feingold's original pro-
visions because they are illustrative of the approach to campaign finance that critics of
Buckley take.
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a. Expenditure Restrictions
The McCain-Feingold Bill's central provision would create a system
of voluntary spending limits in Congressional elections. 19 3 The provi-
sion induces candidates to comply with spending limits by granting
complying candidates a series of benefits and by penalizing non-com-
plying candidates.'94 A candidate who agrees to comply with the bill's
conditions would be allowed to spend anywhere from a minimum of
$950,000 to a maximum of $5,500,000, depending on the population of
the Senate candidate's state. 195 The overall spending provision would
prohibit the Senate candidate from the median-populated state, for
example, from spending more than roughly $1,150,000 in the general
election.196 The bill also places a limit on the amount of money that a
candidate and his campaign committee can spend in the primary and
runoff campaigns, if applicable.'
9 7
If the candidate adheres to the overall expenditure limits, as well as
the limit on use of the candidate's personal funds,198 the bill provides
the complying candidate with the benefits of free television broadcast
time,199 discount broadcast media rates,2"0 and reduced postage
193. Specifically, the bill would grant certain benefits, see infra notes 199-200, to
candidates that complied with the conditions of the bill. The primary condition is an
overall limit on the candidate's spending. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
1997, S. 25, 105th Cong. § 101 (1997). The coercive nature of this "voluntary" scheme
raises the specter of an unconstitutional condition. See generally Adam S. Tanen-
baum, Comment, Day v. Holahan: Crossroads in Campaign Finance Jurispnidence, 84
Geo. LJ. 151, 157-58 (1995). This provision was removed by sponsors of McCain-
Feingold before the Senate vote this year. See supra note 192.
194. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997, S. 25, 105th Cong. § 101.
195. Id. (proposed as § 503 of FECA). The bill provides that, with certain excep-
tions for states with extremely limited media outlets, expenditures by candidates and
their authorized campaign committees shall not exceed the lesser of $5,500,000 or the
greater of $950,000 or $400,000 plus $0.30 multiplied by the voting-age population up
to 4,000,000 and $0.25 multiplied by the number of eligible voters over 4,000.000. Id.
(proposed as § 503(d) of FECA).
196. Id. While $1,150,000 may appear to be sufficient funds to disseminate one's
message, a Senate candidate has to communicate state-wide. The mass media needed
to disseminate one's message to such a large constituency is expensive. In South Car-
olina, the twenty-fifth most populated state according to the 1990 census, the McCain-
Feingold Bill would allow a Senate candidate to spend roughly $0.45 on each eligible
voter in a general election. The primary and general election expenditure limits are
indexed for inflation. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997, S. 25, 105th Cong.
§ 101 (proposed as § 503(g) of FECA).
197. Under the bill's primary expenditure provision, Senate candidates may spend
no more than the lesser of 67% of the general election expenditure limit or
$2,750,000. Id. (proposed as § 503(b)(1)-(2) of FECA). Candidates in runoff elections
may spend up to 20% of the general election expenditure limit. Id. (proposed as
§ 503(c) of FECA).
198. Id. (proposed as § 503(a)(1)(A)-(B) of FECA). This provision forbids a candi-
date or his authorized campaign committee from spending more than the lesser of
$250,000 or 10% of the general election expenditure limit from personal funds of the
candidate and the candidate's immediate family. Id.
199. Id. (proposed as § 504(1) of FECA). A complying candidate is entitled to re-
ceive a total of 30 minutes of free broadcast minutes, to be used in increments not to
27191998]
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rates.01 These benefits are also conditioned on the candidate meeting
a threshold contribution level, 2  complying with certain primary and
general election filing requirements, 0 3 and staying within the limit on
out-of-state contributions °.2 1 McCain-Feingold has a punitive feature
as well: if a competing candidate does not comply with the spending
limits, the complying candidate's spending limits are raised either 50%
or 100%, depending on how much the non-complying candidate ex-
ceeds the limits contemplated in the bill.205 McCain-Feingold pro-
vides for civil penalties and the revocation of benefits for eligible
candidates that fall out of compliance with these requirements. 20 6 Fi-
nally, Title I of the bill imposes strict disclosure requirements on both
complying and non-complying Senate candidates. 0 7
exceed five minutes, from broadcasting stations within the candidate's state or an ad-
jacent state. Id. § 102(c). Needless to say, this provision, along with the reduced
broadcast rate provision, draws the ire of the broadcasters not particularly eager to
turn over broadcast time and raises constitutional issues. See 143 Cong. Rec. S10349
(daily ed. Oct. 6, 1997) (inserted testimony of Professor Lillian R. BeVier before Sen-
ate Rules Committee); see also Political Money, supra note 160, at 670 & n.30 (raising
possible broadcast objections to "free" broadcast time as an "unconstitutional com-
pulsion of speech").
200. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997, S. 25, 105th Cong. § 101 (proposed
as § 504(2) of FECA). A complying candidate is entitled to receive a 50% reduction
in the applicable broadcast rate for the applicable period. Id. § 103(a).
201. Id. § 101 (proposed as § 504(3) of FECA). The bill grants complying candi-
dates the reduced postage rates provided in 39 U.S.C. § 3626(e).
202. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997, S. 25, 105th Cong. § 101 (proposed
as § 502(a)(1)(B) of FECA). McCain-Feingold requires eligible candidates and their
authorized campaign committees to raise in allowable contributions during the appli-
cable period at least 10% of the general election expenditure limit or $250,000 and to
certify this to the FEC. Id. (proposed as § 502(d)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) of FECA).
203. The bill requires a complying candidate to file with the FEC within a certain
time prior to the campaign a declaration that the candidate will comply with the bill's
various spending limits and out-of-state contribution limit. Id. § 101 (proposed as
§ 502(a)(1) of FECA). The FEC then must certify that the candidate has met the
bill's threshold requirements and, that the candidate's filings are accurate. Id. § 101
(proposed as § 502(a)(2) of FECA).
204. The complying candidate generally must raise at least 60% of his contributions
from legal residents of his state. Id. § 101 (proposed as § 502(e)(1)(A) of FECA).
The bill provides a limited exception for the smallest states. Id. (proposed as
§ 502(e)(1)(B)of FECA).
205. Id. § 101 (proposed as § 503(e) of FECA). This section even provides for a
limit increase for the complying candidate to counter independent expenditures made
by outside advocacy groups in support of a competing candidate. Id. § 101 (proposed
as § 503(f) of FECA).
206. Id. § 101 (proposed as § 505(c) of FECA) (requiring FEC to revoke benefits
of a candidate who violates the bill's requirements); Id. § 101 (proposed as § 506(a)-
(b) of FECA) (providing for civil penalties based on amount non-complying candi-
date exceeds expenditure restriction).
207. See id. § 106(a)-(b). The bill imposes more extensive disclosure duties on can-
didates that exceed the personal fund expenditure limit. See id. § 106(b). McCain-
Feingold also requires all candidates to disclose as part of their regular FEC filings the
portion of contributions from in-state residents. Id. at § 106(a)(3).
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b. Ban on PAC Contributions/Ban on SoBf Money
Title II of the original version of McCain-Feingold, entitled "Reduc-
tion of Special Interest Influence," would totally ban PAC contribu-
tions to Senate candidates.20 8  In addition to banning PAC
contributions, McCain-Feingold would sharply reduce the ability of
political parties to use so-called "soft money."20 9 Soft money refers to
the funds that national, state, and local political parties raise for grass-
roots activities, get-out-the-vote efforts and, increasingly, political ad-
vertising.210 Soft money, in contrast to direct contributions and ex-
penditures, is largely unregulated by FECA.21 1 This provision aims to
substantially eliminate the ability of national, state, and local parties
to spend soft money to influence a federal election.2 -12 The crack-
down on soft money comes in the wake of the 1996 election, in which
soft money was used by the national parties to skirt the "hard money"
restrictions and aid both Presidential and other federal candidates di-
208. See id. § 201. The original version of the bill provides that only individuals and
political committees may contribute to a candidate or a candidate's authorized cam-
paign committee, principal campaign committee or committees associated with the
political parties, but not the outside advocacy organizations known as PACs. See hi.
§ 201(a). For the definition of "PACs," see supra note 30. Many constitutional experts
considered this provision flatly unconstitutional, see 143 Cong. Rec. S10347 (daily ed.
Oct. 6, 1997) (inserted testimony of Lillian R. BeVier before Senate Rules Commit-
tee), and the sponsors of McCain-Feingold dropped the provision prior to the final
vote this year, see supra note 192.
209. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997, S. 25, 105th Cong. § 211.
210. See 143 Cong. Rec. S10348 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1997) (inserted testimony of Lil-
lian R. BeVier before Senate Rules Committee); Note, Soft Money. The Current
Rules and the Case for Reform, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1323, 1325, 1333 (1998).
211. See 143 Cong. Rec. S10348 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1997) (inserted testimony of Lil-
lian R. BeVier before Senate Rules Committee).
212. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997, S. 25, 105th Cong. § 211. McCain-
Feingold accomplishes this goal in two principal ways. First, the bill prohibits a na-
tional committee of a political party, or an entity controlled by or acting on behalf of a
national party, from soliciting or receiving contributions or spending any funds that
are not subject to the limitations, prohibitions and reporting requirements of FECA
and McCain-Feingold. Id. § 211 (proposed as § 325 of FECA). Second. McCain-Fein-
gold subjects all funds spent by a state, district, or local committee of a political party
(or an entity controlled by or acting on behalf of such a committee) during a federal
election year "for any activity that might affect the outcome of a federal election"
(which is a standard that the bill defines broadly) to the limitations, prohibitions and
reporting requirements of FECA as amended by McCain-Feingold. See id. (proposed
as § 325(b)(1) of FECA). The bill exempts expenditures for certain purely local,
grassroots activities by local party committees. See id. (proposed as § 325(b)(2) of
FECA). The bill also cracks down on party committees' ability to make coordinated
expenditures on behalf of favored federal candidates. See id. § 404. This provision
forces party committees to forswear independent expenditures with respect to a par-
ticular candidate in order to make coordinated expenditures on that candidate's be-
half. Id Moreover, the provision broadens the definition of "coordination" to sweep
under the bill's coverage even the slightest contact between the party committee and
the candidate-such as merely providing the candidate with polling data over the
course of the election. Id.
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rectly. 213 Supporters of McCain-Feingold cite soft money as the pri-
mary cause of an unhealthy rise in the political influence of well-
heeled contributors, if not outright quid pro quo arrangements, and a
sharp increase in the costs of campaigns.214 Title II of McCain-Fein-
gold seeks to address these concerns.
c. Restrictions on Independent Expenditures and Issue Advocacy
FECA distinguishes between expenditures made by individuals,
outside organizations, and parties that are "coordinated" with a fed-
eral candidate, and "independent expenditures" that are, as the term
suggests, uncoordinated with a federal candidate.1 5 The classification
is significant because a coordinated expenditure is considered a "con-
tribution" to the coordinating candidate subject to FECA's dollar lim-
itations, while independent expenditures are not.2 16 Nevertheless,
independent expenditures are still subject to FECA's disclosure obli-
gations.21 7 Title IV of McCain-Feingold defines contribution to in-
clude expenditures made "for the purpose of influencing [a federal
election] and that is a payment made in coordination with a candi-
date."2 8 The bill then broadly defines "payment made in coordina-
tion with a candidate." '19 In fact, McCain-Feingold would expand the
definition of "coordination" to include practically any contact of a
political nature between the person or group making the expenditure
and the candidate.22 0
Title IV of McCain-Feingold also imposes fresh restrictions on issue
advocacy and independent expenditures.2 2 ' Initial versions of Mc-
Cain-Feingold2 2 would have prohibited all political spending by orga-
213. See Editorial, The Ebb and Flow of Reform, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1998, at A18
(calling soft money the central problem in the campaign finance debate).
214. See 144 Cong. Rec. S1046 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1998) (statement of Senator
Glenn).
215. See supra Part I.A. Compare 2 U.S.C. § 431(8) (1994) (defining contribution),
with 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1994) (defining independent expenditure).
216. See supra note 64.
217. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(c) (1994). This provision requires details of independent
expenditures in excess of $200 to be reported to the FEC, as well as information
indicating whether the expenditure is in support or opposition to the candidate and a
statement swearing that the expenditure is not coordinated. See id. § 434(c)(2)(c).
218. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997, S. 25, 105th Cong.
§ 405(a)(1)(A)(iii).
219. Id. This expanded definition covers payments made in cooperation with, or at
the suggestion of, the candidate or party, as well as payments made to, or received
from, persons who have information about the candidate's electoral strategy. Id.
§§ 404(5)(A)(iv), 405(a)(1)(C).
220. See id. § 405(a)-(c).
221. For a discussion of the Buckley Court's protection of issue advocacy, see supra
note 64.
222. The latest version of McCain-Feingold that the Senate voted on in February
contained less onerous restrictions on issue advocacy than previous versions. See
supra note 192.
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nizations other than political parties and individuals under FECA. 223
The most recent version, while not prohibiting this "issue advocacy"
outright, makes it more difficult for associations to engage in this type
of political spending by re-classifying it as "express advocacy" subject
to FECA's potentially-chilling disclosure requirements."24 FECA cur-
rently defines "independent expenditure" as an uncoordinated expen-
diture that contains "express advocacy."''2 s Under McCain-Feingold,
"express advocacy" becomes not just communications that use specific
words to urge the election or defeat of a candidate as under current
law,'22 6 but any communication that costs more than $10,000 and is
made within 30 days of a primary election or within 60 days of a gen-
eral election that "a reasonable person would understand as advocat-
ing the election or defeat of the candidate."" 7 This definition of
"express advocacy" eschews the "magic word" test' and sweeps for-
merly unregulated issue advocacy-like voter guides that outline a
candidate's position on various issue of concern to an organization-
under FECA's jurisdiction. 29
FECA designates as a "political committee" subject to registration
with the FEC any group of individuals which receives contributions or
makes expenditures in excess of $1000 per year.2"° Under FECA,
"political committees" must retain a treasurer2
-
1 and maintain certain
records including the names and addresses of persons who contributed
more than $50 to the group. 3 2 FECA also requires political commit-
tees to keep detailed information with respect to any disbursements in
excess of $200.3 Thus, to the extent issue-oriented organizations en-
gage in "express advocacy" as newly-defined under McCain-Feingold
in an amount exceeding $1000, the group is subject to the disclosure
requirements under FECA.2 4 The net effect of the expanded defini-
223. See Senate Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1995, S. 1219, 104th Cong. § 201.
224. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997, S. 25, 105th Cong. § 241 (sub-
jecting any independent expenditure in excess of $1,000 to reporting within 24 hours
and any independent expenditures in excess of $10,000 within 48 hours with addi-
tional reports when necessary).
225. Id § 406.
226. For a discussion of the express advocacy test, see supra note 64.
227. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997, S. 25, 105th Cong. § 406(b).
228. See supra note 64.
229. See 143 Cong. Rec. S10,360 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1997) (statement of Sen. McCon-
nell) (inserting article authored by James Bopp, Jr. and Richard E. Coleson that ar-
gues that issue advocacy, including voter guides, deserve full constitutional
protection).
230. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(4) (1994). For the distinction between political committees
and PACs, see supra notes 29-30.
231. See 2 U.S.C. § 432(a) (1994).
232. See id. § 432(c)(2). For further discussion of FECA's disclosure provisions, see
supra note 35.
233. See id. § 432(c)(5).
234. For a discussion of a political committee's disclosure obligations under FECA,
see supra note 35.
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tion of "coordination" and "express advocacy" and the narrowed defi-
nition of "independent expenditure" is to incorporate formerly
protected political activities under the jurisdiction of FECA.
McCain-Feingold contains other regulatory features that provide
for, among other things: strict disclosure requirements,235 tighter con-
trol of contributions through intermediaries and conduits," 6 expanded
random audits by the FEC,2 7 enhanced penalties for willful viola-
tions," 8 tighter control over the content of political advertising," 9 lim-
its on the incumbent candidate's use of the Congressional franking
privilege,240 and a prohibition of contributions from individuals not
qualified to vote.241 In short, McCain-Feingold is comprehensive in
scope and would fundamentally alter the way federal (or at least Sen-
ate) elections are financed. The bill's provisions reflect the general
policy direction that the campaign finance reform movement has ad-
vocated ever since Buckley: stricter limitations and regulations on
political spending by individuals, groups, candidates, and parties.
E. Framing The Questions
The Buckley Court's jealous protection of political spending and its
rejection of the "level-the-playing-field" rationale was concomitantly
a recognition that political spending realizes significant human
goods-goods that cannot be sacrificed at the altar of abstract egalita-
rian principles. If, however, political spending does not contribute to
the well-being of the citizenry and, in fact, does little more than breed
corruption and inequality, then one should rightly criticize Buckley
and urge: (1) Congress to amend the First Amendment or otherwise
circumvent the unjust holding, and/or (2) pass McCain-Feingold. Sim-
ilarly, if Professor Dworkin and others are correct that a just society
requires citizens to have more-or-less equal influence on political and
moral matters, then citizens and Congress should take appropriate ac-
tion including, presumably, pursuing McCain-Feingold or similar
"equalization" legislation.242 If, however, political spending is largely
a genuinely valuable activity worth protecting and the equal participa-
tion principle and cost-cutting rationale cannot be defended, legisla-
235. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997, S. 25, 105th Cong. §§ 213(a),
241, 304.
236. See id. § 231.
237. See id. § 302. McCain-Feingold also contains a provision that allows the FEC
to seek injunctions against probable violators in the middle of the campaign-thus
raising the specter of prior restraint. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997, S.
25, 105th Cong. § 303.
238. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997, S. 25, 105th Cong. § 305.
239. See id. § 402.
240. See id. § 403.
241. See id. § 306.
242. See Curse of American Politics, supra note 21, at 21. Indeed, thirty-eight Sena-
tors voted this past year for a resolution that would amend the First Amendment in
order to circumvent Buckley. See supra note 165.
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tors should leave Buckley alone and abandon the pursuit of legislation
like McCain-Feingold.
Parts III and IV argue that this latter view is indeed the correct
position. As part IV.A.3 explains, the "equal political participation"
principle suffers from the same underlying weaknesses that plague
equality-based liberal theories. The egalitarian principle, therefore,
cannot justify either the criticism of Buckley or the current reform
proposals. Drawing from the perfectionist tradition and borrowing
substantially from theorists like John Finnis, Germain Grisez and
Robert George, this Note specifically criticizes the equal participation
principle that is inherent in the current campaign reform proposals.
In the process, this Note offers a perfectionist account of the First
Amendment and argues that political spending deserves the height-
ened protection that the Buckley Court bestowed upon it. As part IV
details, political spending realizes valuable human goods that those
who criticize Buckley and support McCain-Feingold simply fail to take
into account. To provide context for this discussion, the next part out-
lines, in broad terms, new natural law theory.
II. NATURAL LAW THEORY
Although there are many variations of natural law theory,243 the
central natural law tradition dates back to Aristotle 2" and Saint
Thomas Aquinas.245 Perfectionist theory is designed to assist citizens,
legislators and judges24 6 in distinguishing what is sound and reason-
243. See Natural Law and Civil Rights, supra note 11, at 153. For a description of
the various schools of philosophical and theological thought in this area, and the la-
bels commonly (and often mistakenly) attached to each, see Ramesh Punnuru, Con
Job, Nat'l Rev., Jan. 27, 1997, at 36-39.
244. See Ethics, supra note 5. This Note does not attempt to resolve any doctrinal
disputes within the perfectionist tradition.
245. See On Law, supra note 1.
246. Some argue that judges properly interpret the positive law to comport with the
natural law. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (Chase, J.) (con-
tending that the natural law should overrule manifestly unjust positive law). While
legislators should always apply practical reasoning, it seems that judges should not
employ natural law principles in their decisions if applying these principles means
exceeding the limited (interpretative) role of the judge. In the end, a judge acts un-
justly if his action exceeds the limits of his authority. Thus, a federal judge, for exam-
ple, should not deviate from the text of a federal statute in a particular case even if, in
his mind, natural law principles compel a different result. At the same time, the com-
mon law judge has significant latitude to apply natural law principles in rendering
specific decisions. See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 3-14 (1997). In-
deed, the English common law was largely fashioned by judges applying practical rea-
soning according to natural law principles. See id. at 11 (quoting Robert Rantoul
saying that "[t]he Common Law is the perfection of human reason").
Critics of the perfectionist tradition worry that judges will embrace natural law
principles in rendering decisions on specific cases, despite the positive law at issue. See
Laurence Tribe, Natural Law and the Nominee, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1991. at A20.
The judge acting outside the authority granted to him by the positive law would be,
however, violating natural law principles. The issues surrounding this dilemma arose
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able from what is unsound and unreasonable. 247 And while many per-
fectionist propositions remain controversial, it cannot be denied that
natural law theory, "[1long relegated to merely historical interest (at
least outside of Roman Catholic intellectual circles).... is once again
a competitor in contemporary philosophical debates about law, poli-
tics, and morals." 48 This part will set forth the basic framework of
recently in a case involving a violation of the federal abortion access law by a consci-
entious-objecting bishop and monk. See United States v. Lynch, 952 F. Supp. 167, 168
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). The bishop and the monk had been enjoined by a court order to not
violate, or aid or abet the violation of, the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
of 1994. Id. at 168. Notwithstanding the court order, the enjoined defendants sat in
the clinic's driveway, preventing vehicles from entering the parking lot of the clinic.
Id. Despite police warningi, they continued their modest sit-in until they were carried
away by the police and ultimately charged with criminal contempt by the U.S. Attor-
ney's office. Id. In a non-jury trial, Judge Sprizzo found that the defendants "acted
out of a sense of conscience and sincere religious conviction." Id. at 169. He briefly
addressed whether the defendants could raise either justification or necessity as a
defense to the criminal contempt charge. Id. at 169-70. The government argued that
the legality of abortion under the positive law precluded either defense. Judge
Sprizzo viewed that argument with some skepticism, asking:
Were a person to have violated a court order directing the return of a run-
away slave when Dred Scott was the law, would a genuinely held belief that a
slave was a human person and not an article of property be a matter the
Court could not consider in deciding whether that person was guilty of a
criminal contempt charge? And if so, what moral justification could be of-
fered for trying government officials, including judges, for implementing the
positive laws of Nazi Germany?
Id. at 170 n.3. Judge Sprizzo did not decide the necessity or justification issues, find-
ing instead that the government failed to prove the willfulness element. Moreover,
even if the government was able to show willfulness, Judge Sprizzo would have "ex-
ercis[ed] ... the prerogative of leniency" in his role as fact-finder and acquitted the
defendants anyway. Id. at 171 (citing John Peter Zenger trial).
Many accused Judge Sprizzo of smuggling his own natural law principles into a case
that was a seemingly clear-cut violation of the positive law. Bruce Fein, Tilted Criti-
cism ojJudicial Activism, Wash. Times, Jan. 28, 1997, at A17 (accusing Judge Sprizzo
of "throwing the rule of law into a paper shredder") Defenders of Judge Sprizzo
point out that he had substantial latitude because he was acting, not only as judge, but
also as the jury. Needless to say, Judge Sprizzo's decision in Lynch raises many in-
triguing issues-including conscientious objection, unjust laws, necessity and justifica-
tion, and judicial review-that natural law theorists have written about in the past and
deserve further attention in the future. See, e.g., John Finnis, Unjust Laws in a Demo-
cratic Society: Some Philosophical and Theological Reflections, 71 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 595 (1996) [hereinafter Unjust Laws] (considering the moral questions involved
in "cooperating" with unjust laws); Kirk A. Kennedy, Reaffirming the Natural Law
Jurisprudence of Justice Clarence Thomas, 9 Regent U. L. Rev. 33, 36 (1997) (examin-
ing the natural law as a "jurisprudential tool" of Justice Thomas).
This Note does not attempt to solve the issue of the proper degree of judicial activ-
ism in situations where the positive law does not comport with the natural law.
Rather, this Note defends the Buckley decision as morally correct and argues that
legislators and judges (for slightly different reasons) should follow the principles ar-
ticulated in Buckley. In so doing, legislators and judges will be complying with both
natural law principles and properly interpreting the First Amendment.
247. See Recent Criticism, supra note 2, at 1396.
248. Id. at 1371.
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contemporary natural law theory as articulated by some of the most
prominent perfectionist theorists.
A. Misconceptions Of Natural Law
Due to the many popular misconceptions of what natural law is,
perhaps it is wise to initially describe what natural law is not.2 4 ' First,
adherence to natural law principles does not require belief in a deity
or a Christian theology.2 0 Aristotle, writing 350 years before Jesus
Christ was born, is the most prominent example of a non-Christian
natural law philosopher. The natural law has prescriptive jurisdiction
over every person who has reached the age of reason regardless of
theological beliefs.2" Modern perfectionists hold that objective stan-
dards of morality and the universal requirements of practical reason-
ing can be located independent of a deity. 2
Second, natural law philosophers do not hold that individuals must
adhere to a single, uniform way of life.2 3 Critics of the perfectionist
tradition charge that natural law principles yield rigid conclusions that
ultimately threaten liberties. 4 This criticism may stem from an im-
proper interpretation or understanding of contemporary natural law
theory. While natural law theorists certainly hold that there are objec-
tive and unchanging truths,2-5 at the same time they recognize many
choices and ways of life as morally valid, so long as the choices and
pursuits can sustain the requirements of practical reasoning.- 6 The
first principles of natural law ultimately yield certain absolute moral
norms.21 7 But it is these same first principles that provide citizens
with unlimited opportunities, projects, and commitments that can
(and must) be freely and authentically chosen, consistent with a citi-
zen's own coherent plan of life and other moral responsibilities. 25 1
249. For a detailed discussion of the popular misconceptions of contemporary per-
fectionist theory, see Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3. at 2349.
250. See Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 4849. This is a promi-
nent criticism of natural law theory. See Philip Soper, Some Natural Confusions
About Natural Law, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 2393, 2405 (1992).
251. See Natural Law and Civil Rights, supra note 11, at 150.
252. See Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 48.
253. See Recent Criticism, supra note 2, at 1397.
254. See Natural Law and Civil Rights, supra note 11, at 148, 152-53.
255. See id at 143-44.
256. See Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History 10 (1965). Strauss contends:
[K]nowledge of the indefinitely large variety of notions of right and wrong is
so far from being incompatible with the idea of natural right that it is the
essential condition for the emergence of that idea realization of the variety
of notions of right is the incentive for the quest for natural right.
Id
257. See Recent Criticism, supra note 2, at 1396-98. For a discussion on the first
principles and the intermediate principles of natural law, see supra part II.B-C.
258. See Natural Law and Civil Rights, supra note 11, at 148. Another misconcep-
tion of natural law theory is that it is simply a blueprint for political conservatism.
While the perfectionist tradition can defend many conservative positions, many self-
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Third, new natural law theory does not require belief in a "norma-
tive natural order," in the sense that one can derive ethical rules from
descriptive facts. 259 In this way, the term "natural law" can be mis-
leading.2 6° Natural law practical reasoning answers the question,
"what is reasonable" and thus "morally right?" and not, "what is in
accordance with human nature? 2 61 The human intellect, through the
process of practical reasoning, moves from a practical inquiry into the
constitutive "natural" aspects of a flourishing citizen to the principles
and moral norms that this inquiry implies.2 62
styled conservatives and libertarians actually work within the liberal (broadly de-
fined) tradition. They often speak in the rhetoric of the liberal tradition: rights, hos-
tility to state regulation (of some activity), and individual freedom. See Walter Berns,
Freedom, Virtue and the First Amendment 46 (1957); see also Making Men Moral,
supra note 4, at 93-94. Professor George explains that:
American conservatism has, by and large, left the liberal understanding of
individual rights and collective interests unchallenged.... Those libertarian-
minded conservatives who denounce governmental interference with 'capi-
talist acts between consenting adults' rightly claim to be not so much 'con-
servative' as 'classical liberals.'
Id.
259. See Recent Criticism, supra note 2, at 1382. Natural law theorists are split on
the fundamental question of ontology. Neo-scholastic natural law theorists hold that
prescriptive principles can be derived from factual truths about human nature. Id. at
1384-84. New natural law theorists, including Grisez, defend a cognitivist prescriptive
theory that remains fiercely independent of speculative inquiry into human nature. Id.
at 1378-80.
260. See Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 35.
261. See id. at 35-36; Saint Thomas Aquinas stated:
[Wihatever is contrary to the order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary
to the nature of man, as man; while whatever is in accord with reason is in
accord with the nature of man, as man. Now man's good is to be in accord
with reason, and his evil is to be against reason, as Dionysius states ...
Therefore human virtue, which makes a man good, and his works good, is in
accord with man's nature in so far as it accords with reason; while vice is
contrary to man's nature in so far as it is contrary to the order of reason.
Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1-11, q. 71, art. 2 reprinted in 2 Basic Writ-
ings of Saint Thomas Aquinas 561-62 (Anton C. Regis ed., 1945); see also Robert P.
George, A Defense of the New Natural Law Theory, 41 Am. J. Juris. 47, 47-48 (1996)
[hereinafter Defense of New Natural Law] (new natural law principles ascertain what
ought to be done, not "about what is the case"). That said, new natural law theorists
acknowledge that ethical inquiry must begin by some practical reflection of the ends
of human nature. See Recent Criticism, supra note 2, at 1378.
262. Professor Finnis explains this subtle point:
The basic forms of good grasped by practical understanding are what is good
for human beings with the nature they have. Aquinas considers that practical
reasoning begins not by understanding this nature from the outside, as it
were, by way of psychological, anthropological, or metaphysical observations
and judgments defining human nature, but by experiencing one's nature, so
to speak, from the inside, in the form of one's inclinations. But again, there
is no process of inference. One does not judge that 'I have [or everybody
has] an inclination to find out about things' and then infer that therefore
'knowledge is a good to be pursued'. Rather, by a simple act of non-inferen-
tial understanding one grasps that the object of the inclination which one
experiences is an instance of a general form of good, for oneself (and others
like one).
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B. Major Characteristics Of The Natural Law Tradition
Before more fully exploring the principles of natural law, this sub-
part identifies some general characteristics of the perfectionist tradi-
tion. First, the perfectionist tradition is decidedly non-relativist. 21
Perfectionist theorists hold that citizens can identify, and are bound
by, an objective moral law."6 Second, new natural law theory, unlike
Hume's theory,265 embraces a cognitivist ethics.2  New natural law-
yers assert that individuals are indeed capable of acting on reasons, in
addition to passions. 67 Third, natural law theory differs starkly from
the modern liberal tradition in its theory of jurisprudence. 26 Perfec-
tionist theorists reject the harm-principle morality test 269 that many
liberal moral theorists espouse.270 They similarly reject the modem
notion that the state should be neutral as to any conception of what
constitutes a "good life."27 In the perfectionist tradition, the state is
correctly concerned for the moral well-being of the citizens and, by
Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 34 (footnote omitted).
263. See Natural Law and Civil Rights, supra note 11, at 145. In this article Profes-
sor George quotes Justice Clarence Thomas's criticism of relativism and conventional-
ism: "[tihose who deny natural law cannot get me out of slavery." Id. The point is
that apart from the Thirteenth Amendment, the relativist has no principle upon which
to justify abolition. Id.
264. See Romans 2:1-14-15 (King James) (describing the universal law "written on
[our] hearts"); Natural Law and Civil Rights, supra note 11, at 145; Henry Mather,
Natural Law and Right Answers, 38 Am. J. Juris. 297, 297 (1993).
265. See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Intro-
duce the Experimental Method of Reasoning Into Moral Subjects 375 (Dolphin
Books 1961) (1739-1740) ("Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions,
and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.").
266. See Defense of New Natural Law, supra note 261, at 47. New natural law theo-
rists make the cognitivist claim by referring to the non-instrumental reasons for
human action. Id at 48-51. Professor George defends the cognitivist claim:
Unless non-cognitivists can show[ I] that there are no noninstrumental rea-
sons for action, cognitivists are perfectly entitled to believe that people
sometimes want to do things, not as a brute matter of psychological fact, but
precisely because they grasp the noninstrumental point, and thus, the intelli-
gible intrinsic value, of doing them.
Id. at 51; see also Robert P. George, Can Sex Be Reasonable?, 93 Colum. L Rev. 783,
784-90 (1993) (book review) (challenging Richard Posner's instrumental conception
of rationality). The first precepts of the natural law address the non-instrumental
reasons for action. See supra Part II.B.
267. See A Reply, supra note 24, at 308 ("Grisez and Finnis insist on analytically
distinguishing reasons for action from emotional motives."); Defense of New Natural
Law, supra note 261, at 49 ("Someone who acts for a noninstrumental reason acts
ultimately not on the basis of a brute desire ....").
268. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 71-82.
269. See A Reply, supra note 24, at 311-12.
270. See On Liberty, supra note 22, at 13. Mill is the founder of the harm principle,
which he claimed was "entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the
individual in the way of compulsion and control" whether in the form of legal compul-
sion or moral coercion. Id. Society can rightly interfere with an individual to prevent
harm to others, but never out of a concern for the individual's own good. i.
271. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 84.
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extension, the moral well-being of the community at large. 2  An indi-
vidual who acts immorally "harms" himself and often others, even if
the immoral act would otherwise be characterized by liberal theorists
as victimless.273 The immoral choice itself harms the actor by cor-
rupting his will and "damaging that aspect of [his] own well-being
which consists in establishing and maintaining an upright moral char-
acter., 274 He harms others by his immoral act, if not "directly" in the
traditional sense, certainly indirectly by contributing to a culture that
is less conducive to moral virtue.2 75 Perfectionist theorists simply re-
ject the distinction between private and public morality as the basis
for determining what activities the state may properly regulate.276 As
discussed in more detail in the subpart dealing with natural
"rights," '277 the perfectionist tradition holds that there is no principal
difference between the well-being of individuals and the well-being of
the state.278 The well-being of the community consists of and, indeed,
is dependent upon, the flourishing of the individual citizens.
C. The First Principles Of Natural Law
The most basic precepts of natural law are known as the "first prac-
tical principles." 79 The first principles provide underived reasons for
human choice and action which refer to certain basic human goods
that are intrinsically, as opposed to merely instrumentally, valuable.28
Perfectionist theorists have identified the basic reasons for action:
knowledge and aesthetic experience, life and health, excellence in
work and play, religion, interpersonal harmony (which includes coop-
eration and friendship), marriage and practical reasonableness.2 8'
These "basic human goods" are not extrinsic to the person like some
272. Id. at 20.
273. Id. at 168-69.
274. Id. at 169.
275. Aristotle, for his part, scoffed at the sophist Lycophron who maintained that
law is only "a convention" or merely a "surety to one another of justice," lacking the
authority or ability to make citizens virtuous. See Politics, supra note 1, at 74. The
true definition of a state "is not a mere society, having a common place, established
for the prevention of mutual crime and for the sake of exchange . . . .a state, [is
ratherj a community of families and aggregation of families in well-being, for the sake
of a perfect and self-sufficing life." Id.
276. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 169. That said, natural law theorists
often recognize that certain prudential considerations might militate against enacting
or vigorously enforcing legal prohibitions of so-called private immoralities. See Mar-
riage and the Liberal Imagination, supra note 9, at 319-20 (examining prudential con-
siderations involved in the prohibition of contraception).
277. See infra Part II.C.
278. See Politics, supra note 1, at 168.
279. See Recent Criticism, supra note 2, at 1390.
280. See id. at 1390-94.
281. See Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 85-90; John Finnis, Liber-
alism and Natural Law Theory, 45 Mercer L. Rev. 687, 691-92 (1994) [hereinafter
Liberalism and Natural Law Theory].
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Platonic form, I but are "instantiated," or participated in, as "intrin-
sic aspects of human [flourishing]." 28- These "goods," as interpreted
by contemporary perfectionist theorists, lack normative content at the
initial stage of the practical reasoning process.' The practical intel-
lect merely grasps these basic goods as intelligible, non-instrumental
reasons for action. -
For example, knowledge is a basic human good.' The correspond-
ing, self-evident, pre-moral "first principle" reads: knowledge is a ba-
sic good to be pursued, protected, and promoted. '  The intrinsic
worthiness of knowledge as a basic reason for action cannot be
proved, nor need it be.' It is self-evident, or "per se nota," and
therefore "[n]either its intelligibility nor its force rests on any further
principle." 9 The basic human goods and the corresponding first prin-
ciples are not ranked in a hierarchy,290 nor are they commensura-
ble.29 One cannot, for example, measure the value of life alongside
the value of play, or the value of one life compared to the value of
another life or, for that matter, the value of fifty "young" lives com-
pared to the value of one "old" life: these basic goods are all as in-
commensurable as the sum of four pints and three inches.29 2
282. See A Reply, supra note 24, at 310.
283. Recent Criticism, supra note 2, at 1389.
284. Id. at 1394. "Goods," in the context of the first principles, are not "morally
good." The basic human goods, which the basic reasons for action refer to, are pre-
morally "good"-in that it is something worthy of pursuit. Id.
285. Id. at 1394-95.
286. See Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 63.
287. See id. The flip side of the principle reads, "ignorance is to be avoided." Id.
288. Indeed, if one could prove the existence of the first principles, then the princi-
ples would not be underived/self-evident. See id. at 289.
289. See id. at 69. The primacy of self-evidence in natural law theory has generated
controversy. Critics charge that self-evidence is a dubious concept. See A Reply,
supra note 24, at 304. As Robert George responds, however, the basic reasons for
action "cannot be deduced, inferred, or derived. The premises needed for such de-
ductions, inferences, or derivations are unavailable. If the intelligibility of knowledge
as an ultimate reason for action is to be grasped, that intelligibility must be picked out
of the data by non-inferential acts of understanding." Robert P. George, Human
Flourishing As A Criterion of Morality: A Critique of Perry's Naturalism, 63 Tul. L
Rev. 1455, 1462 (1989). By definition, a self-evident proposition can only be sup-
ported by dialectical arguments or by the weakness of opposing arguments. See Natu-
ral Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 64-69.
290. See Germain Grisez et. al., Practical Principles, Moral Truth and Ultimate
Ends, 32 Am. J. Juris. 99, 133 (1987) [hereinafter Practical Principles, Moral Truth and
Ultimate Ends]. But see, Edward J. Furton, Restoring the Hierarchy of Values to Tho-
mistic Natural Law, 39 Am. J. Juris. 373 (1994) (urging a return to a 'Thomistic"
hierarchy of values). For a response to Professor Furton's call for a hierarchy of basic
human goods, see George Constable, The Problem of a Hierarchy of Values in Natural
Law: A Response to Professor Furton, 41 Am. J. Juris 63 (1996) (contending that
Professor Furton misreads Aquinas).
291. See Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 92.
292. The incommensurability of the basic human goods provides the most powerful
criticism of utilitarian liberalism and militates against assigning too large a role for the
school of thought known as "law and economics." See generally Richard A. Posner,
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Natural law philosophers can only defend the self-evidence of the
first practical principles-like "knowledge is a good to be pursued"-
by employing dialectical arguments.293 For example, any contention
that knowledge or truth is not worthy of pursuit is operationally self-
refuting.294 This is because the skeptic, in denying the good of knowl-
edge and truth, is offering his own statement for its truth. He thinks
that his statement-that knowledge is not worthy of pursuit--is
"worth making qua true. ' 295 Similarly, while one often makes friends
for instrumental or even ulterior motives, this need not always be so.
A person may become "friends" with someone to help advance his
career, to get a ride to work, or to carry out a criminal conspiracy.
Any one of the above instrumental reasons answers the question:
Why are you becoming friendly with her? If none of the above rea-
sons apply, however, a reasonable answer to the question could also
be simply "to make a friend." In other words, friendship or interper-
sonal harmony provides an intelligent, non-instrumental reason for
choice and action. This is what the tradition means by a basic human
good.
The good of practical reasonableness plays a special role in perfec-
tionist theory because it provides the rules that guide how one ought
to participate meaningfully in all the other basic human goods. 296
Practical reasoning ultimately enables citizens to distinguish between
choices that are reasonable, and therefore moral in the normative
sense, from those that are either unreasonable or less reasonable.297
Practical reasonableness is itself a fundamental good that is realized
by intelligently, creatively, authentically, and reasonably choosing
projects and commitments.
A person who has reached the age of reason can grasp the intrinsic
value of basic human goods like knowledge and friendship, and the
accompanying self-evident first principles. 298 Up to this point, how-
ever, the person has not confronted any rules or moral norms. As
Professor Finnis states, the first practical principles serve only to "ori-
ent one's practical reasoning" and "suggest[ ] new horizons for human
activity., 29 9 In fact, it is the multiplicity of basic human goods and
infinite ways to instantiate a good or combination of goods that
Sex and Reason (1992) (analyzing sex from a law and economics perspective). While
the natural law theorist would acknowledge the importance of efficiency in some con-
texts, consequentialism cannot, in the final analysis, secure any inviolate rights. See
Politics, supra note 1, at 1325b6-8 ("[Hje who violates the law can never recover by
any success, however great, what he has already lost in departing from excellence.").
293. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
294. Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 74.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 100.
297. See id. at 101.
298. See id. at 65.
299. Id. at 63.
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prompts moral questions in the first place. 00 One can be fully cogni-
zant of the basic human goods and still be in the dark as to what deci-
sion to make in specific cases. Practical reasoning is simply the entire
process of moving from self-evident, basic reasons for action-such as
knowledge, play, and friendship, inter alia-to specific conclusions
and undertakings. The questions that practical reasoning address are
merely the questions raised in the traditional study of "ethics." 301
D. The Intermediate Principles Of Natural Law
Any act, therefore, requires a person to choose between and among
the various basic human goods. 30 2 Acting in a morally upright fashion
requires application of all the intermediate requirements of practical
reasonableness.30 3 These requirements are derived from what new
natural law theorists call the "first principle of morality" which pro-
vides: "In voluntarily acting for human goods and avoiding what is
opposed to them, one ought to choose and otherwise will those and
only those possibilities whose wvilling is compatible with a will toward
integral human fulfillment."'3 4 Integral human fulfillment is not some
"supreme" good that stands even above the basic human values.3
Integral human fulfillment is nothing short of the full flourishing of
each individual in every respect.30 6 This goal is simply not attainable
"short of the heavenly kingdom," and must, therefore, remain only an
ideal.30 7 The standard of morality is not the unreachable state of "in-
tegral human fulfillment" but, rather, a will compatible with this
ideal.30 ' This abstract first principle of morality is self-evident," 9 but
it is obviously too general to be of much help to the moral agent.310 It
must be broken down into more specific methodological requirements
300. See Recent Criticism, supra note 2. at 1380.
301. See Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 101 ("'Ethics'. as classi-
cally conceived, is simply a recollectively and/or prospectively reflective expression of
[the problem for practical reasonableness] and of the general lines of solutions which
have been thought reasonable.").
302. For example, should one choose to become a doctor (and instantiate the good
of life and health) or should one become a professor (and instantiate the good of
knowledge)?
303. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 17.
304. Practical Principles, Moral Truth and Ultimate Ends. supra note 290, at 128.
305. See Recent Criticism, supra note 2, at 1397. Given the incommensurability of
the basic human goods, a principle of morality that directs choice and action to a state
of integral human fulfillment would open natural law theory to charges of consequen-
tialism. See id. at 1397-98.
306. See Law, Morality, and Sexual Orientation, supra note 9. at 37.
307. Id.
308. See Recent Criticism, supra note 2. at 1397 ("Inasmuch as no human choice, or
set of choices, can realize anything more than aspects of complete human well-being,
integral fulfillment cannot be a grand operational objective (whether of an individual,
a community, or the whole human race).").
309. See i. at 1399.
310. See id at 1397-98.
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that direct morally upright decision-making. 31I Each of the specific
methodological requirements are derived from the first principle of
morality. As derivations, then, these requirements are not self-evi-
dent-unlike the first principles of practical reasonableness and the
first principle of morality.312 Professor George explains the derivation
of the intermediate principles of practical reasonableness:
[W]e often have incentives, and therefore confront temptations, to
treat integral human fulfillment in some of its aspects.., as expend-
able for the sake of others. When we act on these incentives, we opt
for possibilities the willing of which is simply incompatible with the
guiding ideal. We choose with a bad will, and hence, immorally.
Under the Grisez-Finnis theory, the modes of responsibility ...
identify the various incentives to choose incompatibly with a will to
integral human fulfillment, and they direct the chooser not to act on
these incentives. The modes thus provide premises for the often
complex moral analysis by which persons can reason their way to
specific moral norms.313
The "modes of responsibility" fully equip the moral agent to reason
from the abstract first principle of morality to specific moral norms. 314
Through the centuries, political theorists have, upon philosophical
reflection, recognized each of these basic ethical "modes of responsi-
311. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 14.
312. At one point, there was some question whether the methodological require-
ments of practical reasonableness were self-evident. Professor Finnis at least sug-
gested as much in Natural Law and Natural Rights. See Natural Law and Natural
Rights. supra note 3, at 102. Since then, however, prominent "new natural law" theo-
rists have made it clear that these intermediate rules are derived from the self-evident
first principle of morality. See Recent Criticism, supra note 2, at 1396.
Professor Finnis explains the multiple roles the basic requirements of practical rea-
sonableness play in the perfectionist tradition:
Each of these requirements concerns what one must do, or think, or be if
one is to participate in the basic value of practical reasonableness. Someone
who lives up to these requirements is thus Aristotle's phronimos; he has
Aquinas's prudentia; they are requirements of reasonableness or practical
wisdom, and to fail to live up to them is irrational. But, secondly, reasona-
bleness both is a basic aspect of human well-being and concerns one's partic-
ipation in all the (other) basic aspects of human well-being. Hence its
requirements concern fullness of well-being.... So someone who lives up to
these requirements is also Aristotle's spoudaios (mature man), his life is eu
zen (well-living) and, unless circumstances are quite against him, we can say
that he has Aristotle's eudaimonia (the inclusive all-round flourishing or
well-being-not safely translated as 'happiness'). But, thirdly, the basic
forms of good are opportunities of being; the more fully a man participates
in them the more he is what he can be. And for this state of being fully what
one can be, Aristotle appropriated the word physis, which was translated
into Latin as natura .... So Aquinas will say that these requirements are
requirements not only of reason, and of goodness, but also (by entailment)
of (human) nature.
Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 102-03 (citations omitted).
313. Recent Criticism, supra note 2, at 1398.
314. See id. at 1399.
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bility" in some form or another.315 Indeed, as Professor Finnis la-
ments, "[e]ach of these requirements has ... been treated by some
philosopher with exaggerated respect, as if it were the exclusive con-
trolling and shaping requirement. '316 Upon reflection, however, one
realizes that one must comply with each and every one of the require-
ments to lead a morally upright life. 317 Like the basic human goods,
each of the intermediate requirements is no less significant than any
other.31 8
One recognizes that, all too often, human beings act out of bias,
selfishness, shortsightedness or excessive emotion. The intermediate
requirements of practical reasonableness address these human inade-
quacies. The methodological requirements of practical reasonable-
ness dictate that one should: (1) have a coherent plan of life;3 19 (2)
make no arbitrary preferences among the basic human goods; 32 0 (3)
make no arbitrary preferences among persons;321 (4) retain detach-
ment and commitment in decision-making;322 (5) choose to act for ba-
315. Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 102.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 103.
318. Id. at 105.
319. John Rawls and others have identified the requirement that one ought to have
a rational plan of life. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 407-24 (1971). While this
rule does not mandate unwavering adherence to a detailed blueprint of one's life
plans, it does require that one pursue a general direction in life given the infinite
combination of projects and commitments that one can pursue. See Natural Law and
Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 104. Can anyone dispute that it is unreasonable to
needlessly squander opportunities or to "live merely from moment to moment, fol-
lowing immediate cravings, or just drifting[?]" Id.
320. This intermediate principle directs one never to intentionally or negligently
omit any of the basic human goods from the moral equation. See Natural Law and
Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 106-07. Of course, the very multiplicity of the basic
human goods compels individuals, consistent with a coherent plan of life, to choose to
pursue one or more goods at the expense of one or more other goods. Nevertheless,
one ought not think, will, or act in a way that fails to at least account for each of the
intrinsic goods in life. To the extent one denies that a basic good is not a fundamental
aspect of human flourishing and acts consistent with this denial, one acts unreasona-
bly. Id. at 106.
321. This requirement is frequently referred to by theologians and others as the
"golden rule": "Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you.
do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets." Matthew 7:12; see also
Luke 6:31 ("And as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them like-
wise."). In philosophical terms, the rule means that one's moral choices must be
"universalizable." Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3. at 107. As many
ethicists have shown, it is unreasonable to arbitrarily favor an individual or group of
individuals over another. Id. at 108-09 (citing John Rawls's -social contract" as an
insurer of the "golden rule"). While this rule forbids selfishness, thoughtlessness, du-
plicity, and bias, it nonetheless leaves room for a "reasonable scope for self-prefer-
ence." Id. at 107. After all, as an autonomous actor, an individual can more
effectively address his own well-being than that of others, even as he also exhibits due
concern about the well-being of others.
322. This rule is closely related to the first requirement of practical reasonableness
and further ensures that, in all of the various opportunities and circumstances that
one confronts, one will be receptive to all of the basic goods and participate creatively
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sic human goods over merely instrumental goods-and act efficiently
in pursuing these goods;3 23 (6) avoid acts that in themselves do noth-
ing but damage a basic human good (the rule that the ends do not
justify the means);324 (7) advance the requirements of the common
in them. See Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 109-10. The first com-
ponent of this two-part rule dictates that one ought to act with a certain degree of
detachment-so as to guard against becoming fanatical toward any one project or
commitment. Id. at 110. The second component of this requirement safeguards
against the trait that stands opposed, in many ways, to fanaticism: apathy. Id. While
it is unreasonable to focus exclusively on one project or commitment, it is equally
unreasonable to not pursue any projects, or to fail to be open to new, creative ways to
carry out existing projects. Id.
323. Professor Finnis remarks that this rule poses "problems which go to the heart
of 'morality."' Id. at 111. On a broad level, this rule requires individuals to act effi-
ciently and effectively in the pursuit of projects and commitments. The rule should
not, however, be confused with a broad consequentialism or utilitarianism. See supra
note 22 for a discussion of utilitarian principles. The rule only requires that one weigh
the consequences of certain actions, at least in limited contexts. One can safely say,
for example, that one should prefer an intrinsic good (life) to a mere instrumental
good (money). One can be quite confident, in another example, that it is better to
pay less than more, because all things being equal, it is more prudent to preserve
resources than to simply waste them. In other words, in certain limited contexts, an
individual can accurately weigh the consequences and decide the most efficient course
of action. But the perfectionist ethicist is quick to point out that this rule must be
applied along with all the other rules. The other rules of practical reasonableness, and
the incommensurability of human goods rule out, for example, efficiency and weigh-
ing of consequences in choosing to intentionally kill one hostage to save ten. See Nat-
ural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 111-12.
324. This rule is one of Kant's "categorical imperatives." See Immanuel Kant, Met-
aphysics of Morality (1785) reprinted in The Philosophy of Kant: As Contained in
Extracts from his Own Writings 246 (John Watson trans., 1934). The potency of the
efficiency requirement discussed above, is blunted somewhat by the rule that one
should never choose an act "which of itself does nothing but damage," or frustrate an
opportunity to participate in a basic human good. Natural Law and Natural Rights,
supra note 3, at 118. The only reason to act directly against a basic human good is the
consequentialist hope that the damage done will be outweighed by the "good" conse-
quences that are expected. But, as Professor Finnis reminds the consequentialists,
"outside merely technical contexts, consequentialist 'weighing' is always and necessar-
ily arbitrary and delusive" due to the impossibility of assigning a "value" to any of the
basic human goods. Id. at 118-19; see supra note 292 and accompanying text.
The rule has the most force in the kinds of ethical dilemmas like the opportunity to
save ten hostages by killing some innocent man-an opportunity that traditional
ethicists would reject. See Rights and Wrongs, supra note 9, at 96. While ten may be
worth more than one when counting beans, this kind of calculus cannot be made in
the hostage dilemma. As Professor Finnis notes:
The goods that are expected to be secured in and through the consequential
release of the hostages (if it takes place) would be secured not in or as an
aspect of the killing of the innocent man but in or as an aspect of a distinct,
subsequent act, an act which would be one 'consequence' amongst the innu-
merable multitude of incommensurable consequences of the act of killing.
Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 119. This rule obviously provides
the rationale for the inviolability of human rights, including the right to life. See
Rights and Wrongs, supra note 9, at 93-113 (analyzing this mode of responsibility in
the abortion context).
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good;3 2 and (8) follow one's conscience. 32 6
Applying these methodological requirements, any citizen can rea-
son to the most specific moral injunctions like those found in the Ten
Commandments and the Model Penal Code.3 27 Practical reasoning
should guide a legislator, just as it guides an individual citizen, when
making his policy conclusions. Thus, legislative proposals that are in-
consistent with the principles of practical reasoning are unjust.
E. "Rights" In Natural Law Theory
Before identifying and justifying a natural right to free speech, it is
necessary to define a "right" in the context of natural law theory. In
the perfectionist tradition, individual rights are not "opposed" to the
collective interests,32 as they are in certain liberal political theories.329
Professor Dworkin, for example, argues that individual rights must
trump the aggregate, collective good.330 But a natural lawyer observes
that Professor Dworkin's juxtaposition of collective interests and indi-
vidual rights is untenable: "The incommensurability of basic human
goods undermines any aggregative conception of collective interests.
Hence, 'collective interests' are, in reality, the interests of individuals.
There simply are no 'collective interests' not reducible to concrete as-
pects of the well-being of individual members of the collectivity."331
This means that Professor Dworkin's division of labor-the legisla-
ture's role in advancing collective interests and the court's role in pro-
tecting individual rights332 -is equally untenable.
Unlike liberals, natural law theorists conceive of collective interests
in a non-utilitarian, non-aggregative way.333 Individual rights are not
limitations on the pursuit of the common good, but are really constitu-
tive parts of the common good.334 The common good is not the great-
325. The requirements of the common good give rise to many of the moral obliga-
tions that one owes to fellow members of the community. See Natural Law and Natu-
ral Rights, supra note 3, at 125. As part II.E. explains, "rights" in the natural law
tradition are properly understood as implications of the requirements of the common
good.
326. Fundamentally, this requirement directs one to avoid doing an act that -feels"
wrong. Aquinas and others have recognized that one ought not choose an act that
one's conscience views as unreasonable. See Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra
note 3, at 125. It would be equally unreasonable to fail to pursue a course of action
that one analyzes to be reasonable. This rule, which must be applied in light of the
other requirements of practical reasonableness, both encourages consistency with
one's conscience and "excuses" good faith errors in judgment. id. at 125-26.
327. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 17. In part IV, the intermediate rules
of practical reasonableness will be brought to bear on the issue of campaign finance.
328. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 92.
329. See Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 22, at 198.
330. See id.
331. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 90.
332. See Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 22, at 198.
333. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4. at 92.
334. Id.; Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 214.
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est good for the greatest number,335 but instead consists of the
conditions that favor each individuals' integral human fulfillment. 336
Thus, by definition, the non-aggregative common good cannot be ad-
vanced by policies that infringe upon individuals' moral rights. 337 Un-
derstood properly, rights are merely "expression[s] of what is implicit
in the term 'common good', namely that each and everyone's well-
being, in each of its basic aspects, must be considered and favoured at
all times by those responsible for co-ordinating the common life. 338
Like the courts, the legislature has a duty to protect these rights.
Thus, natural lawyers demand from Professor Dworkin some
grounding for the right to "equal concern and respect. '339 The princi-
ple of equality, after all, is not a self-evident first practical principle
"nor does one contradict oneself in denying [this] abstract right. ' 340
While natural law theorists certainly agree that every citizen deserves
"respectful consideration" in the distribution of the common benefits,
citizens have no right to "identical treatment" in these distributions.341
The "equal concern and respect" principle poses problems as a foun-
dational rule for political morality because equality is not the ultimate
objective. 342 A principle of equality, therefore, should remain
subordinate to the first principles that refer to the truly basic aspects
of human flourishing in each and every individual-the common
good.3 43 With the ultimate goal of the common good in mind, one
realizes that "there is no reason to suppose that this flourishing of all
is enhanced by treating everyone identically when distributing roles,
opportunities, and resources. '344
III. NATURAL LAw FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLE
Thus, with full knowledge of the ultimate reasons for human action,
the requirements of practical reasonableness, and the place of "rights"
in the perfectionist tradition, part III will defend a natural law free
speech principle.
335. For a discussion of utilitarian political theory, see supra note 22.
336. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 92.
337. Id. at 93.
338. See Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 214.
339. See id. at 221-23.
340. Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 86.
341. See Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 223. Note that the third
methodological requirement of practical reasoning mandates no arbitrary preferences
among persons. There may be good reasons for not treating everyone identically-
including the needs, function, merit, and relationship of the parties involved. Id. at
173-77.
342. Id. at 174.
343. Note that the "common good" in natural law parlance should be distinguished
from the utilitarian's notion of "collective general welfare."
344. See Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 174.
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A. Traditional Justifications For A Free Speech Principle
For a long time, philosophers and legal scholars have tried, with
varying degrees of success, to defend the heightened protection given
to free speech in many societies. This part will analyze some tradi-
tional defenses of free speech and offer, in their place, a perfectionist
free speech justification.
1. Utilitarian/Truth-Based Defense
Perhaps the most prominent justification for a free speech principle
is the argument from truth.4 John Stuart Mill argued in On Liberty
that suppression of speech has potentially unsettling implications for
the pursuit of truth.3 1 Mill noted:
The peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is that it
is robbing the human race, posterity as well as the existing genera-
tion-those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who
hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity
of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost as
great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of
truth produced by its collision with error.... To refuse a hearing to
an opinion because they are sure it is false is to assume that their
certainty is the same as absolute certainty. All silencing of discus-
sion is an assumption of infallibility. 347
Mill knew very well that "experience refutes" the claim that truth al-
ways prevails over falsehood4 8 Nevertheless, over "the course of
ages" the true statement will continue to resurface until it can "with-
stand all subsequent attempts to suppress it." 49 The modem propo-
nents of the truth-based free speech justification have developed the
language of the "marketplace of ideas. '350
The truth-based approach has some obvious appeal to a scholar
working in the perfectionist tradition. Knowledge/truth is an ultimate,
intelligible reason for action and, thus, a basic human good.51 More-
over, Mill and Justice Holmes are assuredly correct that the exchange
345. See Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 15 (1982) [here-
inafter Free Speech].
346. See On Liberty, supra note 22, at 21.
347. See id. at 21-22.
348. See id at 34.
349. Id at 36.
350. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Homes, J., dissent-
ing) ("[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market . . . ."); see also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95
(1940) ("Abridgement of freedom of speech and of the press... impairs those oppor-
tunities for public education that are essential to effective exercise of the power of
correcting error .... ). For a general discussion of the truth-based defense of free
speech, see Free Speech, supra note 345, at 15-34 (discussing and criticizing "the argu-
ment from truth").
351. See supra Part II.C.
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of ideas facilitated by freedom of speech often yields the truth.352 In-
deed, the natural law theorist has no problem accepting the two as-
sumptions implicit in the truth-based defense: that man is capable of
rational thought and that man can discern objective truth.
Yet, many have recognized the fundamental weakness of the truth-
based justification. Professor Schauer asks the relevant question:
"Does truth [necessarily] prevail when placed side-by-side with fal-
sity?" '353 Critics of the truth-based argument point out that the "mar-
ketplace of ideas" theory is, all too often, simply divorced from
reality, particularly in times of irrational passion.354 Because igno-
rance and falsity often prevail in this marketplace, "there is no reason
to assume that open debate and discussion will automatically and in
every case be beneficial." '355 Thus, the truth-based defense, while
powerful and supportable in many instances, does not always justify
free speech.
2. Democratic/Procedural Defense
In contrast to the truth-based defense of the freedom of speech,
some scholars maintain that the free speech guaranty follows naturally
from the ultimate sovereignty of the citizenry in a democracy. 6 Free
speech enables citizens in a democracy to obtain the necessary infor-
mation, deliberate, and ultimately vote on the issues.3 57 In addition, a
right to free speech grounded in principles of democracy provides citi-
zens with the means to speak out against corruption and injustice on
the part of the government.358 The democracy-based argument, there-
fore, depends on notions of self-government: the sovereign people
have the right to participate in the "shap[ing] of the polity. ' 359 Profes-
sor Dworkin's free speech principle consists of a "just democracy"
prong that incorporates the democracy-based justifications. 60
Over-reliance on principles of sovereignty, however, poses
problems for the democracy-based defense of free speech. The most
prominent flaw in the argument from democracy is illustrated when
the sovereign citizenry decides, as a whole and as a sovereign, to
352. See Free Speech, supra note 345, at 26 (noting the truth-based argument's
"substantial validity" in the academic and scientific fields).
353. Id. at 25.
354. See Rodney A. Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society 6-7 (1992) [hereinafter
Open Society].
355. Free Speech, supra note 345, at 33.
356. See Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of
the People 26 (1960). This defense poses problems because it may not justify freedom
of speech in a community not organized as a democracy. See Making Men Moral,
supra note 4, at 206-07; Free Speech, supra note 345, at 35.
357. See Open Society, supra note 354, at 12.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. For Professor Dworkin's account of the First Amendment, see supra part I.C.
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abridge someone's speech.361 A free speech right that ultimately re-
lies on the consent of the sovereign may not be secure. What the sov-
ereign grants, it can take away. Unless the sovereignty is willing to
forgo inclinations to censor and otherwise "make adequate provision
for self-criticism and self-restraint," what is to prevent censorship? 36 2
As Professor Schauer notes, if a separate free speech principle is to
mean anything, it surely must include free speech in the face of
majoritarian impulses.363
Various scholars, including Professor Dworkin,3 have addressed
the flaws inherent in a "pure" argument from democracy. They have
adjusted that argument accordingly to prevent an unscrupulous major-
ity from taking away the free speech rights of the minority. 31s This
argument depends on the existence of a separate foundational princi-
ple of equality,366 which is hotly debated.b 7
3. Self Expression/Dignity Defense
Beyond the search for truth or the principles of democracy, some
First Amendment scholars justify free speech on the grounds that
speaking one's mind "provides the speaker with an inner satisfaction
and realization of self-identity essential to individual fulfillment. '' 3 8
The natural law theorist would not quibble that speech often instanti-
ates the good of human dignity-that is, so long as the speech is inte-
grated around valuable ends.3 69 To the extent that the self-expression/
dignity defense suggests "an unseemly ring of hedonism," however,
the perfectionist theorist parts company with the dignity-based
defender.370
361. See Free Speech, supra note 345, at 40. Another criticism of the argument
from democracy is its "exclusive emphasis" on matters of public policy and seeming
neglect of private speech. See id. at 44.
362. Id. at 45.
363. Id
364. See supra Part I.C.
365. Professor Schauer points out the similarities between the democracy-based de-
fense and the equality-based defense: "[Als we shift from a sterile notion of democ-
racy as majority rule to democracy as equal participation, free access to information
becomes more a matter of respect for individual dignity, individual choice, and equal
treatment of all individuals, and less an idea grounded in notions of sovereignty." Free
Speech, supra note 345, at 41.
366. See supra Part I.C.
367. Part IV.A.3 criticizes the right to free speech founded solely on notions of
equality.
368. See Open Society, supra note 354, at 9.
369. Cf. Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 203 ("As an instrumental good,
speech is only valuable if it used for good purposes.") Although "abusive, defama-
tory, obscene, or merely manipulative speech "can arguably be self-expressive, these
forms of self-expression are immoral and, therefore, properly limited by the political
community. See id
370. See Open Society, supra note 354, at 9-10. To the extent that any self-expres-
sion has effects contrary to the common good, it is not worth protecting. Sheer self-
expression that fails to advance the common good is not a "right." To the extent that
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The dignity-based defense suffers from other problems, as well. For
example, to the extent the dignity-based defense considers speech or
self-expression an end in itself,371 the defense misses the mark. As
discussed in the next subpart, speech can only be instrumentally
worthwhile.3 72 Second, it is not clear what activities the dignity-based
defense actually protects. The dignity defense, in fact, seems more
properly directed to the right to think, not speak.373 In fact, as Profes-
sor Schauer notes, "[b]ecause virtually any activity may be a form of
self-expression, a theory that does not isolate speech from this vast
range of other conduct causes freedom of speech to collapse into a
principal of general liberty. '' 374 A strong free speech principle must
rest on more than just self-expression.
B. Natural Law Defense Of Free Speech
The natural law defense of freedom of speech and association traces
back, like many other aspects of perfectionist theory, to the work of
Aristotle. 375 Aristotle maintained that "man is by nature a political
animal. ' ' 376 Aristotle therefore maintained that "men, even when they
do not require one another's help, desire to live together; not but that
they are also brought together by their common interests in so far as
they each attain to any measure of well-being. '377 Aristotle and other
perfectionist theorists have recognized that citizens can only partici-
pate in the various human goods by cooperating with one or more
other citizens in one's projects, commitments, and associations. 378
Even the smallest and most trivial activities often require some degree
of cooperation.379 Cooperation often takes the form of, or has as its
impetus, communication or speech. Speech, therefore, is a highly val-
the speaker's will is integrated around upright purposes, including the intrinsic good
of authenticity (a part of the basic human good of practical reasonableness), see supra
part II.C, the self-expression is worthy of protection.
371. See Open Society, supra note 354, at 9; see also Free Speech, supra note 345, at
49 (discussing the view that speech is an intrinsic good).
372. See infra note 380 and accompanying text.
373. See Open Society, supra note 354, at 10-11.
374. Free Speech, supra note 345, at 52.
375. See Politics, supra note 1, at 1253a.
376. See id. at 1253a3, 1278b19-20. In Aristotle's argument that the state is a crea-
tion of nature, he suggests the grounding for the right to free speech:
Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregari-
ous animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and
man is the only animal who has the gift of speech. And... the power of
speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore
likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he
alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the
association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.
Id. at 1253a7-18.
377. Id. at 1278b20-24.
378. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 192.
379. Id.
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uable instrumental good because it "mak[es] possible co-operation in
the pursuit of morally upright purposes." 3 0
While communication is only instrumentally valuable, cooperation
is intrinsically valuable in that true cooperators jointly participate in
the basic good of "interpersonal harmony" whether or not their mo-
tive is to become friends.381 True friendship consists of the good of
interpersonal harmony/cooperation realized in its fullest form; inter-
personal harmony, in its weakest form, has mostly instrumental
value."a Thus, human cooperation/interpersonal harmony ultimately
provides the rationale for a free speech principle-a principle that can
be defended even in non-democratic societies and even when the co-
operation does not yield the truth. 83
To summarize, most speech deserves protection because of its tre-
mendous instrumental value in the coordination of activities toward
the pursuit of the common good. Yet, as important, speech fosters
genuine cooperation, interpersonal harmony and even full friendship
that has intrinsic value. Interpersonal harmony is a basic aspect of
both a flourishing citizen and a flourishing state. Thus, "cooperating
activities" which allow citizens to accomplish instrumental goals and
participate in the intrinsic good of interpersonal harmony should be
protected.3"4 The First Amendment's protection of speech, press, as-
sembly and the communal aspects of religion is justified because these
"cooperating activities"'3"s instantiate substantial human goods.3-6
First Amendment freedoms can indeed be thought of in reciprocal
380. Id at 194. The proposition that speech is valuable for its own sake is, there-
fore, highly questionable. See Free Speech, supra note 345, at 47-59.
381. Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 196.
382. See Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 88. Aristotle considered
"friendship ... the greatest good of states and what best preserves them against revo-
lutions." Politics, supra note 1, at 1262b.
383. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 197. 207.
384. The political community-which includes all of the specific institutions like
advocacy groups, political campaigns, and political parties-is itself only an instru-
mental good. See Liberalism and Natural Law Theory, supra note 281, at 693. How-
ever, the act of forming these organizations, the act of funding them, and the act of
participating in the organization's activities will regularly yield intrinsic as well as in-
strumental benefits. Id While most of the time these acts can not be said to instanti-
ate the fullest form of interpersonal harmony known as complete friendship, they
nonetheless instantiate the intrinsic goods of harmony and cooperation in justice. Cf
Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 197 (noting that "[speech that facilitates genuine
co-operation for worthy ends is valuable because it always realizes the intrinsic value
of interpersonal harmony").
385. A simple example will show the connection between speech and cooperation.
Assume that two individuals (or organizations, for that matter) share the same partic-
ular goal but are pursuing that goal in different geographical areas, unaware of each
other's presence or efforts. In one sense, their several-but-not-joint efforts -cooper-
ate" towards the shared goal. But, in reality, they are not cooperating at all. One
may be confident that one individual (or group) would express goodwill to the other.
perhaps consider cooperating with the other, and perhaps even consider developing a
full friendship with the other individual based on their common interests. The only
way that this "alliance" could be formed, however, is by communication, leading inev-
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terms. For example, one has a right to disseminate a particular idea
over the Internet, in addition, one has a right to receive a particular
idea over the Internet-and then cooperate with the disseminator to
expand on the idea and perhaps fulfill some goal. Thinking of the
various activities protected by the First Amendment in reciprocal
terms 387 reveals that the ultimate justification of a free speech right is
the basic human good of human cooperation. 88
Some may object here to the (over)reliance on the intrinsic good of
friendship/cooperation as the ultimate rationale for a free speech prin-
ciple. After all, two people can speak without cooperating or becom-
ing friends, as that term is commonly understood. They can, in fact,
cooperate without even speaking or learning one another's name.
Moreover, one often directs speech to people one does not consider
friends. Nevertheless, truly cooperating parties participate in the in-
trinsic value of interpersonal harmony even in small, less-personal in-
itably to cooperation, leading eventually to the realization of some form of interper-
sonal harmony.
386. John Garvey offers a slightly different natural law defense of free speech by
distinguishing between freedom of speech and freedom of association. On the one
hand, he defends free speech because it permits citizens to pursue the intrinsically
valuable good of knowledge. See John H. Garvey, What Are Freedoms For? 65
(1996). By contrast, the right to freely associate with others derives from intrinsic
interpersonal goods, or friendship. Id. at 134. This Note treats the two rights as sub-
stantially indistinguishable. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 217 (assembly
and speech are merely two means of cooperating). Freedom of speech, no less than
freedom of association (or press and religion in many cases) facilitates the realization
of all human goods-and not just the pursuit of knowledge. While knowledge is one
of the goods that First Amendment activities invariably instantiate, the right to speech
and association are more naturally derived from the good of friendship, broadly
defined.
387. See Free Speech, supra note 345, at 10 (describing "other-regarding" aspects of
First Amendment); see also Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 321 (1958) (striking
down anti-solicitation statute). In Staub, the Court struck down a municipal ordi-
nance that made it an offense to "solicit" community members to become members of
any "organization, union or society" on First Amendment grounds. Id. This protected
associational right assures that the solicitor can solicit and the potential cooperator/
future member can be solicited and, thus, can evaluate the issues raised by the solici-
tor and eventually decide whether to cooperate further by joining.
388. It is true that this "sharing" of interior thoughts takes place on a large scale in
the political context, and that this "sharing" often becomes crude and impersonal.
Nevertheless, this does not detract from the valuable goods the even impersonal
"sharing" instantiates.
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stances of cooperation 3 8 9 -or even when the cooperation fails to
achieve the instrumental goal.3 9° As Professor George points out:
Whether or not unified action is motivated precisely by the good of
interpersonal harmony, that good is always realized, at least as a
welcome side-effect, in truly co-operative action.... It is realized to
some extent, however, even in small acts of neighborliness and
friendship, such as pleasantly chatting with a co-worker about the
weather, or directing a stranger to the train station.391
Understanding friendship, as Aristotle did, to be a spectrum of human
goods-purely instrumental on one end and purely selfless on the
other392-demonstrates how the multi-faceted good of friendship jus-
tifies a right to free speech even with respect to less personal
activities.393
Aristotle distinguished between several different types of friend-
ship. He defined "complete friendship" as "friendship of good people
similar in virtue," whose concern for another's well-being is for the
other's own sake.394  He acknowledged, however, that complete
389. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 196. The fact that many cooperative
political activities, including political spending, are impersonal should not significantly
detract from the interpersonal goods they instantiate. One can think about political
contributions, for example, in much the same way the Church views charitable contri-
butions. As Germain Grisez points out, charitable giving is an act of fellowship or
participation (koinonia). See Difficult Moral Questions, supra note 11, at 430; see also
Romans 15.26-27 ("For it hath pleased them of Macedonia and Achaia to make a
certain contribution for the poor saints which are at Jerusalem. It hath pleased them
verily; and their debtors they are.") Although charitable contributions differ from
political contributions in many respects, they are similar in two significant ways: both
acts instantiate the intrinsic good of fellowship and both acts reflect (often, but not
always) a genuine concern about the common good. The Church teaches that the
realization of these goods (with respect to charitable giving) does not equire a per-
sonal relationship. See 2 Corinthians 8.1-9.15; Difficult Moral Questions, supra note
11, at 431. For similar reasons, a political contribution made for the right reasons
does not need a personal relationship to instantiate the intrinsic good of fellowship/
interpersonal harmony.
390. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 197.
391. Id. at 196.
392. See Judith A. Swanson, The Public and the Private in Aristotle's Political Phi-
losophy 166-67 (1992) [hereinafter Aristotle's Political Philosophy].
393. Friendship, however, should not be confused with "goodwill." One may ex-
press goodwill toward or "root" for a favorite politician in much the same way one
can exhibit goodwill toward and root for a baseball player. But no one would confuse
the fan for a friend. Aristotle himself held "that friends are aware of reciprocated
goodwill. For many a one has goodwill to people whom he has not seen but supposes
to be decent or useful .... " Ethics, supra note 5, at 1155b34-36. Thus, goodwill is
merely inactive friendship.
One expresses goodwill toward these men, not because they are necessarily one's
friends, but because one recognizes and admires in them certain virtuous characteris-
tics (in the politician's case, perhaps skill in the intrinsic good of knowledge, and in
the baseball player's case, skill in the intrinsic good of play). It is precisely the willing-
ness to cooperate with them, perhaps initially only for instrumental or ulterior mo-
tives but later for noble reasons, that raises the relationship to friendship.
394. 1d. at 1156b7.
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friendship was rare.395 More common than complete friendship are
lesser species of friendship-including what Aristotle termed "polit-
ical friendship" or "concord" (homonoia).3 96 The community partici-
pates in concord when it (i) is in general agreement on the
fundamental reasons for acting as a community397 and (ii) provides an
acceptable decision-making vehicle to "act on their common resolu-
tion. '398 It is a unique species of friendship that is concerned with
what affects life as a whole in the community399 and encompasses the
friendship that can develop between legislators and constituents.00
Political action united around true principles of justice always instanti-
ates concord. Part IV will address the campaign finance implications
of the intrinsic good of concord in more detail.
Naturally, not all cooperation, much less all speech, is valuable. Co-
operation can be for evil or valueless ends.4° ' Speech is valuable only
when it fosters genuine cooperation toward valuable ends, even when
that cooperation ends in failure.4° Speech or cooperation that fails to
advance any human good is not worthy of protection." 3 On the other
hand, speech that fosters genuine cooperation for valuable purposes,
as a general proposition, is worthy of protection.40 4 This means that
freedom of speech is not an absolute right. For example, communities
sometimes rightly place time, place, and manner regulations on
speech.405 Again, some speech and cooperation is clearly harmful and
deserves no protection whatsoever-such as "cooperating" statements
amongst co-conspirators in furtherance of a crime.40 6 Yet, even when
speech is less worthy of protection, prudential concerns about the po-
tential for government abuse in regulating speech might militate
395. Id. at 1156b25.
396. Id. at 1155a25-26, 1159b25; Aristotle's Political Philosophy, supra note 392, at
184.
397. See Unjust Laws, supra note 246, at 596.
398. See Ethics, supra note 5, at 1167a28-31.
399. See id. at 1167b3-5.
400. See Aristotle's Political Philosophy, supra note 392, at 187-89. Aristotle sug-
gests that "rulers may take into account the wishes of [the constituents] and in this
sense 'be ruled in turn' by them." Id. at 188. (citations omitted).
401. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 195.
402. See id.
403. Cooperation that is valueless should not be confused with cooperative efforts
that fail. In the case of cooperation that falls short of the goal, the cooperators still
realize the intrinsic value of friendship (to whatever degree), if only as a welcome side
effect. Moreover, initial failures often result in later success. See id.
404. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 197. For example, a unanimous
Supreme Court defended truly valuable speech in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,
463 (1958) (holding that an order compelling organization's membership list violated
members right to freedom of association because enforcement of order would impair
the ability of the organization and its members "to foster beliefs" and possibly "in-
duce members to withdraw ... and dissuade others from joining").
405. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (upholding ordinance
prohibiting raucous noises on residential streets).
406. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 199.
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against censoring some less worthy speech.4"7 This Note will address
some of the prudential considerations involved in the campaign fi-
nance debate in part IV.B.
Although not an absolute right, freedom of speech should "enjoy a
strong presumption.""4  Thus, speech restrictions are justified only
under one of the following three conditions:4°9 First, when the speech
is not of the kind that fosters genuine communication and coopera-
tion;410 second, when the speech in question fosters cooperation for
manifestly evil ends, as is true in the case of criminal conspiracies;41- '
and third, when the speech is "likely to result in serious harms or in-
justices" such as speech that reveals national security secrets.4 12
IV. APPLYING THE NATURAL LAW FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLE To
THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE DEBATE
Under the natural law free speech principle, political spending is
valuable because it facilitates genuine cooperation by citizens in their
various projects, commitments, and associations. Grounded in this
principle, this part turns first to an analysis of the virtue of the various
components of the Buckley holding. Then, this part criticizes the lat-
est effort in Congress to restrict political spending by individuals,
groups, parties and candidates.
A. The Buckley Decision Is Morally Correct
This sub-part addresses the major holdings of the Buckley decision
and defend them using the natural law free speech principle devel-
oped in the last part. First, this sub-part vindicates the Court's grant
of heightened constitutional protection to political spending. Then,
this sub-part defends the Court's limited acceptance of the corruption
justification and its outright rejection of the non-corruption rationale
offered by proponents of strict campaign finance rules.
407. See id.
408. Id. at 198.
409. Id at 198-99.
410. Id. This category includes speech that is gratuitously abusive or purely manip-
ulative. Id
411. Id. at 199.
412. Id. A free speech principle that ultimately depends on the value of the coop-
erative ends has the advantage of minimizing the unhelpful O'Brien speech/act frame-
work. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of O'Brien in the
campaign finance context. The value of speech is wholly unrelated to whether the
communication is considered traditional "speech" or an "act." See Making Men
Moral, supra note 4, at 205 (suggesting that many forms of speech can yield valuable
cooperation). The natural law free speech principle justifies both speech and action
that constitutes a genuinely cooperative pursuit of valuable ends.
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1. Political Spending Deserves Heightened Protection
Whether or not one accepts the definitional claim that political
spending constitutes "speech, ' 413 it is clear that political spending can
foster genuine cooperation for valuable ends. 414 Thus, although this
Note does not directly address the constitutional interpretation ques-
tion,"15 it is important to note, as the Buckley Court did, that political
spending can be as valuable as other forms of traditionally-protected
speech.416 As a result, the simplistic criticism of Buckley that money
does not equal speech4 17 fails to account for the practical necessity of
money in a large, mass-media-based political community that seeks to
genuinely and efficiently cooperate for the common good. Under a
regime of strict campaign financing, candidates would find themselves
with less resources to spend on everything from travelling the district
to meet constituents to purchasing media to communicate and
sharpen the candidate's message.418 Proposed campaign finance regu-
lations invariably provide disincentives for issue-oriented associations
to stay engaged with legislators and the public issues.4 19
In short, political communities require a substantial quantity of free
speech to function well. Political speech is justifiably at the "core" of
the free speech liberty because it fosters cooperation within the com-
munity as a whole.42 ° While the political community as an institution
or group of institutions is merely instrumentally valuable,42 1 the ac-
tions taken by members of the community in forming various political
and social relationships and in pursuing of specific political projects
instantiate both instrumental and intrinsic goods.422 All of the activi-
ties protected by the First Amendment provide a means by which two
413. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 817, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (rejecting strict scru-
tiny for limitations on political spending), affirmed in part and reversed in part, 424
U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
414. See The Real Truth About Federal Campaign Finance, supra note 158, at 783
(noting that PACs have contributed to increased minority representation in
Congress).
415. See Money and Politics, supra note 158, at 1053.
416. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam)("The First Amend-
ment affords the broadest protection to [political spending] in order 'to assure [the]
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people."' (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))).
417. See Wealth Primary, supra note 72, at 278.
418. See Faulty Assumptions, supra note 25, at 1060 (noting that less political
spending by a candidate yields a poorly-informed electorate).
419. See id. at 1076. Professor Smith states that PACs serve an important interest
by "monitoring" legislators that would be lost if their role were diminished. Cam-
paign finance reform, as currently proposed, would diminish this valuable role. See id.
It should be added that PACs not only "monitor" officeholders, but provide valuable
information to legislators on a particular issue that is important to the association. See
Specious Arguments, supra note 158, at 1275.
420. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 205.
421. See Liberalism and Natural Law Theory, supra note 281, at 693.
422. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 195.
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or more citizens can share their "interior thoughts" on political issues
of the day, or anything else, and act on them to the extent their goals
are in common.423 These actions often achieve instrumental goals.
More than that, the initiation, retention, and cultivation of these polit-
ical relationships, which is often aided and abetted by political spend-
ing, invariably yields some degree of friendship-a basic aspect of the
common good.424
Critics of Buckley scoff at the idea that forming, funding and other-
wise participating in an impersonal political organization, for example,
can do anything more than accomplish instrumental and often selfish
political goals.42 In response to this incredulity, it is worth quoting
the Congressional testimony of a member of the political "special in-
terest" known as EMILY's List426 to illustrate how political spending
can realize deeper goals:
When De Tocqueville wrote his famous chronicle of America, he
marveled at the rich civic life of this young nation, noting that
Americans seemed forever to be forming associations of one kind
or another, including political associations. My membership in EM-
ILY's List is a way for me to be connected to the political life of the
nation and to my fellow citizens; it allows me to band together with
others who share my views and work toward a common end. I do not
pretend to be a Constitutional scholar. But like most Americans, I
carry with me an almost innate knowledge of my First Amendment
rights of citizenship-freedom to practice religion, freedom to speak
my mind, freedom to assemble with fellow citizens in support of a
common goal. I believe without a doubt that my membership in
EMILY's List is secured by such rights.4 27
This citizen, admittedly no constitutional scholar and (in all likeli-
hood) no natural law theorist, nonetheless recognizes her "innate"
right to participate in the good of political "fellowship" with like-
minded citizens.4 1 She testified strongly against McCain-Feingold,
not because she thinks that money equals speech in some abstract
sense, but because she realizes that restrictions on political spending
erode her opportunity to work in harmony with her fellow citizens in
the pursuit of common ends.429
423. See id. at 194.
424. See id. at 196.
425. See Wealth Primary, supra note 72, at 276 (quoting Congressman Bernard
Sanders stating that the American political system is dominated by "greed and self-
interest of a ruling elite.").
426. EMILY's List is a political advocacy association that supports female Demo-
cratic candidates.
427. Campaign Finance Reform: Hearings on S. 1219 Before Senate Comm. on
Rules and Admin., 104th Cong. (Statement of Colonel Billie Bobbitt USAF (Retired)





Proponents of Buckley seek to foster robust discussion and effective
cooperation regarding matters that pertain to the well-being of the
political community.430 Most campaign spending goes for valuable ac-
tivities that involve sharing information with other citizens, 4 31 high-
lighting various injustices in the community, and, finally, persuading
other political actors to cooperate for the common good.432 All of the
above activities redound to the benefit of the intrinsic good of con-
cord-a species of friendship.433
An observer of the American political scene would possibly con-
clude that the American political community is rather "discordant" on
quite a few basic matters.434 He might, as a result, object to the posi-
tion that political participation-and political spending-yields even
the aspect of friendship known as concord. After all, the bitterness of
politics on certain issues seems to indicate that political action actually
produces disharmony, instead of the desired goal of unity regarding
the "essentials. ' '435 The natural law theorist, however, would not
reach this conclusion. No matter how bitterly divided citizens are on a
fundamental issue, present-day discord does not mean that concord is
not worthy of pursuit, or that citizens should abandon the goal of
unity around what is good. Rather than following a discordant path
and withdrawing from the debate, the natural law theorist recognizes
that the community will never fully participate in concord without
political action in this area. The very act of attempting to attain the
noblest aspects of concord through political action is itself a realiza-
tion of substantial intrinsic goods.
This is particularly true with respect to political action seeking to
correct injustice in the community.436 If the members of the political
community experience dramatic examples of injustice and discord, it
is political action, not passivity, that can blunt the effects of the discor-
dant acts.437 First, political action, including political spending, united
against injustice realizes cooperation and (partial) concord among
those who are so united.438 Second, political action and spending that
seeks unity around true principles of justice serves to blunt further
430. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 205.
431. See id. at 204. Free political speech enables "[p]eople who are likely to have
information and ideas relevant to good decision-making" to communicate with fellow
citizens and legislators to realize some good. Id.
432. See Faulty Assumptions, supra note 25, at 1090 (listing benefits of unregulated
political speech).
433. For an account of the good of concord, see supra notes 396-99 and accompany-
ing text.
434. See Unjust Laws, supra note 246, at 596-97. The abortion question reveals
discord in the American political community. See id. at 596-99.
435. See id. at 596-97.
436. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 196 n.2.
437. See Unjust Laws, supra note 246, at 599.
438. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 196.
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injustice.4 3 9 Third, political action/speech/spending that strives to rec-
tify injustice in the political community engages those with the oppos-
ing view and entreats them to provide reasons for their position."'
Professor George observes that,
Democrats and Republicans... sharply disagreeing over important
policy matters, may co-operate for the common good precisely by
engaging in debate over these matters fairly and in good faith ....
Bona fide criticism of putative injustice, whether or not it is on the
mark, is essential to the well-being of any political community and
to most other types of communities.441
Thus, political action can yield concord whether agreement on the es-
sential questions has fully materialized and whether the community
presently endures "putative injustices."'' 2 Liberal and conservative
"special interests" participate in the good of concord even when they
bitterly disagree on specific issues. This political action can, and often
does, have the salutary effect of nudging citizens to consult the "law
written on [their] hearts" and reconsider their positions." 3 The ilu-
mination of injustice thus provides additional, albeit related, reasons
why it is prudent to cultivate an environment of active and even vigor-
ous political participation. One way to ensure that this type of envi-
ronment exists is to avoid enacting chilling regulation that restricts the
ability of citizens to act on political matters.
Concord would seem, then, to justify a right to political speech and
political spending regardless of whether the community disagrees on
certain fundamental matters. A robust environment of political
spending promotes the kind of political action that is necessary to
achieve the goal of concord, especially when the community faces
grave injustices.' 4 Without political speech and political spending,
the citizenry remains powerless to effectuate both instrumental coop-
eration and cooperation for its own sake, whether in the form of com-
plete friendship, concord, or some other aspect of interpersonal
harmony.
439. See Unjust Laws, supra note 246, at 598.
440. See id.
441. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 196 fn.2.
442. See id.
443. See Unjust Laws, supra note 246, at 598.
444. As Professor George states, "discussion and debate are crucial to matters ...
[that] are morally important. [Indeed], [t]he avoidance (or rectification) of unjust or
otherwise immoral policies by people of goodwill is powerfully served by permitting,
indeed, encouraging, vigorous debate, criticism, and dissent." Making Men Moral,
supra note 4, at 202. This is why associations like the National Right to Life Commit-
tee remains unalterably opposed to efforts like McCain-Feingold to restrict political
spending. See Alison Mitchell, Foes of Abortion Split Sharply Over Campaign Finance
Bill, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1998, at A21 (reporting that the National Right to Life
Committee is "lobbying hard" against McCain-Feingold).
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2. The Court Properly Limited The Corruption Rationale
Naturally, not all political spending is for such noble purposes. 44
Sometimes a citizen gives, or a politician accepts, a contribution for
personal gain or favor; this is the scenario of the so-called quid pro
quo.44 6 The Supreme Court recognized this valueless form of speech
in Buckley when it accepted corruption as a compelling reason to up-
hold FECA's contribution limits (but not compelling with respect to
the expenditure restrictions).447 But critics of Buckley and advocates
of further campaign finance restrictions suggest that private political
contributions are-at least partially-per se tainted by corruption." 8
The coverage of political news, at times, suggests that Congressmen
and other politicians are regularly bought and sold.449 Critics of Buck-
ley often presume that the relationship between the modern political
contributor and the candidate amounts to nothing more than that of a
debtor and a creditor. 5 ° If the relationship is not as inherently cor-
rupting as critics of Buckley would suppose, then Buckley's limited
application of the corruption rationale can be defended plausibly.
Clearly, many unscrupulous contributors view their relationship as
some kind of quid pro quo.45 1 But, in reality, most of the relationships
between contributor and candidate are less like a debtor-creditor ar-
rangement and more akin to a benefactor-beneficiary relation-
ship411-a relationship that Aristotle considers an aspect of
445. See David E. Rosenbaum, Oilman Says He Paid for Access By Giving Demo-
crats $300,000, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1997, at Al, A29.
446. The lower court in Buckley cited an example in the 1972 campaign of large
contributions from dairy organizations to President Nixon in order to secure a meet-
ing with administration officials on price supports. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 817,
839 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (citing 1974 Report of the Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities S. Rep. No. 93-381 (1974)), affirmed in part and re-
versed in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
447. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
448. See Wealth Primary, supra note 72, at 274-76. Their conception of corruption
includes more than just the quid pro quo variety. Some argue that corruption in-
cluded the "effects that spending might have not only on the behavior of elected offi-
cials but on the electoral process itself." Specious Arguments, supra note 158, at 1270.
Under this theory, private wealth drowns out ordinary citizens. Id. at 1266-67. This
rationale is closely related to the equalization rationale. See id. at 1267; see also supra
note 79 (discussing corrupting effects of corporate wealth beyond mere quid pro quo
relationships). For some practical problems with this theory, see id. at 1266-69.
449. See Richard Benedetto, Media Too Quick to Buy Into Campaign Reform, USA
Today, Oct. 6, 1997, (noting title of CNN news special on campaign finance, "The
Money Trail: Democracy For Sale").
450. See Wealth Primary, supra note 72, at 276 (arguing that "well-heeled interests
.. buy political influence").
451. See Rosenbaum, supra note 445, at Al.
452. See Faulty Assumptions, supra note 25, at 1068-71. Citizens contribute money
essentially for one or more of the following reasons, according to Curtis Gans, direc-
tor of the Committee for the Study of the Electorate: "1. That they are friends with
the candidate or officeholder. 2. That the candidate or officeholder has views congru-
ent to the giver on one or more key issues. 3. That the opponent has views which are
anathema on one or more key issues. 4. To gain access to the candidate/officeholder
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friendship.45 3 It is of course true that most contributors favor certain
policies and contribute, and may seek access to, those candidates that,
if (re)elected, will likely advance these policies.45" Yet it is also true
that, more often than not, the money follows the policy position, not
the other way around.455 Candidates generally maintain a set of fairly
consistent positions that citizens can, with a little investigation, ascer-
tain (and then support or reject).
If there were hard evidence that money regularly "buys" votes or
evidence of rampant vote switching subsequent to well-placed polit-
ical donations, the danger of the quid pro quo would be more menac-
ing.456 The evidence, however, shows that Congressmen generally
to express one's interest and point of view." 143 Cong. Rec. S10105 (daily ed. Sept. 29,
1997) (statement of Sen. Bennett). Mr. Gans discounts the potential corrupting mo-
tive of even the fourth reason. According to Senator Bennett, Mr. Gans stated that:
[Alccess is different from influence even if money buys access. I think [the
American people] know that access to a leader comes from several different
sources-personal friendship, long-time loyalty, fame, grassroots citizen or-
ganization and money, and that money does not speak with one voice....
[T]he overwhelming majority of leaders are honorable leaders who arrive at
public policy decisions on a basis other that contributions. And that if there
is cynicism about the profession as a whole, it is not because of its actions,
but because they have been vilified by those who seek reform.
Id. Of the four above reasons to make a political contribution, only the last one is
potentially corrupting. If access is sought and granted by individuals with upright
intentions, even the fourth reason is a valid instance of cooperating for the common
good.
453. See Ethics, supra note 5, at 1167b17-1168a28.
454. Critics sometimes argue that wealthy interests can buy access to legislators
that ordinary citizens cannot. See Wealth Primary, supra note 72, at 274-75. Senator
Robert Smith (R-N.H.) concedes that he meets with contributors on occasions. See
144 Cong. Rec. 5897 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1998). Yet, he queries:
[H]ow about the other people who we help get their Social Security checks,
who we meet with every day or we speak to from this group or that group
who we never ask for anything, they never give us anything; we just help
them every day, day in and day out, hundreds of letters we answer, hundreds
of people we help in out constituent offices in our States. Nobody talks
about them. Nobody asks them for money. They can't give money. in most
cases. They just want good Government and some help.... If you put it out
there and balance it out, you find there is heck of a lot more people with
access to us who don't have money than people who do.
Id. (Statement of Sen. Smith).
455. See Faulty Assumptions, supra note 25, at 1068.
456. This is not to say that potential quid pro quo relationships never develop. See
Rosenbaum, supra note 445, at A28 (reporting a contribution to the Democratic Party
by a donor who unsuccessfully sought approval for an oil pipeline project). But the
critics of Buckley speak in terms of rampant corruption to justify their efforts. See
Curse of American Politics, supra note 21, at 24 (describing "corruption that inevita-
bly follows large-scale contributions"). If the corruption is not nearly as widespread
as they claim, then the justification for their efforts to change the campaign finance
laws is weak.
Critics may argue that they speak not only of quid pro quo corruption, but more
subtle corruption and the appearance of corruption. See supra note 448. This form of
corruption presumably takes the form of the "access" given to wealthy contributors
which can result in favorable legislation even without an explicit quid pro quo. Cor-
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base their legislative votes on ideology, party affiliation and constitu-
ent needs-not fund-raising opportunities.457 It is not surprising that
candidates maintain a rough consistency in their positions given the
existence of fund-raising opportunities on both sides of virtually any
significant issue of public policy. Even the largest corporate contribu-
tors must ultimately prevail on the merits of the issue-not the size of
the check.458
Thus, it is simply a gross overstatement that most political spending
takes the form of the debtor-creditor relationship. Aristotle recog-
nized, as critics of Buckley should, the difference between the debtor-
creditor relationship and the benefactor-beneficiary relationship. 9
At first glance, Aristotle concedes that the benefactor, in many ways,
appears to play a role similar to the creditor. 6 By the same token, it
may appear at first glance (especially to the cynical) that the contribu-
tor plays the role of the creditor. Under this scenario, the candidate is
the debtor who must "repay" the contributor in exchange for the con-
porate PAC contributions-from large tobacco companies, for example-are fre-
quently cited as an example of this more subtle form of corruption. Yet, even the
influence of wealthy corporate interests, like those of the tobacco lobby, seems to turn
on the merits of the public policy views that they espouse. Contributions from to-
bacco PACs did not prevent the Republican-controlled Senate Commerce Committee
from passing punitive anti-tobacco legislation in early 1998 by a vote of 19 to 1. See
Jill Abramson, Tobacco Industry Steps Up Flow of Campaign Money: Proposed Set-
tlement Leads to Record Giving Even as Political Opposition Grows, N.Y. Times, Mar.
8, 1998, at Al (noting that "[e]ven some top recipients of contributions over the last
seven years [including House Commerce Committee Chairman Thomas Bliley (R-
Virginia), a Republican representing a tobacco-intensive district] have joined a chorus
of industry critics"); Alison Mitchell, For Tobacco, A Big Gamble, N.Y. Times, Apr.
10, 1998, at Al, A16 (observing diminished level of political support in Congress for
tobacco companies); Jeffrey Taylor and Jeanne Cummings, Clinton, in Tobacco Terri-
tory, Chastises Cigarette Firms for Resisting Legislation, Wall St. J., Apr. 10, 1998, at
A12 (quoting House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Georgia) saying that tobacco lobby
has "zero" influence in Congress). Critics may respond by saying that contributions
from the tobacco lobby delayed certain members of Congress from acting in the pub-
lic interest on tobacco-related questions. At some point, however, the claim becomes
increasingly speculative and, consequently, loses force.
457. See Faulty Assumptions, supra note 25, at 1068. Professor Bradley Smith states
that "a substantial majority of those who have studied voting patterns on a systematic
basis agree that campaign contributions affect very few votes in the legislature." Id.
(citation omitted). It is noteworthy that the most criticized incident in the 1996 cam-
paign, at least from the perspective of Senators on the campaign finance investigation
committee and the media, was an oilman's $300,000 soft money contribution to the
Democratic Party to aid in his efforts to secure approval for his pipeline project. See
supra note 445. Although this contributor gained a brief meeting with President Clin-
ton, he never received approval for his project. Id. Thus, even this example of "ac-
cess" does not seem particularly "dangerous." See Robert J. Samuelson, Making Pols
Into Crooks: Campaign-Finance "Reform" Criminalizes Politics and Deepens Public
Cynicism, Newsweek, Oct. 6, 1997, at 53.
458. See The Real Truth About Federal Campaign Finance, supra note 158, at 783
(citing Robert J. Samuelson, The Price of Politics, Campaign Contributions Haven't
Corrupted Congress, Newsweek, Aug. 28, 1995, at 65.).
459. See Ethics, supra note 5, at 1167a28-33.
460. Id. at 1168a20-26.
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tributor's largesse. Yet, unlike creditors, benefactors seek more than
repayment: "benefactors love and like their beneficiaries even if they
are of no present or future use to them."46' Most contributors are,
like benefactors, pure of hearf. 62 While they may make contributions
with a specific policy (or more likely a specific policy direction) in
mind, they also do it for the sake of the candidate (and/or members of
the organization) and out of a genuine concern for the well-being of
their neighbors and the community at large. 63 Most people who con-
tribute to political campaigns would never consider their relationship
a mere debtor-creditor arrangement 6. 4 1 Indeed, the contributor-can-
didate relationship is not unlike the benefactor-beneficiary relation-
ship that Aristotle identified 2300 years ago as an instantiation of the
intrinsic good of friendship.
While the Court recognized that bribery attempts (the pure debtor-
creditor arrangement) are not worthy of protection, it also recognized
that a community requires a substantial amount of cooperation and
communication and, thus, political spending, to effectively function. 6 s
Thus, whether the Court drew the "corruption" line at precisely the
correct place, the Court was correct in not using the rationale as a
blunt instrument to inhibit otherwise valuable cooperative opportuni-
ties. The corruption rationale is simply not weighty enough to sustain
the expenditure limitations.4" If anything, the Buckley Court can be
perhaps criticized, as Justice Burger and Justice Thomas have 67 for
holding that the corruption rationale, in light of other quid pro quo
safeguards, justifies even the contribution restrictions. Immediate dis-
closure of large direct contributions seems to be a narrowly-tailored
remedy that serves to inform the voter of any potentially troubling
relationships," 8 while maintaining a robust environment of political
461. Id. at 1168a31-33.
462. See Pat Caplan Andrews, Confessions of a $25 Donor, N.Y. Times, March 17,
1997, at A15. For a discussion on why citizens contribute to political candidates, see
supra note 452.
463. See supra notes 389 and 452 and accompanying text.
464. The closest that the modem-day political contributor gets to a debtor-creditor
relationship seems to be the situation in which a particular interest group gives to
both political parties in order to "hedge their bet." In some cases, this relationship
may be not much more than an instance of instrumental friendship. Even in this
scenario, however, it is not inherently evil to give to both parties, when one's legiti-
mate interests (which presumably, in the case of a business PAC, include the interests
of shareholders, employees and other constituencies) are regularly at stake in Con-
gress. Truly genuine cooperative relationships can exist even under this scenario.
465. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) (citing benefits of
exchanging ideas, discussing candidacies, and robustly debating public issues).
466. See id at 48-49.
467. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
468. See 143 Cong. Rec. S100021 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Grams). Senator Grams argued that "[Ihf there are those in Congress or any place
else who would sell their integrity for a $2,000 contribution rather than representing




cooperation. Ultimately, corruption is not caused by the system of
campaign finance, but by the moral failings of individual citizens and
officeholders.469
3. Buckley Properly Rejected The Equalization Principle
Buckley can be defended against the other major criticism: that the
Court failed to recognize the egalitarian, "level-the-playing-field" ra-
tionale as compelling.470 The stated intention of the campaign finance
reformer, as evidenced by McCain-Feingold, is to increase the voice of
those without deep pockets.4 71 But McCain-Feingold achieves this
goal in only in a relative sense. Campaign finance restrictions in real-
ity do nothing to increase the voice, in any absolute sense, of those
with modest resources. The restrictions serve merely to bring every
citizen into roughly the same position-a position in which everyone
equally lacks opportunities for political cooperation! Thus, the ongo-
ing strategy of campaign finance "reformers" consists of "balancing
speech rights away" and viewing the First Amendment as "a liberta-
rian barrier to equality. 472
The natural law recognizes an equality principle under which the
fundamental dignity and equality of every human being is an indispen-
sable truth.473 This "universizable" principle474 forbids trading away
the fundamental rights of some in favor of others.475 Indeed, such fa-
voritism, even if "in the name of human rights," can only be the result
of a contorted view of "rights 4 76 as "sever[able] from the just require-
ments of morality and the common good., 477 Of course, it is not nec-
essarily true that forbidding the millionaire from writing a large check
for a political cause robs him of his "fundamental dignity and equal-
ity." The reality, however, is that worthwhile organizations, candida-
cies, and political causes need funding to flourish. To the extent that
campaign finance reform impedes these "subsidiary 4 78 organizations
from flourishing, it impoverishes the common good-and, therefore,
the rights of citizens.
469. See 144 Cong. Rec. S881 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1998) (statement of Sen. McCon-
nell). Senator McConnell quoted Professor Wendy Kaminer of Radcliffe College as
saying, "[dlirty politicians who sell access and lie to voters in campaign ads will not
suddenly become clean politicians when confronted with limits on contributions and
spending." Id.
470. See supra text accompanying note 75.
471. See 144 Cong. Rec. S1047 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1998) (statement of Sen. Glenn).
472. See Faulty Assumptions, supra note 25, at 1089.
473. See Statement of the Ramsey Colloquium, On Human Rights: The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights Fifty Years Later, First Things, Apr., 1998, at 18, 19
[hereinafter On Human Rights].
474. See supra note 321.
475. See On Human Rights, supra note 473, at 20.
476. For the natural law account of "rights," see supra part II.E.
477. See On Human Rights, supra note 473, at 20.
478. See infra note 534.
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As noted in part II.E, the ultimate goal of any community should be
the common good rather than some abstract and counterproductive
notion of equality.4 79 Natural law theorists criticize Professor Dwor-
kin and other liberal theorists for making this principle of equality
more fundamental than the first principles of natural law that refer to
the basic reasons for human action and serve as the starting point in
all moral reasoning.' Acting on the basis of equality should remain
instrumental to the bottom-line pursuit of the common good.48 1 This
common good-the full protection and realization of every basic as-
pect of human flourishing in each individual- --4 may or may not be
most fully advanced by equal distribution or treatment in any particu-
lar area.483
Thus, the merit of the redistribution of political influence can only
be determined by reference to its potential to foster valuable political
cooperation in each and every citizen.4" It is not at all clear-in fact,
it is quite improbable-that proposals to restrict spending across-the-
board on individuals, candidates, parties and associations in the name
of equality will produce an environment conducive to political cooper-
ation. History teaches that one individual or a small group of individ-
uals often can most effectively promote, at least initially, a worthy
political goal. Thus, a small group of wealthy contributors advanced
Senator Eugene McCarthy's "peace" campaign for President in
1968. 5 In that situation, few complained that "big money" or "une-
qual influence" corrupted the cause. Campaign finance restrictions
would impede this kind of valuable political cooperation, as well as
more grassroots-oriented political activity. The equalization strategy
does not seem likely to yield either the quantity or quality of political
participation that is possible under a regime that avoids strict cam-
paign finance restrictions. Thus, because the goal of equalization can
only be instrumental in a sound perfectionist theory and because the
reality of the American political community suggests that the equali-
zation strategy would have deleterious effects on the common good,
the Buckley Court correctly rejected this rationale.
On a more practical level, although the equalization rationale as
conceived by Professor Dworkin does not go so far as to require dis-
tribution of precisely equal rations of political influence and aims only
479. See supra notes 336-44 and accompanying text.
480. See supra note 338-44 and accompanying text.
481. See Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 174.
482. See supra text accompanying notes 336-38.
483. See Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 174.
484. Cf id. ("If redistribution means no more than that more beer is going to be
consumed morosely before television sets by the relatively many ... than it can
scarcely be said to be a demand of justice.").
485. Faulty Assumptions, supra note 25, at 1073; 144 Cong. Rec. S876 (daily ed.
Feb. 24, 1998) (statement of Sen. Bennett) (recalling testimony that had McCarthy
been limited to $1000 contributions, he could "never have been able to challenge
Lyndon Johnson" in 1968).
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for an ideal,486 it also does not speak to the other resources that are
often unevenly distributed in any political community: speaking abil-
ity, good looks, family reputation, and popularity. This suggests that
the goal of an equal right to political influence is illusory. For exam-
ple, Citizen A could give $10,000 to a candidate, while Citizen B can-
not afford to contribute any money to political campaigns. But
Citizen B, just because he cannot spend $10,000 on politics, does not
necessarily have less political influence than Citizen A. Citizen B may
regularly write letters to the editor, call in to political programs on C-
Span. sport a political bumper sticker on his car and volunteer time at
the candidate's phone bank and help drive supporters of the favored
candidate to the polls on election day. It is not clear anymore that
Citizen A still has more "influence" than Citizen B. The point is that
any meaningful equal participation principle does not seem feasible,
much less desirable, in a free society consisting of individuals with dif-
ferent talents and different interests.
From a natural law perspective, the fundamental flaw of the equali-
zation rationale is its reliance on a foundational equality principle that
appears constructed, not self-evident.487 As discussed earlier, the un-
derlying equality principle rests on a weak philosophical foundation in
which rights are separated from the requirements of the common
good.488 Under McCain-Feingold, a citizen would presumably be
comforted by the notion that, while he cannot cooperate politically
with other individuals, candidates, parties and groups to the extent he
may want to, no one else can either. McCain-Feingold tramples on
citizens' cooperative rights in the pursuit of some abstract, and ulti-
mately impossible, "level playing field." Thus, a legislator, consistent
with Buckley, is morally correct to reject the "equalization" rationale
as the moral basis of strict campaign finance laws.
4. The Court Properly Rejected The "Too Much Money"
Argument
As mentioned in part II.B., the Buckley Court also rejected the ar-
gument that the American political community is awash in too much
money.489 Money is a neutral instrumental good. When individuals
and associations use money for genuinely valuable purposes, too
much money, all other things being equal, is better than too little.
Thus, there can only be "too much" of it if it is being used for immoral
purposes. But, as argued in the last sub-part, while the occasional
contribution is tainted, most political spending is valuable. Once one
486. See Curse of American Politics, supra note 21, at 23 (noting that his ideal of
self-government "will never be perfectly fulfilled" in a "pluralistic contemporary
society").
487. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 86.
488. See supra notes 336-44 and accompanying text.
489. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
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realizes that political spending serves an important function in the
well-being of the citizenry, the cry of "too much" money rings rather
hollow. Indeed, this argument is merely illustrative of an instinct on
the part of critics of Buckley to attack political spending rather
indiscriminately.
Once again, the question must be asked: how much money is
"proper"? Due to the substantial human goods that can be realized
by individuals and associations that spend money on politics, the bet-
ter course is to follow the Buckley Court and leave these determina-
tions to the people themselves. The total amount of money spent for
all offices in 1996 was roughly $4 billion, or less than 1/20th of 1% of
the country's gross domestic product ("GDP"), which works out to
approximately 20% of what Americans spend on dry cleaning and
laundry.4 90 After accounting for all of the sundry coordination
problems that involve all the various requirements of the common
good in a diverse nation with such a large GDP, the amount of money
spent on politics does not appear as threatening. As political science
professor Herbert E. Alexander of the University of Southern Califor-
nia testified before Congress:
[T]here are no universally accepted criteria by which to determine
where political campaign spending becomes excessive. No one
knows precisely how much is too much, but it is clear that we spend
a lot more on other endeavors, many of them arguably less impor-
tant to the welfare of the republic than choosing our government
leaders.49'
Unless one views Congressmen as hopelessly corrupt or political mat-
ters just not that weighty, one has little reason to accept the argument
that there is "too much" money in politics.
B. McCain-Feingold Is Practically Unreasonable
This subpart examines the major provisions of the McCain-Feingold
Bill, mindful of the basic perfectionist rationale for protecting catego-
ries of speech from government restriction and comfortable that
Buckley was rightly decided. First, this subpart focuses on the pro-
posed "voluntary" ceilings on overall spending by candidates. Then,
this subpart assesses the merit of McCain-Feingold's restrictions on
issue advocacy and other expenditures by political associations.
490. See 143 Cong. Rec. S10,719 (daily ed. Oct. 9. 1997) (statement of Sen.
Roberts).
491. See Campaign Finance Reform: Hearings on S. 1219 Before the Senate Com-
mittee on Rules and Administration, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Herbert E. Al-





As explained in part II.D., the intermediate requirements of practi-
cal reasonableness provide that one should remain open to each of the
basic human goods.49 2 This rule most obviously prohibits choices that
directly attack a basic good: no direct taking of innocent life, no lying
when the truth matters, no adultery, etc.493 But most of the time vio-
lations of this rule involve a "discounting" or insufficient regard for
one or more basic human goods. 4 94 Of course, this rule does not
mean, as some might suppose, that one has the duty to take up every
opportunity to participate in a basic human good. Inevitably, in
whatever choice one makes or project one pursues, one chooses to
realize one or more basic values at the expense of others.495
McCain-Feingold's spending restrictions, like most of the other ma-
jor provisions of the bill, violate this intermediate requirement of
practical reasonableness by paying insufficient regard to the intrinsic
value of cooperation that political spending often yields. McCain-
Feingold, as noted in part I.D.2., induces candidates to adhere to
spending limits by offering a generous set of benefits to complying
candidates and by punishing non-complying candidates. 96 Yet, candi-
date expenditures are a primary means for the candidate to communi-
cate, and ultimately cooperate, with his constituency.497 Expenditure
limitations inherently inhibit to some degree the ability of a candidate
to explain a difficult vote, respond to a critical editorial or otherwise
communicate, and cooperate with the citizenry on crucial public policy
issues.4 98 This, in turn, detracts from the aspect of concord that deals
specifically with friendship between "rulers and ruled.,,499 This dy-
namic involves the candidate listening and speaking to his constituents
and, ultimately, cooperating with them."°
492. See supra note 320.
493. See supra notes 320 and 324 and accompanying text.
494. See Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 105-06.
495. See id. at 100.
496. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
497. See 143 Cong. Rec. S10,010 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Bennett).
498. See Faulty Assumptions, supra note 25, at 1061 (noting that spending caps
could prevent a candidate from responding to negative advertising by his opponent
late in the campaign).
499. See Aristotle's Political Philosophy, supra note 392, at 189; Ethics, supra note
5, at 1161a11-14, 32-34.
500. This dynamic includes communicating and cooperating through political ad-
vertisements on television. Consider the following experience of Senator Bennett:
I am currently spending all the money that I am currently raising in building
[a grassroots] organization.... It is going right now into building a precinct-
by-precinct, voting-district-by-voting-district campaign organization so that
if I have no money for television, I have at least one person for every 10 or
20 households who will go out and knock on doors on my behalf.... How-
ever, my personal experience says that I cannot energize these folks without
some ads on television. I can gave them all the letters, I can give them all
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Thus, once the rationale for free speech is considered, it is clear that
the Buckley Court was entirely justified in giving heightened protec-
tion to political spending and striking down FECA's spending limits.
Expenditure restrictions, whether induced or imposed directly, curtail
the ability of the candidate and the citizenry to cooperate for the sake
of shared political goals-and for the sake of interpersonal harmony
(or concord) itself. As such, McCain-Feingold's spending limits in-
fringe upon the "rights" 0' of both candidates and citizens. It is no
doubt true that supporters of spending limits are hoping to realize
some goods-fairness and confidence in government-even if their
proposals are off-the-mark. But, even conceding good intentions, the
legislator, truly receptive to all the basic goods, would address unfair-
ness and cynicism more creatively-and thus more reasonably-than
by limiting candidates' and citizens' cooperative rights.
Furthermore, supporters of McCain-Feingold arguably can be
charged with not merely neglecting a basic human good, but acting
directly against it.5 02 The rule provides that one should never choose
an act that directly attacks a basic good, either as an end in itself or as
a means.50 3 The basic concept of McCain-Feingold is to suppress the
political spending ability of some (candidates, outside issue groups,
parties) to achieve certain goals, namely enhancing the relative polit-
ical voice of others, guarding against corruption, and reducing the
amount of money in politics in general. In other words, the professed
goals are attained only by impeding the genuine cooperative rights of
others.5 4
the phone calls, I can tell them all how wonderful they are, but until they see
something on the screen, they are not convinced I am a serious candidate...
. At the same time, my experience in the last campaign is that when there
were ads attacking me, I found that the general public did not pay any atten-
tion to them and did not care. But my own troops all panicked until I was
able to get back on television and answer those ads.... By the same token, I
am told by my opponent's people ... that it was one of my ads puncturing
my opponent's attack on me that took all the starch out of their door-to-
door grassroots organization.... So, these things play hand in hand.
143 Cong. Rec. S10,010 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997) (statement of Sen. Bennett).
501. See supra part II.E. for an examination of "rights" in natural law theory.
502. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17 (1976) (per curiam) (noting that govern-
ment interest in limiting political spending "arises mainly because the communication
[(or more precisely, the quantity of communication)] is itself thought to be harmful."
(quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968))).
503. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
504. This is a familiar strategy by the "reformers." See Faulty Assumptions, supra
note 25, at 1089. The relevant ethical question is whether spending limits directly
attack the good of cooperation or whether proponents of McCain-Feingold really in-
tend to impair the good of cooperation as a means to their professed ends. Philoso-
phers address this kind of dispute with the "doctrine of double effects." See Rights
and Wrongs, supra note 9, at 102-12. The doctrine helps determine whether the bad
effects of an individual's act were intended either as the end or the means to the end.
See Rights and Wrongs, supra note 9, at 102-03. If an individual chooses the ill effects
either as the ends or the means, the individual has acted immorally by violating the
requirement not to choose to directly damage a basic good. See A Reply, supra note
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Even if it could be plausibly argued that supporters of McCain-
Feingold do not improperly intend to suppress legitimate political co-
operation as a means to some other goal, the spending limits appear to
transgress other requirements of practical reasonableness. Even if
one grants the legitimacy of the corruption-deterring goal of McCain-
Feingold, the efficiency rule50 5 warns the proponents of spending lim-
24, at 313. For a discussion of this requirement of practical reasonableness, see supra
note 324. One can posit two scenarios that might help determine whether proponents
of McCain-Feingold choose the contra-cooperative effects of spending limits either as
an end or a means. In the first scenario, the cash-strapped school board grudgingly
eliminates the budget for new library books to constrain costs and remain operational.
The school board's goal is noble: it wants to remain solvent so as to continue educat-
ing the students (thus choosing a contra-knowledge act for the sake of realizing the
good of knowledge). Here, one could confidently say that the contra-knowledge ef-
fects of a poorly-stocked library, in light of the budgetary constraints, were chosen
merely as unfortunate, incidental side effects. See Rights and Wrongs, supra note 9, at
103 (addressing this question in the abortion context). Thus, the school board did not
choose the bad effects either as an end or a means. The relevant question is, "if
presented with an option in which the anti-knowledge effects could be averted with-
out the school becoming insolvent, would the school board have chosen it?" See A
Reply, supra note 24, at 313 (asking a similar question to determine whether halting a
sporting event in the event of a bomb threat is a direct act against the basic good of a
skilled performance). In the hypothetical, it is clear that the school board would not
have cut the library budget if it were not faced with crisis. In the second scenario, the
school board forbids (or restricts) certain well-performing students from using the
library in order to enhance the self-esteem of poorly-performing students (by allowing
them, in effect, to "catch up"). Or perhaps the goal of the second school board is to
equalize the intellectual abilities or the student body or even to ensure that each stu-
dent could "participate on equal terms in formal politics and in the informal cultural
life that creates the moral environment of the community." See Curse of American
Politics, supra note 21, at 21. In this case, one can posit that the contra-knowledge
aspect of the decision, while not intended as the end, was likely intended as the
means. The banishment from the library is more than merely a foreseen and unde-
sired side-effect. Thus, it is fair to say that the school board acts immorally when it
chooses to enhance the self-esteem or the intellectual abilities or the political influ-
ence of some students, by barring the pursuit of knowledge by well-performing stu-
dents (at least in the library). The second school board's decision was not out of
budgetary necessity as it was in the first scenario. The choice in the second case is
immoral because, unlike the school board in the first case, it wills the affront on the
good of knowledge as the precise means to achieving some other goods.
This Note does not aim to resolve the complex issues surrounding the rule of
double effects. It is only to suggest that the theory behind McCain-Feingold's spend-
ing limits and, indeed, most campaign finance restrictions as proposed over the years,
is not unlike that of the second school board. In fact, as noted above, the rationales of
the second school board and the proponents of McCain-Feingold could be precisely
the same. The second school board could bar the good students from the library to
prevent them from becoming too articulate or knowledgeable so as to have a dispro-
portionate influence in the political community. (After all, it is difficult to see how
one's intellectual capacities bear any less directly on one's ability to influence the
political community than one's fund-raising prowess. Moreover, it is evident that in-
tellectual abilities, including oratorical skills, often bear directly on fund-raising abil-
ity.) In both cases, a rigid egalitarian goal is attained precisely through the
curtailment of someone else's rights. The more reasonable solution in both cases,
however, is to find a way to enhance the political influence (or intellectual abilities or
self-esteem) of the less well-off citizens without depriving others of their rights.
505. See supra note 323.
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its to use the most narrowly-tailored means to advance the stated
goals." 6 If circumstances compel legislators to substantially limit the
opportunities for valuable political cooperation, they should limit only
what they have to. As noted in part IV.A.2., it seems that the most
efficient deterrent is instantaneous disclosure of contributions above a
certain threshold. That way, the voters (and the prosecutors) can
readily determine who contributes what to whom and for what re-
sult.50 7 If a voter feels that his Senator is too beholden to contribu-
tions from large tobacco companies, for example, he can vote
accordingly. Sweeping measures like spending limits apply indiscrimi-
nately to illegitimate and appropriate political spending alike, violat-
ing this requirement. Thus, even assuming a corruption-fighting
motivation on the part of the "reformers," they violate the efficiency
rule by proposing a too-sweeping response.
In addition to the corruption rationale, advocates of spending limits
often justify their bill as a way to level the playing field between in-
cumbents and challengers.5 0 8 But proponents fail to realize that in-
cumbents start out with enormous advantages:5 09 Incumbents enjoy
name recognition, the "power of the purse," and franking privileges to
name just a few advantages. Sharp spending limits, like those pro-
posed in McCain-Feingold, will likely have the unintended conse-
quence of protecting incumbents and penalizing challengers.510
Studies indicate that it is not overall campaign spending that deter-
mines how successful a challenger is. Rather, the key to a strong chal-
lenge is, not spending more than the incumbent, but by spending a
certain minimum threshold.51' In many cases, the spending limits
would penalize challengers by not allowing them to reach the mini-
mum threshold. 12 More money generally produces more competitive
races.5 13 And, as outlined in part M, vigorous, even bruising, political
debate realizes to some extent the good of cooperation.5 14
Finally, in a time of increased political apathy and low voter turn-
out, one should not, as Professor Dworkin does, lightly brush aside
concerns that expenditure restrictions would further reduce the diver-
sity and depth of the political debate. Today's political debate, as Pro-
506. See supra note 323.
507. Newspapers and public watchdog organizations play a critical role in this dis-
closure process. For example, the New York Tunes and other news organizations
hired a private contractor to better keep track of campaign contribution records.
About the Campaign Database, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1998, at 40. The ability of voters
to access this information-and decide for themselves whether a candidate is
"bought"-lessens the need for broader efforts to deter the quid pro quo.
508. See Curse of American Politics, supra note 21, at 19.
509. See Faulty Assumptions, supra note 25, at 1072-75.
510. Id. at 1074.
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. Id. at 1072-75.
514. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at 196 n.2.
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fessor Dworkin rightly observes, too often dissolves into sound-bites
and attack advertising.5 15 It should be added that what little political
coverage the news media provides (particularly on the major televi-
sion networks), consists mainly of "horse-race" analysis (who's ahead
in the polls?) instead of substantive examination of the issues (what
are their positions?).5 16 As a result, candidates increasingly need to
go outside the mainstream media to get their message out. Spending
limits invariably weaken the candidates ability to convey his message
unfiltered-which turns out to be a bigger concern for challengers
than incumbents. 17
Part of the motivation of proponents of spending limits is no doubt
to limit "negative advertising" by candidates."' Although Professor
Dworkin derides negative advertising,1 9 this form of political speech
is valuable because it educates the voter, even if in crude terms. 20
Studies have shown that increased campaign spending, even on nega-
tive advertising, results in a more informed electorate.52' This educa-
tion is the first step in the political cooperation process. If nothing
else, a negative advertisement can identify an issue or a proposal to
the voter. Moreover, it does not follow that less money in politics will
result in less negative campaigns. 522 Some commentators have argued
that the current low contribution limits have in part caused candidates
to turn to negative advertising. With less access to resources, candi-
dates must turn to the most cost-effective campaign tactic-often neg-
ative ads. 523 Even if a connection exists between liberal spending
limits and negative campaigning, mere crudeness in political advertis-
ing does not seem to be justification for a wholesale limitation of
political speech rights.
515. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
516. See 143 Cong Rec. S10,454-55 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kohl).
517. See 143 Cong Rec. S10,008 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997) (statement of Sen. Ben-
nett). Senator Bennett explains the logic:
The best way you can help the challenger in the field of money is to allow
the challenger to raise more money than the incumbent. If you level the
playing field and say to the challenger ... you cannot raise any more money
than the incumbent but the incumbent starts out with all of the name recog-
nition, and the years of going to Rotary Clubs and bar mitzvahs, all of the
staff paid for by the taxpayers available to him, all of the record of answering
letters and doing favors and congressional constituent service ... you have
decapitated the challenger and guaranteed that the incumbent is going to get
reelected in virtually every circumstance.
Id. (Statement of Sen. Bennett).
518. See Curse of American Politics, supra note 21, at 19.
519. See id. (calling political advertisements "negative, witless, and
condescending").
520. See Faulty Assumptions, supra note 25, at 1060-61.
521. See id. at 1060.
522. See id. at 1061.
523. See id.
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Negative ads that are manifestly untruthful or purely manipulative
are obviously immoral.5 24 Nevertheless, certain amounts of exaggera-
tion and blustering are customary in political campaigning and should
be permitted.' z Here, newspapers play useful roles when they
"breakdown" political advertisements for their accuracy. Outright lies
should be vigorously condemned. Nevertheless, it is in the interest of
the common good to allow robust debate, even in the often crude and
exaggerated terms of political negative advertising. Political advertis-
ing often serves to highlight various injustices, or to merely present
alternative policy proposals. Perfectionist theorists note that, even
when criticism is off the mark, the default rule should favor a robust
environment for criticism. 26
2. Restrictions on Issue Advocacy By Non-Candidates
As observed in part I, McCain-Feingold seeks to reduce the "influ-
ence" of outside political organizations including PACs and other is-
sue-advocates. The bill, in its original form,527 would ban PACs from
contributing to federal candidates entirely.-" In addition, the bill
cracks down on expenditures made by political associations on their
own behalf by subjecting these expenditures to chilling disclosure re-
quirements and other restrictions. 2 9 By proposing these restrictive
provisions, proponents of McCain-Feingold exhibit a hostility to, or at
least a neglect of, the valuable aspects of political cooperation that
pertain to the activities of these political associations.
In recent years, "PACs" and "special interests" have become pejo-
rative terms.530 But PACs and issue-oriented political associations
are, in one sense, pure units of valuable political cooperation. PACs
and other political associations allow citizens of modest means to pool
their resources to promote the common good.5 3' The provisions limit-
524. Cf. Making Moral, supra note 4, at 198-99 (giving example of manipulative
advertising that "induce[s] anxious elderly people to invest in sham life-insurance
policies").
525. See David Tell, In Praise of Dirt, Campaigning, Wkly. Standard, July 8-15,
1996, at 9-10 ("It's a seductive impulse, this sense that modern politics would be bet-
ter if less rambunctious and smaller, its layers of 'dirt' removed.").
526. See Making Men Moral. supra note 4, at 196.
527. See supra note 192.
528. See supra note 208.
529. See supra note 217.
530. See 143 Cong. Rec. S10,011 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997) (statement of Sen. Ben-
nett joking that "special interest" is "a group that is against what I am trying to do.").
531. This conclusion holds whether the political association's view of the require-
ments of the common good are off-the-mark. See Making Men Moral, supra note 4, at
196 n.2. Again, associations, candidates, and parties almost always realize the good of
concord by debating the requirements of the common good openly and fairly. Id.
Almost all political action aims to correct a perceived injustice, thus instantiating the
first component of concord which consists of unity around true principles of justice.
See supra notes 396-99 and accompanying text. Most political groups that McCain-
Feingold seeks to restrict evidence an intent to strive for true principles of justice,
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ing the amount and manner in which these associations can spend to
further various cooperative efforts are unjust for the same basic rea-
sons that the restrictions on candidate expenditures are. Both sets of
restrictions neglect or openly attack the basic human good of coopera-
tion-which is an constitutive aspect of every citizen's well-being.
This is why the courts have so jealously guarded issue advocacy.5 32
Recently, for example, the European Court of Human Rights ruled
that an English law restricting the political spending of non-candidates
to five pounds violated the right to expression under the European
Convention on Human Rights.533
The movement to diminish the influence of PACs and other political
associations undermines the natural law principle of "subsidiarity. ' 534
The principle recognizes that:
[T]he proper function of association is to help the participants in the
association to help themselves or, more precisely, to constitute
themselves through the individual initiatives of choosing commit-
ments (including commitments to friendship and other forms of as-
sociation) and of realizing these commitments through personal
inventiveness and effort in projects (many of which will, of course,
be co-operative in execution and even communal in purpose).535
This principle grants responsibility to those smaller and more private
organizations and communities that are closest to the persons whose
well-being is at stake.536 These organizations serve, as the state does,
to promote the collective good in their particular "spheres of
influence. 537
So while candidates and the media have their own spheres, they
should exhibit due respect for the spheres of political associations.
PACs and outside organizations maintain a "sphere of influence" that
serves multiple benefits. First, they provide a vehicle to effectuate
joint political participation in pursuit of instrumental goods-which
precisely because it is a common effort, invariably realizes interper-
sonal goods-often the species of friendship known as concord. Sec-
ond, these organizations provide expertise in a particular area and
even if these groups sometimes incorrectly perceive injustice where it does not exist
or perceive justice when injustice reigns. The ability of political associations to speak
out and act on various injustices-real or imagined-validates the second component
of concord, see supra note 396 and accompanying text, which is concerned with an
open and fair decision-making process.
532. See supra note 64.
533. See John Mason, Court Lifts Curb on Activists' Election Spending, Fin. Times,
Feb. 20, 1998, at 22.
534. See Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra note 3, at 169. The principle of
subsidiarity is a requirement of justice in natural law theory. Id. The principle is de-
rived from the requirement that one should foster the common good, id. at 125, and,
to a lesser extent, the rule requiring efficiency. See id. at 146-47, 159.
535. Id. at 146.
536. See On Human Rights, supra note 473, at 21.
537. Id.
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highlight potential injustices in that area-both to the legislators and
the community at large.538 Thus, these organizations fulfill their
proper subsidiary role of advancing the common good. This dual role
often necessarily includes uniting around certain proposals and candi-
dates in the form of political participation which invariably involves
some form of political contribution or expenditure. Thus, it is reason-
able to conclude that "regulation of these associations should never
(in the case of the associations with a non-instrumental common
good) or only exceptionally (in case of instrumental associations) be
intended to take over the formation, direction or management of
these personal initiatives and interpersonal associations.."5 39 McCain-
Feingold, with its flat prohibition of even modest contributions by
PACs and its harsh restrictions on independent expenditures and issue
advocacy, detracts from, rather than promotes, the principle of sub-
sidiarity by diminishing the role that these (instrumental) associations
play.
Many PACs and other grass-roots organizations will find their vital
role as political participators limited by the provisions in McCain-
Feingold. As noted in part I.D., McCain-Feingold would subject valu-
able issue advocacy to regulation under FECA. In the latest draft of
McCain-Feingold, Congress would restrict these outside advocacy
groups from political advertising which uses the name or likeness of a
candidate within 60 days of the election.1 0 This rather Orwellian con-
cept-censoring criticism at the time when it matters most-is incrim-
inating evidence of unreasonableness on the part of proponents of
McCain-Feingold.
For this reason, some of the largest grass-roots political organiza-
tions stand most strongly opposed to McCain-Feingold.1" Most of
these organizations are single-issue groups that will associate wvith cer-
tain candidates only to the extent that the candidate supports their
issue. As pure issue groups, these organizations-the Christian Coali-
tion, the National Right to Life Committee, the Sierra Club, the Farm
Bureau-pose virtually no threat of corruption and, instead, seek to
unite the political community around certain principles of justice.
Their activities invariably realize both aspects of concord: the activi-
ties promote united action around the requirements of the common
good and the activities validate an open and largely democratic deci-
sion-making process in which subsidiary associations serve a role in
shaping the common good.
538. See Specious Arguments, supra note 158, at 1275.
539. See Law, Morality and Sexual Orientation, supra note 9, at 34.
540. See supra notes 221-27 and accompanying text.
541. See 143 Cong. Rec. S10359 (daily ed. Oct. 6. 1997) (statement of Sen. McCon-
nell) (inserting article by James Bopp, Jr., citing the efforts of the Free Speech Coali-




If newspaper editors could only spend a limited sum to disseminate
their publication or were forced to register with the FEC, for example,
they would be rightly outraged. It is not surprising, then, that political
associations have expressed outrage at McCain-Feingold and have vig-
orously assailed the proposal as an infringement of their rights. Advo-
cacy groups from all parts of the ideological spectrum formed an
organization called the Free Speech Coalition to ward off proposals
such as McCain-Feingold.542 The coalition represents over fifty non-
profit organizations "from the American Conservative Union to the
Fund for the Feminist Majority. 54 3 The joint opposition from such a
various collection of groups should cause proponents of McCain-Fein-
gold to question whether they are not transgressing legitimate rights
of citizen groups.544 If they would put themselves "in the shoes" '45 of
the diverse members of the Free Speech Coalition, they would per-
haps realize that the proposed restrictions will indeed restrict the co-
operative opportunities of these vital organizations.
It is tempting for politicians to try to muzzle outside advocacy orga-
nizations whose primary purpose, in many cases, is to criticize the pol-
itician's voting record. But there is nothing inherently evil about
outside issue-advocacy organizations attempting to influence the polit-
ical process-through voter guides, independent political advertising
or by developing relationships with legislators. These issue organiza-
tions are not influential because their members are wealthy; rather, it
is because these groups have thousands, even millions, of members
who cooperate by donating small amounts. McCain-Feingold's treat-
ment of issue advocacy is clear and convincing evidence of an intent
on the part of its sponsors to shirk the requirements of the common
good, among which include promoting instrumental and intrinsic co-
operation among the citizenry.
McCain-Feingold's ban on soft money should undergo the same
analysis as the restrictions on issue advocacy. Banning soft money
means that political parties would be severely restricted in their ability
to engage in issue advocacy or otherwise spend money to influence
the political process.546 It is difficult to see for what other purposes
the political parties exist.
542. See 143 Cong. Rec. S10359 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1997) (statement of Sen. McCon-
nell) (inserting article by James Bopp, Jr., citing the efforts of the Free Speech
Coalition).
543. Id.
544. See Mitchell, supra note 444. (reporting that National Right to Life Committee
viewed McCain-Feingold's issue advocacy restriction as "crippling" to the pro-life
movement).
545. See supra note 321.
546. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Supporters of the McCain-Feingold seek to capitalize on current
headlines and tap into public cynicism. In so doing, they are acting
with shortsightedness. Supporters of McCain-Feingold will no doubt
be able to find plenty of public cynicism directed at government and
politicians to exploit. But the American people deserve sound poli-
cies that conform to all the rules of practical reasoning, not rash re-
form efforts that make good sound bites but would produce undesired
consequences. Defenders of Buckley are not naive enough to think
that the current system is flawless. Nor is anyone naive enough to
think that the ideal that is portrayed in these pages-the modest con-
tributor joining an association to advance true principles of justice,
and, in the process, forming meaningful friendships with fellow citi-
zens-is always and everywhere fulfilled. Nevertheless, current cam-
paign finance proposals, untrue to the spirit of Buckley, move away
from this ideal instead of toward it.
Critics of Buckley working in the liberal tradition seek to impose a
comprehensive set of regulations that would seriously stifle genuinely
valuable political cooperation. In so doing, they violate the require-
ments of practical reasoning. The "reformers" clearly do not suffi-
ciently consider the intrinsic value of cooperation realized in a more-
or-less unregulated campaign finance environment. By promoting
equality to a foundational principle, by exaggerating the pervasiveness
of corruption, and by allowing Congress to determine how much polit-
ical cooperation is allowed in an election cycle, critics of Buckley
short-change the well-being of every "political animal."
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